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PREFACE
This dissertation vnll focus on the subject of Soviet-American
detente. It will be demonstrated that the detente policy has caused
a good deal of confusion regarding its true meaning both in theory
and in practice. After analyzing the most significant schools of
thought and different viewpoints in regard to detente, this disserta-
tion will pose three major hypotheses. These hypotheses will address
what this writer feels are the most critical aspects of Soviet-American
detente and will be assessed throughout the body of this study. This
dissertation will place specific emphasis on the Soviet perception of
detente and, accordingly, will rely heavily on primary Soviet source
documentation
.
The first hypothesis will present the belief that detente was
a political strategy that was created solely by the U.S.S.R. Furthermore,
the Soviet leadership designed detente on the basis of revolutionary
Marxist-Leninist ideology; an ideology that serves as an important factor
in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. It will be shown that detente
was not a policy that was developed jointly by the United States and
the U.S.S.R. Rather, detente was conceived, implemented, and updated
by the Soviet Union as a means by which long-term ideological
objectives
could best be accomplished. The United States, in the Soviet
view,
never willingly agreed to the conditions of detente that were
established
by the Soviet Union. The Soviets argue that the United
States continually
opposed the Soviet policy of detente and chose the
unfriendly cold war
posture as an alternative to the Soviet policy of
peace. It was only upon
iv
reassessing the objective reality of the realignment of world forces in
favor of socialism, the growing might of the Soviet Union, and the inherent
weakening of and contradictions in the imperialist system that the United
States was forced to accept the Soviet policy of detente.
The Soviet Union not only created detente but built the policy
on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. That ideology has done
much to define the scope and purpose of Soviet foreign policy in general
and detente in particular. Detente was not specifically created as a
means by which short-term objectives could be realized or the cause of
Soviet national interest served. Rather, historical evidence suggests that
detente was designed as the catalyst by which long-term goals could be
achieved and the cause of communist ideological objectives addressed. Thus,
a presentation will be made in regard to the conflicting schools of thought
on the subject of ideology. It will be argued that the central core of
detente, a commitment to the ideological goal of the worldwide victory
of socialism, has remained in existence throughout the long history of
Soviet-American detente.
The second major hypothesis presents the belief that detente was
created by V.I. Lenin in 1918, and has remained a constant factor in Soviet
foreign policy to this day. Hence, a detailed study of the history of
detente will be presented. It will be shown that Lenin designed detente
as a means by which to accomplish eight (8) primary objectives. Detente
provided the breathing spell, a respite in war, by which Lenin could con-
solidate internal strength. Detente allowed Lenin to survive as an "oasis"
in a sea of capitalist-imperialist adversaries. Detente gave Lenin the
means by which he could best prepare for the inevitable East-West military
confrontation. Detente provided the means by which Lenin could best
forestall the inevitable anti-Soviet alliance of imperialist nations.
V
Detente afforded Lenin the opportunity to secure much needed Western,
and specifically American, economic assistance. Detente provided the
means by which Lenin could exploit the existing contradictions within the
imperialist camp. Most importantly, detente provided the fulcrum by
which Lenin would achieve his ultimate goal of transforming the world in
the socialist order.
It will be shown that Stalin and Khrushchev adhered to and
implemented the policy of detente as established by Lenin. While making
basic alterations in the policy, both Stalin and Khrushchev maintained
the nucleus of detente and formulated Soviet foreign policy on the
basis of the detente strategy. It will also be demonstrated that Leonid
Brezhnev has maintained both the historical and ideological continuity
of detente to this day. Evidence will be presented to support the thesis
that the detente of Brezhnev is far more effective than that of any of
his predecessors by virtue of the more advantageous and powerful position
of the Soviet Union in world affairs. It will be shown that the achievement
of strategic parity by the Soviet Union and the augmented ranks of the
socialist commonwealth have made detente a very aggressive and highly
successful Soviet strategy. It will then be suggested that detente, while
maintaining the central objective of a worldwide socialist victory, has
been transformed from a defensive ploy to an offensive weapon.
The third major hypothesis will posit the belief that the Soviet
policy of detente has posed a serious threat to the interests of the
United States. It will be shown that the stated objectives of detente
are inimical to the United States and were designed to accrue unilateral
advantages to the cause of world socialism. Moreover, the acceptance of
detente by the United States, with the inherent limitations imposed by
the Soviet Union, has made detente all the more dangerous to American
vi
interests. It will also be demonstrated that the U.S.S.R. has clearly
stated that detente will provide the catalyst for the further dissemination
of socialist influence and prestige to the direct detriment of the United
States. Detente, in this view, has always provided the best conditions
for the proliferation of socialism and the construction of communism.
It will be argued that the Soviet Union has used detente to
achieve the ultimate objective of gaining the worldwide victory of
socialism. Within this overall strategy the U.S.S.R. has targetted the
specific objectives of further augmenting the ranks of non-capitalist
nations and of continuing the process of the realignment of world forces
in favor of socialism. In order to accomplish this objective the Soviet
Union has employed the strategic goal of realigning the Third World, or
developing nations, by way of national liberation movements, from the non-
socialist to the socialist camp. Hence, it will be argued that detente
imposes unilateral restraints on American action and allows for freedom
of action for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its foreign policy objectives.
Furthermore, detente does not allow for the preservation of the status quo,
the sustainment of the present balance of power, any convergence with the
West, the lessening of the inter-camp ideological struggle, or any long-term
rapprochement of sorts with the United States. In fact, in the Soviet
view, detente guarantees the antithesis of any of these and ensures the
shift in the status quo in favor of the "forces of peace," a realignment
of the balance of power in favor of world socialism, no convergence with
the West, an intensification of the ideological struggle, and an irreversible
posture for the policy of capitalist decline and socialist gain.
vii
ABSTRACT
THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DETENTE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUITY OF THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE FROM LENIN TO BREZHNEV
(May, 1981)
Stephen R. Willand, B.A., College of the Holy Cross
M.A., Center for Advanced International Studies, University
of Miami (Fla.), Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Karl Ryavec
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the Soviet
perception of detente with specific reference to the conduct of Soviet-
American relations. It is shown that the Soviet understanding of detente
differs significantly from that of the United States. Moreover, the
Soviet view of detente has been translated from theory to practice and
now governs the scope of U.S. -Soviet, and East-West relations.
The first thesis presented is that detente was created by the
Soviet Union and was built on the foundation of revolutionary Marxist-
Leninist ideology. It is demonstrated that detente was never mutually
designed by the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Rather, the policy of
detente was conceived by the Soviet Union as a means by which to achieve
long-term Soviet ideological objectives. The United States, in this
view, was forced to accept the Soviet policy of detente by virtue of the
objective factors underlying the growing might of the Soviet Union
and the alignment of world forces in favor of socialism. Furthermore,
this dissertation differs with the "end of ideology" thesis and posits
the belief that ideology serves as an important determining factor in the
vi i i
formulation of all Soviet foreign policy in general and detente in
particular. It is shown that the ideological goal of the worldwide
victory of socialism has remained as the nucleus of the Soviet policy
of detente.
The second thesis is that detente was created by V.I. Lenin
in 1918, and has remained a constant factor in Soviet foreign policy to
this day. It is demonstrated that Lenin utilized eight (8) criteria
to develop a defensive detente policy aimed at gaining the valuable
time necessary to strengthen the Soviet Union for the inevitable East-
West military confrontation. Stalin continued the Leninist detente
strategy and greatly improved the position of the U.S.S.R. relative
to its chief imperialist adversary. Khrushchev transformed detente
from a defensive maneuver to an offensive strategy aimed at effecting
incremental changes in the East-West balance of power without the need
for inevitable Soviet-American military confrontations. Brezhnev, in
achieving military parity, made detente an aggressive strategy that
would serve the cause of world socialism to the detriment of the United
States
.
The third thesis is that detente has posed and will continue
to pose serious threats to the interests of the United States. It is
shown that detente from the Soviet perspective guarantees an intensification
of the East-West ideological struggle, the further decline of American
prestige, no convergence with the United States, a deepening of class
antagonisms, a repudiation of the status quo, and creates the best con-
ditions for the further growth of socialism and the building of communism.
Rather than establishing a rapprochement between the United States and
the Soviet Union, detente places unilateral restraints on American
action and allows for the active pursuit of Soviet ideological
goals.
ix
Detente is employed by the U.S.S.R. as the best means by which to
achieve its final objective - the complete victory of socialism - by
its strategic objective of the further alignment of world forces in
favor of socialism, and its specific strategy of aligning the developing
nations, through anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions, into
the pro-Soviet socialist camp.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
We are living not merely in a state but in a system of
states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side
with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One
or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end
supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet
Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.
-V.I. Lenin
The Setting
This dire warning was made by Lenin less than two years after
the October revolution of 1917 had swept him and his Bolshevik supporters
to the pinnacle of power in Soviet Russia. During this time the
fledgling Soviet state was beset with many difficulties that threatened
its very existence as a functioning system of government. These
problems made it equally difficult for the Soviet government of that
time to become a recognized world power conducting a realistic foreign
policy with the established nations of the world capitalist system.
Yet, while confronted with the socio-economic, political, and military
chaos engendered by World War I and the ensuing revolutions, civil '
strife and civil war, Lenin, some three years before the official formu-
lation of the Soviet Union, had already made it unquestionably clear
that Soviet relations with the West would merely be a temporary
phenomenon. These relations, according to Lenin, would inevitably
terminate with the fatal demise of one of the conflicting systems. Thus,
a more ominous prediction was made by Lenin less than one year later:
1
2As long as capitalism and socialism exist we cannot live
in peace. In the end one or the other will triumph a funeral
dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over
world capitalism.'
It was, therefore, a basic belief of Leninist ideology that a
cataclysmic clash between the two conflicting socio-economic systems was
unavoidable. In Lenin's view the powers of the world capitalist-
imperialist structure simply would not submissively acquiesce to the
demise of their system. Rather, these nations would employ any and all
strategic means at their disposal, including the waging of full-scale
war, to forestall the destruction of their dying socio-economic
structure. Furthermore, Lenin reasoned that the extinction of the
capitalist-imperialist world order was not only historically inevitable
but was also predicted by the creation of its antithesis -- the communist
controlled socialist government of Soviet Russia.
While Lenin was certain that the Soviet state would inevitably be
forced to engage the West in a life and death struggle, he was equally
assured as to the ultimate victor in this unavoidable Armageddon. So
as to leave no doubt as to which system of states would be vanquished
in this struggle, Lenin further stated:
Despite this (the backwardness of Russia) we are firmly
convinced that we are invincible, because mankind will not
break down under the imperialist slaughter, but will over-
come it. We are beyond imperialist dependence, we raised
before the whole world the banner of struggle for the com-
plete overthrow of imperialism.
In a word, we are invincible, because the world prole-
tarian revolution is invincible.
2
Such a despairing prognosis for the future of international
relations would hardly seem to be conducive to the maintenance of harmon-
ious inter-state relations, especially between those states with
differing social systems of the East and West. If one were inclined to
3attach significant emphasis to these apocalyptic warnings of Lenin and,
more importantly, to transpose them to the present era of international
relations, one might then expect the contemporary international situation
to be governed by total animosity between the communist and capitalist
world. In fact, one could reasonably argue that Leninist ideology
would preclude any future continuation of coexistence between the Soviet
state and world capitalism, since the long-term nature of their coexistence
from 1917 to today was purely unthinkable for Lenin.
Yet, the contemporary state of international relations, as it exists
more than sixty years after the formation of the Soviet state, is far
removed from the situation as envisaged by Lenin. To be sure, the Soviet
Union and the West, and most notably the United States, must still contend
with a series of crises and direct confrontations. Yet no "funeral dirge"
has been sung over either system as both the U.S.S.R. and world capitalism
have managed to co-habitate the same planet for a reasonably long period
of time. What is more, the two global superpowers, one the acknowledged
leader of an ever-expanding, albeit polycentric, socialist-camp, and
the other the bastion of world capitalism-imperialism, have mutually
agreed to embark on a far-reaching course of action aimed at creating
a mutual understanding between them and at establishing a viable system
of cooperation. Hence, the United States and the Soviet Union since
1972 have negotiated, or are now negotiating, important accords of both
a bilateral and multi-lateral nature. For the most part, these
agreements
have as their stated underlying motivation a movement away from the
aforementioned pessimistic view of world politics in the realm of
socialist-capital i St relations
.
How then does the present course of events correspond to the
4pessimistic world view as espoused by Lenin? Furthermore, how is it
that the Soviet state and the nations of the capitalist-imperialist
order have managed to exist side by side with each other for such a
long period of time a thought that was unthinkable in Lenin's mind?
Has the present Soviet leadership altered and revised Leninist doctrine
so extensively and mellowed so far in their interpretation of the
seemingly intransigent communist view of the West to the point of becoming
"soft on capitalism" and of finding a permanent modus vivendi with its
very ideological antithesis? Have they further, as they have been
accused by their most ardent critics within the socialist camp, become
revisionists in their own right, forsaking their duty as proletarian
internationalists so as to advance the objectives of the Soviet national
interest? What have become of the behests of Lenin and, most importantly,
his dogmatic assertions that capitalist and socialist nations cannot
live in peace for a long period of time? Have these stern ideological
tenets become victims of the lack of revolutionary zeal among the
faceless party bureaucrats who now hold the mantel of power in the
Kremlin? Furthermore, has the present Soviet leadership supplanted
Leninist revolutionary ideology with the ideology of East-West conver-
gence and/or indefinite coexistence?
In the minds of many political observers the answers to the
questions posited above are in the affirmative. Within the communist
world itself, the Soviet Union has not been above reproach in this
regard. Leading spokesmen in the People's Republic of China, for
example,
have long accused the Soviet Union of "selling out" to the
West and of
sacrificing the objectives of international prol etarianism to the goals
of traditional and non-revolutionary Russian national
interest.
5While claims and counter-claims of ideological revisionism exist
within the communist world, many political observers in the West, albeit
for different reasons, arrive at similar conclusions. In this view, the
Soviet Union either never strictly adhered to the revolutionary
ideology of Lenin or, in the face of a post-industrial thermonuclear
world, has realized that ardent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology
has outlived its usefulness.
The first theory has its roots in the earliest days of socialist-
capitalist relations with the formulation of the Soviet state and the
initial Western response. Many Western nations, and most notably the
United States, failed to fully understand the revolutionary experiment
taking place on Russian soil. The first official American response was
somewhat skeptical in nature and looked upon the Bolshevik party and
its extremist views on class struggle and revolutions as a short-lived
phenomenon that could not exist for a long period of time while basing
3
its existence on the foundations of a militant and fanatical ideology.
The second school of thought, which will be analyzed in greater
detail later, theorizes that the pragmatic concerns of a modern nation-
state supersede the concerns of political philosophy and form the basis
for the present era of international relations characterized by an
"end of ideology."'^ In this light, the present Soviet regime has most
definitely foresaken the extremist objectives of Leninist ideology with
the realization that they are no longer practical nor attainable in the
present era of international relations. National interests, traditional
power politics, and balance of power concerns, and not Leninist
ideology,
5
form the basis of Soviet foreign policy in this regard.
Thus, it is
quite natural in this view for the present Soviet regime to
co-exist with
6the West, at the expense of Leninist revolutionary thought, for it is
in the national interest of the Soviet Union to do so. While the Soviet
propaganda machine makes repeated assertions to the contrary, they are
dismissed, in this view, as ideological rhetoric that in no way forms
a basis for the determination of Soviet actions.^
For whatever reasons, many Western analysts now believe that the
behests of Lenin and the dictates of his revolutionary ideology have
become lost in a maze of national interests and non-revolutionary concerns
that occupy the minds of the policy makers in the Kremlin.^
It is not surprising therefore, that few Western political analysts
are willing to ascribe a great deal of credibility to the incessant
claims by the Brezhnev regime that the class struggle is intensifying,
that the ideological antagonisms between the two camps are becoming more
acute, and that the present era of international affairs is characterized
g
by the deepest form of ideological struggle between the East and the West.
Such assertions are looked upon as mere ideological bombast, a necessary
component of the ritual performed by Soviet theoreticians and propagandists.
The world view, as espoused by Lenin and reiterated by the Soviet regime
to this day, is illogical, in the minds of many, in that it calls for the
ultimate defeat of the West, the intensification of the class and
ideological struggles, and the primary role of ideology and ideological
commitments. Many analysts therefore, find it difficult to believe that
the ruling regime of a modern superpower, complete with extensive strategic
and conventional military technology and global influence can be illogical
and irrational in regard to its most basic and guiding political
philosophy.
During the early Brezhnev years many observers cast a disparaging
7eye on the role of ideology and saw the bureaucratic regime of Brezhnev
as providing the catalyst for an era when Soviet-American interests
would not be inimical and when a permanent rapprochement between the two
nations could be found. It was here that a number of political scientists,
journalists, and economists provided theories regarding the eventual
harmony that would exist between the two countries. One of the more
popular schools of thought in this regard espoused the belief that a con-
vergence of the two opposing systems was inevitable. Arguing that the
Soviet Union would most probably not return to capitalism and that the
United States would not embark upon communism, it became logical to assume
that the two states, in their own best interests, would converge on a
middle ground and form a hybrid of the two systems. The Soviet Union, faced
with the uselessness of pursuing a militant ideology, would find such a
course of action to their benefit since it would, in the words of John
Kenneth Galbraith, "dispose of the notion of inevitable conflict based on
g
irreconcilable difference." Yet, the Brezhnev Doctrine, the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, and the stigma of "neo-Stal inism" attached to the Brezhnev
regime re-emphasized the fact that the Soviet leadership was not interested
in any permanent ideological coexistence or convergence of the two
ideologies.
In the early 1970's, however, there was new evidence of a reconcil-
iation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States; a reconciliation that
culminated in 1972 with the visit of an American president to Moscow.
When Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev concluded their agreements and,
most importantly, signed the "Declaration of Basic Principles," a new
era
of Soviet-American relations was proclaimed. Concurrently, many
observers
saw the long-anticipated reconciliation between the two nations,
the
8cessation of ideological polemics between them, and the beginning of a
non-ideological age of harmony and mutual interests in the conduct of
Soviet-American relations. The catalyst for the rapprochement would
be the policy of detente, a policy that would, it was claimed, bring to
a halt foreign policies that were based on the belief that irreconcilable
ideologies must exist, that each side must attempt to destroy the other,
and that the differences between the two nations precluded the attainment
of a permanent coexistence.
Detente, in the minds of many, would succeed where so many other
theories and policies had failed. Detente would establish the "rules of
the game" whereby each party agreed to play within certain limits and,
always, avoiding a direct confrontation with the other. Detente would
eliminate any aspirations of global hegemony on the part of either
country, establish clearly defined spheres of influence, and would emphasi
mutual cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Most
importantly, as we were told incessantly by the American architects of
the detente policy, detente would eliminate the possibility of a thermo-
nuclear confrontation between the two global superpowers; a confrontation
that would threaten the very existence of mankind.
The policy of detente, in this writer's view, cannot be expected
to achieve any of the aforementioned objectives. If the stated objectives
of the detente policy are those of modifying the Soviet adherence to
ideological dogma, and compliance with the long-term goals of Leninist
ideology, then it has been and will continue to be ineffective. If its
objectives are those of codifying rules, establishing spheres of influence
and setting limits on acceptable action by the Soviet Union, then it
will be equally ineffective. Detente, in this writer's view, will not
9provide a viable deterrent to the pursuit of Soviet objectives that
are inimical to the best interests of the United States. In fact, con-
tinued acquiesence on the part of the American government to the policy
of detente, as witnessed from 1972 to the present, may well serve to
enhance the prospects of continued unilateral Soviet advantages in the
realm of international affairs.
In an attempt to support these claims, this dissertation will subject
certain significant areas of the policy of detente to a fairly detailed
scrutiny. Throughout this analysis heavy emphasis will be given to the
Soviet perception of detente. It is clearly the goal of this dissertation
to analyze Soviet motives and rationales and to reach some logical con-
clusions in regard to Soviet thought as it pertains to the detente
strategy. It will be important, of course, to examine the American
perception and understanding of detente quite closely as well; yet, this
analysis will be less intensive than the study of the Soviet viewpoint.
This dissertation will also provide an historical analysis of the
detente policy from Lenin to Brezhnev. The major focus of the detente
strategy in the Brezhnev era will center on the period from 1972 to 1976.
It was during this time span that the Soviet leadership accorded the
detente strategy the highest level of prestige and when the American
government pursued the detente line with the most ardent vigor.
With the innauguration of President Carter in 1977 the American
perception and pursuance of the policy of detente underwent basic alter-
ations that at first were very subtle, and most recently have been
somewhat dramatic. The initial emphasis on international human rights,
and a less enthusiastic American pursuit of detente led many observers
to conclude that detente as a viable tool in the management of
Soviet-American affairs might quietly wither away as each side reverted
to a Cold War relationship. Recent events have added further fuel to
the fires of those writing the obituaries for detente. The faltering
SALT negotiations, the crisis in Iran, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and the ensuing American boycott of the Olympic Games in
Moscow have all contributed to the belief that detente had, in fact,
been eliminated from the list of foreign policy objectives of both the
U.S.S.R. and the United States. The resignation of Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance, an acknowledged moderate in regard to the Soviet Union,
and the apparent victory of the "hardliners" epitomized by National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski have added further vigor to the
death of detente philosophy. The innauguration of President Reagan has,
of course, also done much to inspire those who would write the final
epitaph of detente.
It is this writer's belief that such a view is erroneous in that it
acknowledges only one perception of detente, the American, to the exclusion
of the Soviet understanding of the policy. If detente did indeed die in
1979 or 1980 it did so only from the perspective of the American govern-
ment and Western political commentators. The view from the Kremlin is
vastly different. In Moscow's view, detente was never meant to exclude
any of the animosities, conflicts, or crises in United States-Soviet
relations that now cause such concern in the United States. On the
contrary, detente as the Soviet Union has consistently informed us, allows
for the intensification of the worldwide class struggle and the
strengthening of the ideological conflict between the world's two great
superpowers. As Leonid Brezhnev stated shortly after the departure from
Moscow of Richard Nixon:
nstriving for the confirmation of the principle of peace-
ful coexistence, we recognize that successes in this important
matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the
ideological struggle. On the contrary, it is necessary to be
prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still
sharper form of the antagonism between the two social systems.
And we do not have any doubts about the outcome of this
struggle, for the truth of history, the objective laws of
social development are on our side.^*^
The Soviet Union has claimed that there is little, if any,
difference in their perception of the policy of detente during the entire
Carter administration and the period from 1972 to 1976. Nothing has
changed in the minds of the Kremlin leaders in regard to detente 's goals
and objectives, its ideological content, or the acceptable foreign policy
actions that it permits. What has changed is the American willingness to
fully accept the Soviet doctrine of detente and to make such an acceptance
the primary goal of American foreign policy.
Hypotheses To Be Analyzed
In this writer's view, the policy of detente, as a process that
governs the relations between the world's two most powerful nations,
represents an important, if not the most important, aspect of international
relations. Yet, at the same time, detente has been and will continue to
be a phenomenon that causes no small amount of confusion and uncertainty.
These areas of confusion will be addressed in the form of three basic
hypotheses to be presented here and analyzed in detail throughout the
dissertation
.
The first hypothesis to be posited is that detente is a political
strategy that was designed and conceived by the U.S.S.R., that has its
theoretical foundation in revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology, and
that is governed to a large degree by the dictates of Soviet ideology.
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It will be shown that detente was never a mutually developed process
by the nations of the East and West in general, or the Soviet Union and
United States in particular. Rather, as will be demonstrated, detente
was born of necessity to a Soviet leadership that, while attempting to
prepare itself for an inevitable confrontation with the West, desperately
groped for a process that would defer this confrontation to a more
advantageous time. The detente scheme was written by the Soviet Union
and fostered by a realistic assessment by the Soviet ruling hierarchy
that they faced an insurmountable disadvantage in military and industrial
technology vis-a-vis the West. It will be shown that detente as a policy,
and a Soviet strategy for action, was designed by its creators as a means
by which long-term Soviet goals and objectives could be realized.
Furthermore, the ideological continuity of the detente process
from its original Leninist design to the present Soviet interpretation
will be given special emphasis. It will be argued that the most basic
component of detente is the goal of the ultimate defeat of the world
capitalist-imperialist structure, which was fashioned by the tenets of
Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The second major hypothesis posits the belief that the present
Soviet-American detente structure is the latest variation and maturation
of a policy that was originally developed in 1918 by Lenin. Confronted
with a host of domestic difficulties, Lenin formed the strategy of detente
as a means by which to both postpone a direct clash with the West and
strengthen his country for the eventual pursuit of long-term and global
foreign policy objectives. There is evidence that suggests that detente,
while adapting to the changing environment of international relations,
has maintained the essential core of the Leninist detente to this day.
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The third hypothesis is that the Soviet perception and application
of the detente strategy has posed and will continue to pose a serious
threat to American interests and may accrue continued unilateral advan-
tages to the Soviet cause. This thesis is directly related to the first
two hypotheses. If the process of detente was designed by the Soviet Union,
and if the nucleus of its development has been a hostile ideology with
stated objectives that are antithetical to those of the United States,
then it is logical to assume that the process itself poses a threat to the
United States. The Soviet perception of detente is replete with assertions
that the ideological struggle will intensify, the class antagonisms with
the West will become more acute, and that detente was developed as a result
of Western weakness and futility, as well as a drastic change in the
correlation of world forces in favor of the communist world. Furthermore,
the Soviets have told us that detente is a strategy for struggle that is
aimed at the ultimate defeat of the West. As such, it implies no conver-
gence with the West, utilizes economic and scientific competition, condones
Soviet-backed "wars of national liberation," allows for the expansion of
communist influence, permits "violent paths to power," is not applicable
to other socialist states, realizes a persistent danger of inter-camp wars,
condones continued Soviet military buildup, and calls for new and
strengthened roles for the Soviet military forces. This theoretical percep-
tion of detente by the Soviet Union has been directly translated into
practice. The Soviet support of the MPLA forces in Angola, economic
assistance to the new Iranian government, Soviet activity in Ethiopia,
the invasion of Afghanistan, among other actions, were all undertaken
within the framework of the Soviet perception of detente. In short,
detente, in the Soviet view, sets no limits on hostile Soviet actions, and,
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in many ways, allows for their more active pursuit. American policymakers
have expressed the belief that short-term or regional objectives and
victories by the U.S.S.R. do not warrant the elimination of the detente
policy and, it is supposed, the consequent renewal of the threat of
thermonuclear war. As such, the process of detente has hampered American
activities in the realm of foreign policy and possesses the potential to
continue to do so in the future.
Methodology: The Use of Primary Soviet Source Material
The serious student attempting to analyze Soviet politics and
predict Soviet behavior has been consistently beset with a host of difficul-
ties not usually encountered by political scientists and area specialists
who are not concerned with the political machinations of the Kremlin
regime. Much of this difficulty, of course, stems from the very nature of
the Soviet political system which has all too often excluded or rendered
useless the traditional and accepted methods of analysis and observation
employed in investigative scholarship in other areas. It has been
claimed that this lack of conventional research techniques in regard to
the Soviet Union has led to a good deal of Western ignorance of the
12
U.S.S.R.; ignorance that may well have led to serious and costly miscalcu-
lations regarding Soviet motives, especially in the immediate post-World
1
3
War II years.
It was partially in response to the costly lessons learned in dealing
with the Soviet Union that the West began to devote a great deal of
attention to scholarly investigation of the U.S.S.R. Thus, a large number
of research methodologies and paradigms of inquiry were created and serious
and sophisticated bodies of literature pertaining to the Soviet Union
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began to emerge. ""^ However, many of these research models prove, in this
writer's view, to be unsatisfactory in that they attempt to utilize
scientific discipline in an area that lacks sufficient amounts of scien-
tific dataJ"
on
A factor to be emphasized in regard to any scholarly research
the Soviet Union is that the Soviet regime, through the dissemination of
the oral and written word, continually reveals a great deal about its
perception, goals, and objectives on even the most crucial and sensitive
issues. Thus, a careful analysis of official Soviet documentation will
provide an accurate means of assessing present Soviet views and of pre-
dicting future Soviet behavior.
The Soviet political system is, by its very nature, forced to
reiterate the accepted political stance on any given issue throughout all
levels of its administration. In so doing the Soviets provide outsiders
with an accurate account of what to expect. ""^ This is due to the necessity
for political uniformity, or a pretense thereof, that is vital to the
Soviet political system. The only manner in which this can be affected
is to continually expound the policies and views of the Kremlin to the
point that there is no room for misapprehension at any level of the party
or governmental apparatus. The oral and written word are not only the
means by which the Soviet regime can provide essential guidance at all
levels, but are also an effective means for avoiding confusion and
uncertainty in any new policy or program. There have been very few major
changes or policy implementations that have not been foreshadowed by
extensive press campaigns and authoritative statements by the ruling
hierarchy.^'' If one is willing to read and scrutinize the often redundant,
polemical, and ideologically-charged mass of official Soviet documentation
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then a very accurate means of analysis, in this writer's view, will be
1 p
employed.
Nowhere has the flow of official documentation on the part of the
Soviet regime been as great as it has been in relation to the subject of
detente. This is itself an aid to research. A careful reading of Soviet
speeches, press reports, and radio broadcasts regarding detente has
offered observers an impressive amount of material that is both informative
and authoritative. Furthermore, especially as it relates to detente, there
is a direct correlation between Soviet words and Soviet deeds. In nearly
every aspect of detente, Soviet policies and actions have conformed very
closely to the definition and spirit of detente that has been publicly
espoused by the Soviet government. The Soviet government has not been
reluctant to tell us what detente means; we in the West, however, are often
reluctant to believe what they say.
The Role of Ideology in the Formulation of
Soviet Foreign Policy
Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolu-
tionary movement.
.
.The role of the vanguard can be fulfilled
only by a party that is guided by an advanced theory
-V.I. Lenin
There is considerable debate regarding the role of ideology as
a determining factor in the formulation of Soviet policy and as a
variable that either should or should not be addressed in an analysis
of Soviet behavior. It is certainly not within the scope of this paper
to offer a definitive critique of this debate, the very subjective nature
of which precludes the attainment of any authoritative or final solution.
However, since the Soviet perceptions of detente, as seen through official
Soviet sources, form the main focus of this report, it is imperative that
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ideology and its influence on the conduct of Soviet actions be clearly
defined.
As is the case with most debates of this nature, two schools of
thought exist with viewpoints diametrically opposed to the other. First,
there are those that view Soviet ideology as no more than a ritualistic
justification of action that is misleading and manipulative, as well as
being subservient to the more traditional considerations of national
interests and power politics as determining factors in the formulation of
Soviet foreign policy. The antithesis of this argument is that ideology
provides the Soviet hierarchy with a theoretical blueprint that transcends
most other considerations and influences both the character and substance
of Soviet political behavior. For many, the relative importance of ideology
vis-a-vis more orthodox political considerations is a fluctuating phenomenon
that is tempered by the substantive nature of the particular policy in
question and, as such, must be viewed as something other than either an
inflexible, ironclad dogma or an irrelevant, irrational political philosophy.
For those who view ideology as being subservient to the role of
national interest in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, complicated
issues of Soviet foreign policy, such as the complex question of the
Sino-Soviet rift,^^ are cast in frameworks that totally ignore any ideological
20
motivation on the part of either the Moscow or Peking regimes.
Furthermore, ideology, in this view is seen in the area of domestic
policy as a means of self-justification and/or manipulation that serves as
little more than a mechanism that can ensure compliance of the Soviet
21
masses with the policies of the Kremlin regime.
In regard to foreign policy considerations this school of thought
often dwells upon the "instrumental" character of ideology. In this respect.
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"ideology serves foreign policy as justification after the fact, while
the principal concern of Soviet policy-makers in the realm of doctrine... i
to retain a free hand for any opportune move, unrestricted by possible
theoretical inhibitions."^^ Ideology, in this light, is not a national
guide to the operations of Soviet foreign policy at all, but is rather a
post facto legitimizer of actions governed by the cause of national
interest. Moreover, the invocation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as
expressed by Alfred G. Meyer, goes beyond the function of legitimizing
Soviet actions and acts as a deliberate "deceptive smokescreen" used to
prevent others from understanding the true motivations underlying Soviet
23
actions
.
If detente has robbed ideology of its inspirational character as
a guide to the conduct of foreign policy, it is quite natural that its
corollary function as a legitimizer of Soviet actions should increase.
Those who feel that detente has precipitated a further demise in the
importance of ideology see a directly proportional relationship between
the increase in the dimensions of detente and the need for a justification
for the policies of the Soviet regime. This need, quite naturally, is
served by ideology which now, more than ever, functions as a mere tool
24
for self-legitimization.
Within the research framework of this dissertation ideology will
be viewed as an important determining factor in the design and conduct of
Soviet foreign policy. This is not to say that ideology alone serves
as an inflexible guide to the pursuit of Soviet objectives or that all
Soviet activity flows automatically from that ideology. Yet, at the same
time, it should be noted that there is evidence that indicates that
ideology still provides an inspirational source of guidance for the
19
decision makers of the U.S.S.R.
It will be shown below that an important feature of Marxist-
Leninist ideology is the commitment to the objective of achieving the
final victory of socialism over capitalism. Leading Soviet spokesmen
25have claimed, and noted Western commentators have observed, that this
ideological goal of transforming the world in the socialist order remains
as a central component of long-term Soviet planning. Specific Soviet
actions when examined within the confines of their own seemingly limited
objectives and not as a small part in a much larger, more elaborate scheme,
might very well seem to be dictated by the cause of national interest.
This is true because of the need for foreign policy to be adaptive to the
present historical environment in which it operates. When the long-term
and ultimate objective of Soviet foreign affairs is disassociated from
its short-term or regional goals, it is easy to confuse ideology and
national interest. For many, these two factors, far from being mutually
27
exclusive, operate together and often overlap.
It has been claimed by Adam B. Ulam that in the Soviet Union the
reality of a modernized and industrialized society clashes with the ideo-
logical premises and hence "the U.S.S.R. is bent upon ideological and power
28
expansion." Perhaps the most concise manifestation of the problem of
national interest in respect to ideology was inadvertently made by Fred
Warner Neal in his testimony before a House subcommittee. Professor Neal
first stated that Moscow was motivated to embark upon a detente policy for
reasons of national interest, in this case, to insure national security
vis-a-vis both Peking and Washington. In the very next sentence, however,
it is claimed that "one of the reasons the Russians want to avoid war is
to further the chances of achieving communism in the world. They reason
20
that it cannot be built on the ruins of a thermonuclear conf 1 ict
. .
.
"^^
The fact that the ultimate end of communist ideology cannot be achieved
in the aftermath of a catastrophic nuclear clash dictated the feasibility
of the contemporary means of a detente with the major Soviet nuclear
adversary. It can be argued that the protection of Soviet national
security, the advancement of Soviet influence, and the augmentation of
Soviet power and prestige are not necessarily objective ends of the Soviet
state per se but are instead the functional means for the further advance-
ment of the communist cause. In fact, one observer has noted that "Soviet
ideology itself defines 'national interest,' 'power' and 'world revolution'
in such a way as to make them virtually as indistinguishable and inseparable
as the three sides of an equilateral triangle. Zbigniew Brzezinski
views the Soviet commitment to the goal of the worldwide socialist victory
as infusing Soviet foreign policy with a "sense of continuity in purpose,"
and "universitality of goal," which clearly separates it from traditional
policies of power politics:
Admittedly, Soviet foreign policy, especially in its short-
term aspects, is concerned with national security, frontiers,
national power, etc. -- factors that inherently introduce
similarities with Russia's traditional concerns. Quite unlike
their predecessors, however, the Soviet leaders view these
issues in terms of certain long-range perspectives and not as
ends in themselves . 31
While the Kremlin hierarchy may well have consistently manipulated
the masses, asking seemingly impossible sacrifices and demanding persistent
patience in the name of ideology, this does not mean that ideological
exhortation is a form of cruel chicanery perpetrated on the Soviet citizenry
by a handful of priviledged leaders who believe none of what they say. As
the noted team of sociologists, Inkeles, Bauer, and Kluckhohn state, "the
leadership's use of ideology for cynical manipulation does not mean that
21
the regime does not take ideas as such seriously - quite the contrary. "32
To think otherwise is to represent ideology, in the words of R.N. Carew Hunt,
"as a species of opium with which the Soviet leaders contrive to lull the
people while taking care never to indulge in it themselves" thus attri-
buting to them "an ability to dissociate themselves from the logic of their
system -- an ability which it is unlikely they possess. "^^^
It has been noted that only a serious setback, which would weaken
the Soviet position of influence and prestige, could force the Soviet Union
to lose "its evangelical fervor and sense of imperial destiny and resign
itself to function within the framework of limited objectives and circum-
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scribed ends." The present era of detente, and the immediate future
within a detente structure, would not seem to augur any such serious set-
back. In fact, evidence suggests that the successes enjoyed by the Soviet
Union in its foreign policy from 1972 to 1980 would seem to add to, rather
than subtract from, the momentum the Kremlin now has in the realm of
foreign affairs. Summarizing the past decade of Soviet foreign policy,
Leonid Brezhnev, for example, can paint a picture of Soviet advances that
can only strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis the United States. Citing
socialist gains in India, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere Brezhnev
claims that Soviet-styled detente not only strengthened the "unity of
the fraternal countries" but also served the interests of "the peoples
who have freed themselves from colonial oppression and are engaged in
35
the difficult task of constructing a new and independent life." Denouncing
the U.S. leadership for "pursuing a line aimed at undermining detente and
aggravating the international situation," Brezhnev can warn the United
States, as follows:
22
...the present day colonialists run the risk of miscalcu-
fIh^-iQ.n.^'^^ n° ''^"^^'^ ^'"''"9 Prewar years, or eveninthe 1950 s. Dozens of previously dependent countries havegained experience in independent life and policy .. They will
not so easily renounce detente for the sake of American plans
for world domination. For our part, we continue to favor thedevelopment of peaceful cooperation of all sorts with these
countries
. .
.
This correlation of world forces in favor of socialism, along with
the proliferation of socialist principles, the strengthening of socialist
internationalism and others, are assertions that the Soviet Union has
been making for some time now. Taken in light of the present Soviet
position in international affairs, however, they show a Soviet position
that from Moscow's perspective is free of any serious setbacks or loss of
influence and prestige.
Review of Pertinent Scholarly Literature
This dissertation will attempt to provide a new perspective on a
subject matter that is considered to be of great importance. It is
interesting to note, however, that while a great deal of scholarly liter-
ature has addressed the topic of Soviet-American relations and of Soviet
foreign policy in general, very little has been written in regard to the
subject matter of detente per se . The subject of Soviet foreign policy is
best presented in Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence : The History of
Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).
Other notable contributions are: Herbert S. Dinerstein, Fifty Years of
Soviet Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968), George F.
Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (New York: New American
Library, 1960), and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941 (Princeton, N.J.: Van
Nostrand, 1960), Anatol Rapoport, The Big Two : Soviet-American Perceptions
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of Foreiqn Policy
.
(New York: Pegasus, 1971), Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals :
America and Russia Since World War TT (New York: Prager Publishers, 1971),
Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds. The Conduct of SoviPt
Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), Zbigniew K. Brzezinski
:
The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967), Vernon A. Aspaturian, ed. Process and Power in Soviet Foreign
Mlcz (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971). Together these works con-
stitute an exhaustive study of nearly every facet of U.S.
-Soviet relations,
and posit varying claims in regard to peaceful coexistence, the Cold War,
containment, Soviet expansionism, and the like. Very few, if any, of
these works, however, directly address the subject of Soviet-American or
East-West detente or coexistence in a comprehensive manner. A notable
contribution here is Albert L. Weeks, The Troubled Detente (New York: New
York University Press, 1976). Other works include Gerald L. Steibel,
Detente: Promises and Pitfalls (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., Inc.,
1975), Jeffrey Simon, Ruling Communist Parties and Detente: A Documentary
History (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1975), and George Schwab and Henry Friedlander, eds. Detente in
Historical Perspective (New York: Cyrco Press, 1975). Of all these studies
those by Adam B. Ulam (especially his Expansion and Coexistence ) Zbigniew
K. Brzezinski, and George F. Kennan are considered by this writer to be
the most authoritative and informative.
The subject of ideology in the Soviet Union, and its role in shaping
foreign and domestic policy has received considerable attention in Western
scholarly literature. The most authoritative of these, in my view, is
Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1962). Other contributions include: Michel Tatu, Power in the
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Kremlin From Khrushchev to Kosygin (New York: The Viking Press, 1968),
^^"'^^ BelK The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Trip..
^" (New York: Collier Books, 1961), and "Ten Theories in
Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior," in Aspaturian ed.
Process and Power in Sov iet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown and Co.,
1971), Alex Inkeles, Social Change in Soviet Russia (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1971), David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (New York:
Random House, 1971), Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR: The
Struggle for Stalin's Succession (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), Leonard
Schapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union (New York:
Vintage Books, 1965), and The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York:
Random House, 1960), Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics-The
Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), Alfred G.
Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random
House, 1965), Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How
the Soviet System Works (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), R. Judson Mitchell,
"Continuity and Change in Soviet Ideology," Current History (October, 1975),
Bayless Manning, "Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
(January, 1976), Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or
Pluralism?" Problems of Communism (March-April, 1972), Samuel L. Sharp,
"National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics," Robert V. Daniels, "Doctrine
and Foreign Policy," R.N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," Adam
B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," all in Hoffman and
Fleron, eds. The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton, 1971), Wolfgang Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Winston, 1970), and Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology
and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (October, 1962). This body
of literature provides a thorough and complete presentation of the role
of ideology and also represents a fairly wide spectrum of thought on the
structure of the Soviet political system and the appropriate methodologies
by which to study it. Of all these works, it is my belief that the most
informative and accurate are those of Brzezinski and Carew Hunt on the
subject of ideology and Conquest on the subject of investigative
methodologies.
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CHAPTER II
THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE DURING THE BREZHNEV ERA
The Soviet Union claims that detente forms the very pillars on
which its foreign policy is constructed. At the same time, the American
government has claimed that detente is the only sane and rational
guideline for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S.S.R. views
detente as a means by which to achieve communist objectives. The United
States, meanwhile, sees detente as a means by which confrontations based
on expansionist goals will be eliminated. The Soviet Union views detente
as a catalyst for the intensification of the ideological struggle. The
United States perceives detente as a way to reach a reconciliation with
Moscow. For one it means change in the world; for the other, stability.
Both parties obviously have vastly different perceptions of the same policy
by which they have mutually agreed to abide. Despite the major differences
their understanding of detente, leading spokesmen in both the Soviet Union
and the United States have agreed on one major point; detente is the single
most important policy in the realm of international relations.
This view was echoed incessantly in both Washington and Moscow from
1 972 to 1 976. In the ensuing four years the Kremlin regime did not change
the party line in this regard and, to this day asserts that detente forms
the very nucleus of Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, the United
States has diminished its praise of detente in light of the Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan, which some American observers feel constitutes a
flagrant violation of the principles of detente. The Soviets, for their par
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see this action as perfectly consistent with detente which never pre-
cluded and, in fact, fostered the proliferation and expansion of the
peace-loving principles of socialist internationalism.
Leonid Brezhnev has charged in this regard that "imperialist and
Peking progaganda are del i berately and shame! essly distorting the Soviet
Union's role in Afghan affairs."^ Brezhnev has also claimed that the stern
American response to Soviet activity has seriously worsened the inter-
national situation. In the words of Brezhnev:
Our Party's consistent and creative pursuit of a course
aimed at peace, detente and disarmament and at the implemen-
tation of the Peace Program advanced by the 24th and 25th
C.P.S.U. Congresses has made it possible to accomplish a
great deal
But, unfortunately, as the 1970's end and the 1980's
begin the international situation has worsened appreciably.
The people ought to know the truth about who is responsible
for this. I can answer without reservation--the blame rests
with the imperialist forces, and above all with certain
circles in the U.S.
2
Brezhnev then can clearly identify the fact that the United States
did not understand the meaning of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, within
the framework of detente:
Today the opponents of peace and detente are trying to
capitalize on the events in Afghanistan. Mountains of lies
are being heaped up around these events, and a shameless
anti-Soviet campaign is underway. What actually happened
in Afghanistan?3
What actually happened, in Brezhnev's view, is that the Soviet
Union rendered support to "revolutionary Afghanistan" in the face of an
undeclared war being waged there by counter-revolutionary imperialist
forces. The Soviet Union, of course, was asked to come to the defense of
the revolutionary forces in Afghanistan. In summary Brezhnev can then
claim:
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For our part, we warned the parties concerned that ifthe aggression did not stop that we would not abandon theAfghan people in their time of need. And. as is known, wedo what we say we are going to do.^
It will be argued in greater detail below that Soviet support for
anti-imperialist revolutionary forces in the developing nations is not
only above condemnation by the United States, but is also an integral
component of the policy of detente. The reasons for the recent American
re-assessment of the detente policy and the Soviet's unwillingness to
depart from detente in 1980, however, are topics that are clearly beyond
the scope of this present analysis. The focus of the present chapter will
be on the period from 1972 to 1976 when the latest detente model was
fully developed, and when both sides agreed that detente was on a level
of unmatched significance.
While present events may go a long way in reshaping the emphasis
placed on detente, it was the period under discussion here that provided
detente with the acclaim, support, and formal diplomatic recognition that
it still enjoys in the minds of many to this day. Moreover, this time span
manifested some of the misunderstandings of the policy that have caused a
number of concerns and problems which still persist in 1981.
In addressing detente, the political analyst could question how
detente,, with two vastly different perceptions, one being the near anti-
thesis of the other, became the most important component of the foreign
policy of two adversaries. The answer, of course lies in the particular
interpretation of detente, as it exists in both Moscow and Washington.
In the first place, it should be noted that detente, in this writer's
view, is a very important variable in the present international arena. The
rationale for this claim, however, is different from those of the
architects of detente, who are the objects of this analysis. A
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representative sampling of authoritative spokesmen from both Moscow and
Washington shows that detente, whether understood or misunderstood, liked
or disliked, is viewed as a policy of great importance in both capitals.
There has been no dearth of authoritative spokesmen in both the
Soviet Union and the United States who, at the risk of overselling their
product, sang the virtues of detente and acclaimed it as a policy of unpre-
cedented importance. It must be remembered, of course, that more than one
political career has been gambled on the successful acceptance of detente,
and many glowing assertions in this regard must be taken with more than
one grain of salt.
The American Perception of the
Importance of Detente
Former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one of the
main architects of the detente policy in the United States, and its most
ardent supporter, depicts the importance of detente in the following terms
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of
catastrophe and its hopes for peace have hinged on the rela-
tionship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In an era when two nations have the power to visit utter
devastation on the world in a matter of hours, there can be
no greater imperative than assuring that the relationship r
between the superpowers be managed effectively and rationally.
The perception of detente as the only sane alternative to the
waging of full-scale nuclear war appeared to be the highest accolade that
American proponents of detente could give to this policy. At the same
time, this theme tended to epitomize the basic essence of detente as per-
ceived by American policy makers. Of all the spokesmen in the United
States who repeated this familiar line, none was more persistent than
Kissinger:
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...But in the nuclear age, when casualties in a qeneral
nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter ofdays the use of force threatens utter catastrophe It is
our policy to contain Soviet power without global war to
avoid abdication as well as unnecessary confrontation'
This is what is meant by the process called detente.
6
One could logically argue that such a formula, that depicts
detente and thermonuclear confrontation as mutually exclusive activities,
is overly simplistic. To do so might give credence to the argument that
detente or a thermonuclear war are somehow the only two options available
to American and Soviet decision makers. Detente may be seen more
properly as something other than the sole variable preventing the exacer-
bation of Soviet-American tensions to the point of provoking a thermonuclear
exchange. Zbigniew Brzezinski, an outspoken critic of Kissinger-styled
detente, noted, in this regard, that "the alternative to detente is not
war but a variety of intermediate positions." The crux of this argument
is, as Brzezinski points out: "When there was no detente, there was no
war either."^
Such an argument did not deter the American proponents of detente
from asserting that detente found its significance in its contribution
to the prevention of a thermonuclear holocaust. This dictum became the
accepted stance of the Nixon and Ford administrations. As echoed by the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco:
Our efforts to strengthen relations reciprocally between
the United States and the Soviet Union must continue; for
this relationship will probably determine more than any other
single factor whether our hopes for peace and stability in the
world are eventually realized.^
Much the same view was expressed by Deputy Secretary of State
Kenneth Rush, who questioned the rationale for not pursuing a detente
relationship with the Soviet Union:
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Detente is founded on the belief that when nations havethe power to destroy each other - and the world - it is irra-tional to make the threat of holocaust the only base for peace
aXSsnive'bas?sT°'' '° relationships on a .ore Lble
Yet, more than anyone else, it was Kissinger who presented the
most detailed defense of a doctrine that was not universally received in
all segments of American society. Kissinger often repeated this line in
a manner that left no room for misapprehension:
There can be no peaceful international order without a
constructive relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union - the two nations with the power to destroy
mankind.'^
Moreover, detente in the view of the former Secretary of State, was
the only feasible alternative facing American policy makers:
In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality,
the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course and
the only policy that can be pursued by any administration
charged with the responsibility for the lives of Americans...
When both sides have the military power to annihilate mankind,
it would be utter recklessness to invite tension needlessly.''
This formula therefore, provided a capsule summary of the American
perception of detente. As will be seen below, the Soviets hold a similar
view, but with significant variations added.
The Significance of Detente :
The Soviet View
The perception of detente as an immensely important doctrine
was not a characteristic that was indigenous to statesmen in Washington.
The Soviet ruling hierarchy, on a number of occasions, repeated the need
for pursuing a policy based on the formula of easing tensions and removing
the threat of thermonuclear war. According to the official Soviet line,
detente is a course of action that must be implemented, and eventually
made irreversible, so that the two superpowers can move from an era of
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confrontation and threats of war to one of negotiation and of stabilizing
peace.
In his keynote address at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev the General Secretary of the C.P.S.U.
and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, elevated this doc-
trine to the level of official policy:
...we have every reason to confidently state that the
improvement of the international situation is irrefutable
evidence that the securing of a permanent peace is not only
a good intention but a truly realistic goal...
The improvement in our relations with the United States
of America, the capitalist world's greatest power, has, of
course, been of tremendous importance in reducing the threat
of a new world war and of consolidating peace. ^2
It must be noted that the congresses of the C.P.S.U. are generally
regarded as the most important forums for the Soviet regime to articulate,
in detailed fashion, the official policy line on all foreign and domestic
issues. Moreover, the keynote address delivered by Brezhnev was acclaimed
as the single most important component of the Congress in regard to the
official Soviet perception of any issue. Hence, when Brezhnev stated in
his address that "the main element in our relations with the capitalist
states has been the struggle to assert the principles of peaceful
1
3
coexistence," and that detente has helped to strengthen peace, "and
14
lessen the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war," it then became
an accepted fact in the Soviet view, that detente was a policy of great
importance.
The Soviet Union, having become disenchanted with the foreign
policy of President Carter, unleashed a major propaganda fusillade against
the new American president in the early months of his administration.
This process certainly underscored the fragile and uneasy state of U.S.-
Soviet relations. Yet, in no manner did the U.S.S.R. diminish the
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importance of pursuing the policy of detente. Thus, Brezhnev, in discussing
Soviet-American relations on French television, claimed:
The consolidation of peace is one of the most important
guarantees of the greatest human right, the right to live...
I will say again and again: The cause of peace and
detente must be the cause of everyone. What has been
achieved toward consolidating peace is not a limit, but a
starting point for a new activity. 15
While watching the erosion of a more amiable U.S.
-Soviet rapport
that existed during previous administrations, Soviet commentators still
portrayed detente as a policy of unequalled significance:
The living process of detente, the development of
various forms of cooperation among states and the affirma-
tion of the principles of peaceful coexistence in inter-
national relations - this is a reality which is increasingly
determining the course and nature of events on the world
scene. 1
o
Brezhnev has also added a feeling of optimism, or hope, that
detente would not become stagnated with the changing of the guard in the
White House:
I have had many occasions to talk about the favorable
influence of detente on the entire international climate.
I see no reasons to make any changes in this estimate. How-
ever, it would be correct to note that in some places detente
has engendered a certain complacency .1
7
The 1972 "Declaration of Basic Principles "
One of the major hypotheses of this report is that detente is
not a process that is limited to the present state of U.S. -Soviet
relations. Rather, it will be argued that detente has been in existence
from the outset of the relationships between Soviet Russia and the United
1 o
States. However, evidence suggests that the latest historical era in the
life of detente was given birth by the Brezhnev regime. This process
reached its full consumation in Moscow in May of 1972 with the co-signing
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of the "Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
This "Declaration of Basic Principles," more than any other document, has
defined the nature, scope, and intent of detente. As such, this document,
and the reaction it has engendered, provides a barometer for measuring the
perceived significance of detente.
Of the nine separate accords signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at
the Moscow summit, the Soviet Union has attached the greatest significance
to the "Declaration of Basic Principles." Yuri Chernov, in an authori-
tative Pravda article of June 15, 1972, asserted that this declaration
"deserves special attention above all else" in regard to the summit
talks. It was, as Chernov declared, "the first document between the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to give international legal form to relations
between the two sides on the basis of the principles of peaceful
1
9
co-existence." As such, this document attains special significance
in the Soviet view:
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the
fact that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., the powers with the
greatest military potential, powers belonging to different
social systems, have agreed to, by what is for all practical
purposes, a treaty, to build their relations on this basis. 20
Georgi Arbatov, the director of the Institute of the U.S.A. of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and an acknowledged Soviet specialist on
American affairs saw the "Declaration" as a "far reaching document filled
with profound meaning," and one that "essentially formulates the inter-
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national legal principles for relations between the two states." Arbatov,
furthermore likened the document to the most significant events in the
history of U.S. -Soviet relations, claiming that the "Declaration of Basic
Principles" and the Moscow summit as a whole,
^...may very well become a landmark comparable in
significance to such events as the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between the two countries in 1933 and their
cooperation during the Second World War. In other wordsthe results of the talks may open the way to an important
shift in Soviet-American relations .^2
Much of this euphoria has been tempered by the realities of
events following the summit. While many of the expectations of May of
1972 have not been realized, the Soviet Union did not diminish the
significance of the Moscow Declaration. Brezhnev, in his address to
the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress reaffirmed the importance of the document
calling it the main result "of the development of Soviet-American
relations in the past five years. "^^ Likewise, Arbatov in a Pravda
article of April, 1976 asserted that "if we consider not only the
number of agreements (signed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), but also
their substance, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of
such documents as the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations
between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S..."^^
Detente, obviously, involves far more than the signing of a
joint document. Yet, it is testimony to the Soviet adherence to the
concept itself that these accords are viewed as the most significant
agreement in the history of U.S. -Soviet relations. In discussing Soviet-
American relations from 1972 to 1977, Soviet commentator Vladimir
Bolshakov cast that five year period in terms of the "five year anniver-
sary" of the signing of the basic principles document:
It will be five years on Sunday since the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the president
of the United States signed in Moscow the basic principles
of relations between the two countries.
The agreement .. .did a great deal to improve Soviet-
American relations, put an end to the cold war, and move
from confrontation to mutual cooperation. The main docu-
ment was the basic principles of mutual relations. It be-
came the political and legal foundation for the new
relationship. 25
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Soviet commentators, it can be reasoned, look upon detente,
as defined in the "Declaration of Basic Principles." as a legalistic
endorsement by the United States of the Soviet policy of peaceful
coexistence. The American view is clearly different. Brzezinski,
although critical of the policy, did not diminish the significance of
detente as defined in the basic principles declaration. As he claimed,
the declaration signalled "a significant codification of the 'rules of
the game' under which the rivalry is to be conducted" and signifies "a
change toward a more mixed relationship."^^ In Brzezinski 's view the
declaration, and the summit in general, "suggest that the cold war is
gradually being transformed from an implicity apocalyptic conflict to an
explicity relativistic competition . "^'^ Similarly, Richard Nixon viewed
the "Declaration of Basic Principles" as one of his greatest achievements
at the Moscow summit. In a report to the Congress, Nixon highlighted
the fact that the two countries have "established a set of basic prin-
ciples to govern our relations." This, in the President's view, marked
the first time in the postwar era that the two countries had established
"a code of conduct that both sides could accept as the basis for regulating
their competition and channeling their efforts toward more constructive
28
endeavors." In this light, Nixon sees the Moscow Declaration as the
ultimate achievement of the summit and a document that "can provide a
solid framework for the future development of better American-Soviet
29
relations." The Declaration is then coordinated with the overall
perception of the American government in regard to detente. As Nixon
declared before a joint session of the Congress, the basic principles of
detente can deter the two countries from engaging in a nuclear war and,
in his words, "in a nuclear war there could be no winners, only losers.
""^^
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The Global Nature of Detente
An important aspect of detente is its ability to transcend a
bi-lateral Soviet-American relationship. The Soviet perception of
detente allows for the dissemenation of socialist principles, support
for wars of national liberation, and the Soviet ability to "create conditions
favorable for the spread of socialism." From this perspective, detente
undertakes a global significance. This worldwide significance of detente
is also understood, but for different reasons, by the American government.
Former Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Rush, for example, was able to
deny any limited Soviet-American interests in detente:
We strive for broader areas of detente in the cause of
global tranquility and heightened prosperity. This in no way
is a condominium between the Soviet and American superpowers,
but an engagement in the interests of all. 31
Former president Gerald Ford, while acknowledging the necessity
of "pushing back the spector of nuclear war" by concluding bi-lateral
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arms control accords, maintained the belief that detente supersedes any
limited Soviet-American interests:
...it would be very unwise for a president, me or
anyone else, to abandon detente. I think that detente
is in the best interest of this country. It is in the best
interest of world stability, world peace.
And for us to abandon this working relationship and to
go back to a cold war, in my opinion, would be very unwise
for us in the United States and the world as a whole. 33
One of the more important residual effects of detente is the
impact that it has had on the nations within the communist world. It will
be demonstrated below, for example, that the U.S. -Soviet detente has had
a direct bearing on the Soviet-Chinese relationship. The U.S.S.R. has
repeatedly charged that the U.S. is willing now to "play its China card"
as a tool of anti-Soviet activity. It has also been claimed that the fear
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of a meaningful, and perhaps exclusive U.S.-C.P.R. rapprochement was one
of the primary factors motivating the Soviet Union to embark on the
latest detente course.
There are many who see the U.S.
-Soviet detente as having a
tempering effect on Soviet relations with the Warsaw Pact bloc of
countries. This is often seen as the result of the necessity for the
U.S.S.R. to maintain a reasonably moderate posture in the face of
Western demands for increased liberalization within the Eastern European
area. It has been shown, in the past, that the Soviet Union will not
tolerate direct or indirect manifestations of ideological relaxation,
ideological schism, political laxity, or "liberalization" in this region.
These costs appear to be too high a price for the Soviets to pay for any
positive image that might be deemed necessary during a period of East-West
detente. In addition, such factors are at odds with the scope and purpose
of detente which, in the Soviet view, does not allow for any relaxation
of ideological vigilance by the "fraternal countries" of the socialist
commonwealth. Yet, as two noted specialists of Eastern Europe have
claimed, "detente has apparently affected intra-C.E.M.A. relations to
the extent that the Soviet pursuit of a positive image in the West
moderates their tactics, if not their ultimate goals. ""^^
Another important area in the sense of the global significance
of detente, outside of the bi-lateral U.S. -Soviet equation, is in the
realm of domestic policies within the U.S.S.R. Specifically, this relates
to the ideological backlash that is often a result of the easing of tensions
abroad. It can be argued, in this regard that the Soviet Communist
Party requires a menacing foreign threat to fully maximize ideological
purity at home. As was mentioned above, this is oftentimes a reflection
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of the manipulative and cynical aspects of Soviet ideology that is
most clearly reflected in the domestic affairs of the U.S.S.R. For a
good many years the United States played the role of the foreign menace
quite admirably. The United States was accused of being the bastion of
decadent capitalist-imperialist oppression, the suppressor of national
liberation movements, and the main obstacle to the peace-loving foreign
policy of the Soviet Union. During an era of detente, with its expansion
of political, cultural, athletic, and scientific contacts, this foreign
enemy may well appear to be less ominous. A domestic response then
becomes necessary. Stated very simply this foreign/domestic equation
would read as follows: the greater the relaxation of tensions with the
West and the greater the number of contacts with the West, the greater is
the need to insure ideological vigilance and conformity within the realm
of socialist nations in general, and within the Soviet Union in particular.
We in the West may find that some of the tangible results of
Soviet-American detente outside of foreign policy, may well be the ideo-
logical retrenchment of the communist world, a reinforcement of "Stalinist"
ideological controls, and a tightening of the screws of conformity. In
this light, Kissinger had no qualms about presenting a tempting array of
Western-styled innovations to the communist world, apparently regardless
of their consequences:
The winds of change are blowing from the West; the
ideals of liberty and the challenge of technical innova-
tion come from the West. The efforts of the Communist
countries to participate in the rest of the world after
decades of autarchy are a sign of the vigor and attraction
of our economic system. These are assets of our diplomacy
which we should be prepared to use. 35
Many analysts saw the use of such "diplomacy" and the Soviet
response to it as the most important aspect of detente and the most
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significant development in regard to the fate of Soviet dissidents,
intellectuals, and minority nationalities in years. Alexander
Solzhenitsyn has expressed his fears that detente may well be "encour-
aging new acts of brutality and persecution." This has become possible,
according to Solzhenitsyn when "any acts of cruelty, and even brutality
by one side toward its own citizens and its neighboring peoples is
hastily and near-si ghtedly accepted by the proponents of detente as 'in no
way standing in the way of detente. '"^^ The importance of detente, in
the view of Sovietologist Klaus Mehnert, rested with the fact that it may
well serve as the fulcrum for such new acts of persecution. In discussing
the plight of intellectuals. Professor Mehnert claimed that it is a fact
that "the more there is detente (and that means, the more Western ideas
come into the Soviet Union), the more repression the Soviet leaders will
use against their intellectuals who are the people most exposed to
37Western ideas." Similarly, David Zilberman, an emigre Soviet intellec-
tual, believes that detente is of unparalleled importance because of its
creation of increasing amounts of "compensative compression and growth
on
of tensions" within Soviet society. In the same regard, the fate of
the many diverse minority nationalities within the Soviet Union has been
seen as being subject to the whims of Soviet-styled detente:
If the process of detente is pursued without a keen
awareness of this multi-national complexion of the U.S.S.R.,
we may find ourselves by virtue of our economic contributions
guaranteeing the permanent captivity of the many nations of
the U.S.S.R.39
With these heavy prices, detente logically presents the United
States, in Kissinger's words with "one challenge unprecedented in its own
history and another challenge without precedent in the history of the
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world." Yet, the primacy of this challenge is represented in terms of
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the supposed consequence of its failure; thermonuclear war:
Historically a conflict of ideology and geopoliticalinterest such as now characterized the international scenehas almost invariably led to war. But in the age of
strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a
repetition of history. War would mean mutual suicide.
Echoing the same theme, Winston Lord, the former Director of
the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, has stated that this
repetition of history cannot be tolerated and that it is imperative to
abandon the traditional oscillation between relaxing and exacerbating
tensions
:
For Americans, the most fundamental challenge is to
pursue a steady, long-term course with the Soviet Union
It is time we left behind our traditional fluctuation
between euphoria and gloom, between good will and
indignation. 42
In citing the "long-term" nature of the detente relationship as
it exists today, Lord has underscored one of the central considerations
of this process, its nearly-guaranteed existence in one form or another
for the foreseeable future. Thus, Brezhnev can call for the creation of
an "irreversible" detente relationship, and a firm commitment to never
abandon this relaxation and return to a cold war era when as he stated,
disagreements are settled not by "peaceful political means," but by "force,
threats, and sabre rattling."
Those who see detente as the sole means of preventing a thermo-
nuclear war have made this long-term characteristic a fact that is simply
true by definition. If the alternative to detente is nuclear war, which,
as the formula goes, would mean either mutual suicide or total destruction
of one system, then detente will be with us as long as Soviet-American
relations exist. Hence, Kissinger can claim that "for the first time in
our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending,
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that there is no easy and surely no final answer. m .uch the same
manner, Marshall Shul.an sees the evolutionary nature of detente which
indicates that its final fruition will be seen at some future ti.e:
Under favorable conditions this 'limited detente' mavevolve through the decades to a later stage in which thecooperative elements can be strengthened and Jhe SovietUnion can be drawn into a more constructive role in workinatoward the strengthening of the international syslem as
^
opposed to t e condition of international violence and
anarchy which is the alternative confronting the world.
Detente has also been seen as a phenomenon that will outlive any
presidential administration. In the words of former Assistant Secre-
tary of State for European Affairs, Arthur A. Hartman:
This (detente in the face of Soviet military might) is
not a problem which confronts this Administration only It
will be a problem for the next Administration and the next
one after that. Indeed, I think that it will be a problem
for Americans for at least the lifetime of every person in
this room. 46
Detente is seen from a number of different perspectives. While
none of these viewpoints agree on why detente is of such importance,
they all concur in the fact that it is a concept of great significance.
Detente may be seen as the deterrent to a thermonuclear war, the fulcrum
for socialist expansion, the catalyst for ideological and social repression,
or an irreversible and permanent fixture in international relations.
Yet, in all these cases, the significance of detente is not overlooked.
This is certainly true of the Soviet perception. For reasons to
be outlined below, the Soviet Union worked diligently to foster a U.S.-
Soviet relationship based on the principles of detente. Soviet goals
and objectives, it will be argued, could not be achieved with an antag-
onistic U.S. -Soviet posture. Detente provided the means by which many of
these objectives could be realized without drastically increasing any
risks to Soviet interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
U.S.S.R. made every attempt to foster an image of detente as the single
most important phenomenon in international relations. In the words of
Arbatov
:
II c:^? n''' ^'J'V^u
Restructuring of relations between the
u'./.l:,' H
the spirit of peace, greater mutual
understanding and cooperation has become one of the cardinalquestions of international life. 47
^cirain i
Likewise, an influential Pravda editorial signed by "commentator
expressed the same view:
_
In the overall process of positive changes taking placein the world, a significant place is being held by U S S R -
U.S. relations... • . . .
The strengthening of relations of peaceful co-existence
between the states with different social systems and the
development of mutually advantageous and constructive
cooperation between them is becoming the dominating feature
of the international situation. 48
In his address at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooper
ation in Europe, Brezhnev highlighted the major accomplishment of that
meeting
:
In our view, the main result of the conference is that
it is making international detente increasingly substantive.
It is precisely the materialization of detente that is the
essence of the matter... 49
A manifestation of the importance of detente in the Soviet view
was given with the publication of the new "Brezhnev Constitution" of the
U.S.S.R. This document, which replaced the 1936 "Stalin Constitution,"
contained the first constitutional reference to foreign policy. The
foreign policy chapter provided a concise capsule summary of the Soviet
perception of detente; its goals, objectives and significance:
The Soviet state shall consistently pursue the
Leninist policy of peace...
The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. shall be aimed at
insuring favorable international conditions for the
building of communism within the U.S.S.R., at strengthening
the positions of world socialism, supporting the struggle
of peoples for national liberation and social progress.
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preventing wars of aggression and consistently imple-menting the principles of peaceful coexistence of tateswith different social systems. 50
It is understandable that Soviet commentators would devote a
good deal of time to analyzing the new constitution. Yet, it is signi-
ficant that the greatest amount of attention was given to the foreign
policy section of the constitution. The inordinate number of editorials
and commentaries that addressed the foreign policy articles of the
constitution (encompassing but 2 of the 173 articles in the entire docu-
ment) gave testimony to the level of significance that the Soviet regime
attached to detente. Thus, detente was referred to as a policy "elevated
in the draft of the new constitution to the rank of a law of the Soviet
state's activity both in domestic and foreign policy. "^^ From the Soviet
perspective, the new constitution, which "legislatively enshrined the
goals and principles of the country's foreign policy line" has made
detente a legal Soviet commitment.
The ensuing chapters of this study will address the reasons for
the Soviet insistence on maintaining detente and elevating it to a position
of law. At the present time it must be remembered that this perception
was not unique to the Soviet Union. Professor Fred Warner Neal , an
expert on Soviet-American affairs echoed the same theme:
I consider the present movement toward an American-
Soviet detente to be the most significant and salutary
development in American foreign policy since the end of
World War II. The Declaration of Principles which President
Nixon signed in Moscow in 1972, provides, it seems to me, the
basis for ending the cold war... a definitive ending of the
cold war is about the best thing imaginable that could happen
for all of us. And that is precisely what an American-Soviet
detente is all about. 53
Even Solzhenitsyn, with his grave concerns about the suppression
of human rights, can claim that "detente is not only necessary, but
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mankind's only salvation, and an urgent need of our times, more powerful
than the intentions and decisions of individual political leaders ... "^'^
The Nixon administration provided the most glowing praise for a procedure
that formed the core of its foreign policy. In the words of Assistant
Secretary Hartman, detente is "a policy of unique importance for all of
us," and "the basic international problem of our time - perhaps of this
whole half century. .."55 Kissinger, of course, was even stronger in
his comments and felt that "the future of mankind requires coexistence
with the Soviet Union" because, as he claimed, "we owe future generations
more hopeful prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces. "^^
Nixon, felt that, as a result of the new era of detente, "never have two
peoples had a greater challenge or a greater goal."^'' According to the
former president "an unparalleled opportunity has been placed in America's
hands" which, in his words, could "lead the world up out of the lowlands
of constant war and onto the high plateau of lasting peace. "^^
Much of this post-Moscow summit euphoria has, of course, been
lost. Yet, as we have seen, the Soviet Union has not decreased its
emphasis on detente. In the early months of the Carter administration
the same viewpoints were being expressed in regard to detente. Brzezinski,
notwithstanding his direct criticism of Kissinger/Nixon-styled detente,
could still claim that detente provided "a truly creative and historically
novel framework" for the conduct of U.S. -Soviet relations. Carter
himself, although providing the catalyst for much of the de-emphasis of
detente from the American perspective, still felt that detente with
the Soviet Union was a policy that he would pursue "earnestly, constantly,
and sincerely. "^^ According to Vice President Mondale, detente provided
the forum by which the two countries could "talk where before it was only
possible to confront one another in deadly and undiminished hostility.
And it is imperative that we continue this dialogue, ever seeking to
expand its depth and compass. "^^
Detente and the Pursuit of Soviet Ob.iectives
The evidence presented would show that detente, for a variety of
reasons, has been accorded a position of unmatched significance. The
question that still remains is: where does the true significance of
detente actually rest?
While this writer is in agreement with the fact that Soviet-
American detente is of unique and unmatched importance, the reasoning
outlined above is seen as insufficient. In the first place, detente
would not seem to be the only rational option available to American
decision makers charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the
interests of the United States. Nor does it appear that detente should
become an irreversible policy that will stay with us for the foreseeable
future. Detente, it can be argued, should not be viewed as the only
defense against a possible thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet
Union. None of this is to say that an exacerbation of tensions in the
thermonuclear age is necessarily in the best interests of either side.
Yet, it would seem that the prevention of such a holocaust could be
achieved by establishing a Soviet-American posture that is not totally
dependent on a full-scale detente relationship as defined at the Moscow
summit in 1972 and implemented in the years following. In short, the
argument for detente, as depicted in the following formula, would seem
to be insufficient:
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Let us remember that we seek detente with the SovietUrn on for one overwhelming reason: Both countries have thecapability to destroy each other - and most o^^he rest
of the wor d in the process. Thus, both of us have an over-
c^tasL^phe^^sr^" ^0 P-ven? IIIT
It goes without saying that the preservation of peace in the
thermonuclear age, and the prevention of a thermonuclear exchange are issues
of importance. Yet, there are two caveats that must be mentioned here.
Both of these considerations would, in this writer's view, belie the belief
that detente solely serves the cause of peace in the thermonuclear age,
and, as such, has no present alternative.
In the first place, any detente, even on the most cordial and
harmonious of terms, cannot expect to eliminate the areas of concern
that might eventually provide the basis for a direct confrontation.
There is no reason to believe, nor any concrete evidence to suggest,
that the Soviet Union will acquiesce in any agreement that would reduce
the level of strategic conventional military parity that now exists
between the two rival superpowers. It will be outlined in detail below
that Soviet foreign policy in the contemporary era of detente, requires
a military equation that is based on nothing less than parity with the
West. It is precisely this parity that will maintain the constant
threat of a thermonuclear war.
Secondly, detente, by allowing incremental and "non-threatening"
forms of Soviet expansion, may eventually lead to a position where the
threat of the use of strategic weaponry may become a very real American
option. Detente, as perceived by the Soviet Union, may very well exacer-
bate the tensions and animosities that it was created to eliminate. The
Soviet perception of detente, as noted earlier, is based on: the
improvement of the correlation of the forces in the world in favor of the
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socialist camp; the realization by the West that any attempt to thwart
socialist expansion is useless; the realization of the growing military
might Of the Soviet Union; and the full understanding by the United
States that it has no choice but to adhere to the Soviet policy of
detente with the socialist camp. Furthermore, detente, according to the
Soviet perception, creates favorable conditions, not only for the
growth of communism within the U.S.S.R., but for augmenting the principles
of socialism in those nations seeking national liberation, and the
nations of world capitalism, as well.
It is not surprising therefore, that a number of crises and areas
of direct conflict in American-Soviet interests have arisen since the
1972 Moscow summit. Tensions in southern Africa in general, and Angola
in particular, the October, 1973 Mideast War, the revolution and crisis
in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and others have all served
as testimony to the Soviet need to fulfill its expansionistic destiny.
These crises should not be seen as breakdowns in detente, or a threat to
detente; they would more accurately be viewed as inherent components
of the Soviet perception of detente.
Thus, the true importance of detente may be seen as resting with
the fact that it is a detailed Soviet blueprint for action. Moreover,
detente in the Soviet view, is designed primarily to assist in the
expansion of Soviet prestige and power and the placing of the United
States under a system of unilateral restraints. As such, detente must
be fully respected. Yet this respect should not be in the form of a
commitment to an idealistic faith in a doctrine that can save the world
from the horrors of a thermonuclear catastrophe. Rather, it should be in
the form of a respect that must be shown to a formidable and worthy oponent.
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If detente is pursued within the framework of the Soviet percep-
tion then it could also be a process that generates a good deal of con-
cern and trepidation. Detente could easily lead to a series of geopolitical
losses and constraints that could spell a period of rapid Soviet expansion
and eventual communist domination. When Brezhnev claims that the Soviet
Union intends "to pursue a policy of detente, striving to extend it to
every region of the globe, we in the United States might do well to
reflect a moment before extending our full support to his wishes.
It will be shown below that the Soviet cause has been served
very ably by detente. To demonstrate this, and to show how the Soviets
arrived at their perception and understanding of detente in 1972, it
is necessary to trace the historical development of this process. By so
doing both the historical and ideological continuity of detente from
1918 to 1980 will be more clearly manifested. In addition, the motives
and aspirations inherent in detente from the Soviet perspective should
become much more apparent.
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CHAPTER III
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DETENTE
It has become quite fashionable for political commentators to
write the final obituaries for detente. Detente. In this view, was
born in Moscow In 1972 and died In Afghanistan in 1980. Detente may or
may not have served Its basic purpose, but In any event, it is now dead;
the victim of a Soviet act of aggression and a firm American response
to that act.
Such an argument appears to contain two basic flaws, one of which
will be the focus of this present chapter. The first concern is that
there is evidence to suggest that detente is not dead. It is, to be sure,
being re-evaluated by the United States and may, in fact, be diminished
in the American view. However, it is not a forsaken policy in the Soviet
view. In fact, detente from the Soviet perspective, as will be shown
below, is being pursued with a good deal of enthusiasm. The second con-
cern addresses the birth of detente. Specifically, the claim that detente
is a policy that began in 1972 at the Moscow summit is one that deserves
careful scrutiny.
As was mentioned above, the concept of Soviet-American detente
has generated no small amount of confusion. Much of this confusion
rests with the fact that there is no consensus regarding the very meaning
of detente. Thus, as we have seen, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
while pursuing objectives contrary to the interests of the other, simul-
taneously acclaim the virtues of a detente policy that governs their relations
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The specific area of concern that has caused much of the
present misunderstanding relates to the role that history has played in
the formulation of detente. In short, this problem is manifested by
the tendency of many observers to perceive detente through a percep-
tual lens that virtually excludes an assessment of the historical
context in which detente has been conducted. Detente, in this view,
is seen as a novel policy that was designed by the Nixon and Brezhnev
regimes. Detente has been seen as their attempt to find a new and unpre-
cedented answer to the formidable dilerrma of managing Soviet-American
affairs, and as an alternative to the exacerbation of tensions and
mutual hostility that had marked their previous relations.
However, there is evidence to show that detente is a process with
which Soviet and American statesmen have been grappling for some time,
and which had been a variable in U.S.
-Soviet relations for a full half
century before Richard Nixon set foot on Soviet soil. Detente, in this
view, was not born with the signing of the Moscow Declaration of
Principles as many in Washington would have us believe. Rather, it can
be argued that it was conceived and put into practice as a viable tactic
and strategy in the earliest days of Soviet power. As such, the
phenomenon of detente has deep historical roots that should be understood
if its present manifestation as the most significant aspect of contemporary
interstate affairs is to be understood.
It could be quite misleading to view detente as the brainchild
of the present Soviet regime, or as some totally unheard of concoction
of Soviet propagandists who arduously labored to devise a politically
and ideologically proper means of addressing the problem of handling
Soviet-American relations in the 1970's. It would seem to be equally
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misleading to view detente as the righteous and virtuous policy devised
by American statesmen as the only sane and sensible
.eans of conducting
relations with Moscow without threatening the destruction of civilization
by inviting a cataclysmic thermonuclear holocaust. To perceive detente
in either of these fashions would be to ignore much of the history of
detente.
Detente in respect to U.S.
-Soviet relations is a by-product of
the unique tendencies that characterized the formulation of the tentative,
and often hostile, relations between two nations espousing antithetical
and totally irreconcilable ideologies and world views. Moreover, it was,
as the evidence below will show, a willful and carefully designed policy
of one system of government, whose avowed aim and primary purpose was
the complete overthrow and final destruction of the opposing socioeconomic
system. It was, in this view, an attempt to effect a means of conducting
international affairs in a manner that seemed most conducive to realizing
that system's ultimate goals.
The process of detente, whether or not it has been vigorously
adhered to by the nations of world capitalism-imperialism, has been
nurtured and reared throughout the history of Soviet-American relations
by the Soviet Union. Detente has progressed to the point that we are
now witnessing its final fruition as the legally accepted norm by which
both sides have agreed to conduct their mutual affairs. In this manner
the present variation of detente can be seen as representing a victory
of sorts for the Soviet Union. For fifty years the ruling hierarchy in
Moscow, and the most noted communist theoreticians in the world, had
been ardently proclaiming the correctness and objective necessity for
the policy of detente as the only rational means for conducting relations
among states with different social systems. In the face of this
unrelenting propaganda fusillade directed at the righteousness of the
peaceful- objectives of the Soviet Union, the Western world, and most
notably the United States, was unimpressed. In fact, the United States
tended to ignore the concept and avoided any outward manifestation of
tacit approval or adherence to this policy. The present Soviet regime
can rejoice to some extent in the fact that their program, conceived
and developed in the Leninist years, and meticulously bred to its full
maturation in the ensuing half century, has finally been accorded complete
and total recognition by the West, the very existence of which it was
originally created to destroy. When Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev
signed the "Declaration of Basic Principles" in Moscow in May of 1972
and proceeded from the "common determination" that there "is no alternative
to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence,"
they did not create the process of detente. Instead, as the ensuing
chapters will demonstrate, they merely accorded official recognition and
formal acceptance to a phenomenon of international relations that had been
a vital and central part of U.S.
-Soviet relations for more than fifty years.
The fact that the Soviet regime remained fully committed to
detente throughout such a long period of time, which witnessed marked
fluctuations from eras of conciliation to eras of animosity between
Moscow and Washington, is strong testimony to the tremendous degree
of importance that the Kremlin has attached to this concept. It is
important in this light to interject two caveats into the historical
and causal links from detente under Lenin to detente under the present
Soviet leadership.
The first of these considerations has to do with the revisions
62
which detente has undergone during its lifetime. To unequivocally
assert that detente politics of 1972 or 1980 and detente politics of
1918 or 1921 are totally and completely synonymous concepts, without
exhibiting the slightest variations in theory and practice, would be
to oversimplify, it will be demonstrated that detente, as a functioning
process dominating the conduct of Soviet-American affairs, has been
able to withstand the tests of time by virtue of its ability to adapt
and correspond to the ebb and flow of the volatile shifts in the atmosphere
of international relations. At any given time the process of detente,
viewed amidst the background of the existing international environment,
may be quite accurately perceived as more or less durable, intense, and
pragmatic than at another given time. Although detente transcends the
usual concerns of short-term international politics, it must be borne
in mind that the residual effects of these particular actions and events,
and the political climate they foster, have determined both the strength
of detente as well as the vigor and enthusiasm with which it is pursued.
Crises, unfavorable political incidents, wars, alliances, and political
leadership changes have all, at one time or another, proven to be prime
determining factors in the creation of periods in which detente was
mildly pursued amidst an air of increased tensions and contravening political
objectives. At the same time, these variables have fostered eras in
which the limited goals of both sides were coincidental, thus producing
a period of strong coexistence between the two as each strove to jointly
and harmoniously effect common ends.
Hence, it is not surprising that detente, as manifested during
the Soviet-American alliance of World War II, has been described as a
period, albeit of extremely short duration, in which both nations in
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their united quest to crush the
.enace of Nazi Germany, reduced tensions
and ani^sities to very lo« levels. This upsurge in the fortunes of
Soviet-American coexistence, of course, stood in marked contrast to
the preceding inter-war years, when, although peaceful coexistence was
inherent in the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, relations were
continually strained. Here, both parties, preoccupied with overriding
domestic difficulties and pursuing a foreign policy stance with objectives
inimical to the interests of the other, found little common ground for
mutual understanding.
Similarly the high level of cooperation and conciliation that
was witnessed in the struggle against Hitler experienced a drastic and
predictable downturn in the immediate postwar years as the Soviet Union
and the United States moved to the Cold War. The Cold War years, replete
with the tensions, threats, confrontation, saber-rattling, and short-lived
"spirits" of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro, would in their turn,
give way to the antithesis of improved relations and negotiations that we
are experiencing today. The present variation of detente is itself under-
going the same oscillations and pendular shifts of its predecessors.
The October Mideast War, the crisis in Angola, Afghanistan and the
strategic arms impasse, have all contributed to the flux and reflux we
are now witnessing between high levels of vitality for detente and the
lowest stratum of Cold War-like animosity.
It is important to remember that detente, notwithstanding the
above-mentioned fluctuations in U.S. -Soviet relations, permeated the
activity of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from 1918 to the present. Detente
may well have been weak or strong or passive or active during any one
year or period of years that spanned more than a half century of
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soviet-American relations. Yet, the evidence suggests that detente did
exist throughout this period and provided perhaps the one co^on thread
that has .arked Soviet foreign policy from its earliest years to conte.-
porary times «ith respect to its relations with the United States. As
will be seen below the form that detente took during this period changed
from a defensive ploy by Lenin and Stalin ("peaceful cohabitation"), to an
offensive strategy by Khrushchev ("peaceful coexistence"), to an aggressive
offensive strategy by Brezhnev ("detente" "relaxation, or reduction of
tension" )
.
The Soviet use of the terminology involved in the subject of
detente deserves some attention in that it both provides an accurate means
for measuring Soviet motives and underscores a central theme of this
dissertation. In the first place, it should be noted, as seen above, that
this writer employs the term detente to describe the Soviet version of a
policy from Lenin to Brezhnev. This is being done for two (2) principal
reasons. First, the term detente has become the accepted word, especially
in the West, that is used to describe the relationship between the nations
of the East and West in general, and the United States and the Soviet
Union in particular. Secondly, as will be argued below, the Soviet Union
in implementing a contemporary policy of detente has maintained the most
important features of the original detente policy of Lenin.
None of this is to say that the Soviet Union has consistently
utilized the word detente to describe any particular era of international
relations. In fact, Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev appear to have never
used the word at all. The usual terminology during the early years of
Soviet rule was mirnoe sozhitelstvo (peaceful cohabitation). It will be
argued below that this phrase, as an early variation of the detente
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terminology, was used to describe an essentially defensive strategy that
sought to gain a breathing spell or a respite in war for the Soviets. In
later years, the Soviet Union widely utilized the phrase
.irnoe sosushchest-
ovavanie (peaceful coexistence). As will be reasoned ^e^'Z^^^,
coexistence constitutes an offensive Soviet strategy that implies a
constant struggle with the West with the objective of assuring favorable
conditions for the worldwide victory of socialism. Contemporary Soviet
spokesmen often use the term razryadka
, or the phrase razryadka
^^^^^'^^osti (relaxation or reduction of tension). The term razryadka
has almost always been translated in the West to read detente. (Detente
is literally defined in Western dictionaries, e.g., Webster's Third New
International Dicti onary of the English Language Unabridged , rev. ed. (1976),
as the reduction or the lessening of tension.) However, detente ( razryadka )
is used by the Soviet Union to describe a state of reduced tensions
(especially, reduced thermonuclear war tensions) in international relations
resulting from the observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
Thus, razryadka would seem to flow from the phrase mirnoe sosushchestovavanie
and, in effect, be a component part of the latter. Peaceful coexistence,
which the Soviets, in their view, have defined with utmost clarity, then
becomes the most important of the three (3) detente-related phrases.
Detente, it will be argued below, represents a logical extension by the
Brezhnev regime of the Khrushchev policy of peaceful coexistence. It
will further be reasoned that Brezhnev, with the establishment of thermo-
nuclear parity, the realignment of world forces in favor of socialism,
and other factors felt it necessary to add an image of reduced tension
and threats and increased Soviet cooperation and friendliness to the
peaceful coexistence formula. It will also be shown that Brezhnev, in
the implementation of detente, never reduced, and actually strongly
reinforced, the primacy of the peaceful coexistence characteristics of
intensifying the political, economic, and ideological struggles, of
eliminating the international stat^M, furthering the expansion of
socialism, providing the best conditions for communist construction,
and preparing the way for the eventual worldwide victory of socialism.
To separate detente from peaceful coexistence, or to ignore the
relation between the two, can, quite naturally, cause confusion. Henry
Kissinger, in discussing detente, was using a term that would appear to
be very pleasant and non-threatening to an American audience. In the
face of a thermonuclear capacity that could destroy all of mankind, as
Kissinger often claimed, a detente, or relaxation of tensions, would seem
to be a most appropriate policy. However, it will be argued below that
the Soviet Union, by not using detente in isolation from peaceful coexis-
tence has a far different connotation of the same term.
One need also be mindful of the fact that a number of tactical
variations have been implanted in the Soviet strategy of detente over
the years. These changes have further differentiated present-day
detente from the process that was established by Lenin. It will be
argued below that the Soviet ruling hierarchy has revised and altered
basic components of detente politics to better suit the modern world of
thermonuclear technology. Yet, while the U.S.S.R. has interjected basic
strategic alterations in the tactical means of the detente process, the
final ends for which this strategy was initially created have not been
changed. Throughout the entire history of U.S. -Soviet detente, the
primary rationale for the inception of detente politics, the creation
of advantageous conditions for the strengthening of communism and the
dissemination of socialist principles to the direct disadvantage and
eventful demise of the capitalist-Imperialist system, has not been
el iminated.
The second consideration has to do with the unprecedented
significance that one should properly attach to the present era of
detente. It has been noted earlier that this writer is committed to
the view that the contemporary U.S.
-Soviet detente is the most important
facet of international relations of this or any other age. However, if
detente, as seen today, is a direct descendant and historical maturation
of a fifty year old policy with deep and lasting historical roots,
then it is important to reiterate why the latest variation of this
process is significantly more important than any of its earlier stages.
Detente, as we have correctly been told, has confronted the
United States with a challenge unprecedented in its history. Yet, much
of this reasoning is based on the assumption that the challenge with
which we are faced is primarily concerned with the prevention of nuclear
war and its almost certain devastation of modern civilization.
However, the relative significance of contemporary detente can
also be seen as a direct result of the strategic parity that now exists
between the two superpowers. Throughout all previous stages of detente
the process was almost always conducted between two vastly unequal parties
With the United States enjoying an inordinate military superiority, the
Soviet Union, in the initial phases of detente, had to set certain limits
on acceptable expansionist policies while struggling to overcome the
awesome gap in the relative military prowess of the two adversaries.
Even after emerging from the second world war as a bona fide military
power, the U.S.S.R. constantly had to be mindful of the superior military
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-ght Of its chief rival. While asserting itself ™ore aggressively
in the world arena, the Soviet Union could never fully challenge the
united States until a drastic altering of the strategic balance could
be realized. In the early 1960's the U.S.S.R. purported to have
achieved such a balance. Consequently. Moscow embarked on a fairly
aggressive, if not somewhat reckless, course of action. When this
alleged equality in strategic weaponry was shown to be a sham, however,
much Of the lifeblood of Soviet aggressiveness had been sapped, and the
Kremlin again became preoccupied with erasing the American nuclear
advantage.
The present Soviet leadership is not confronted with such an
overwhelming dilemma. By most accepted standards the U.S.S.R. has
achieved strategic parity, and can therefore act in the world arena as a
co-equal, with the United States vis-a-vis the relative military capabil-
ities of each side. While this balance of power quite naturally raises
the specter of nuclear war, an important asset from the Soviet perspective,
is the increased flexibility and risk-taking potential that it affords
the Kremlin.
Thus, during the present era of detente the Soviet Union has
shown an increased willingness to embark on a course of action aimed at
implementing i ncremental' and gradual changes in the East-West equation
to the direct detriment of the United States. While these alterations
in the framework of world politics, which are advantageous for Soviet
purposes, are being realized, the U.S.S.R. for its part can rattle the
saber of nuclear confrontation as a tempering and moderating factor to
any direct American response. Hence, the awesome destructive power of
thermonuclear weapons, and the effective equivalence of the world's two
nuclear superpowers have served as factors 1n both the level of
aggressiveness of any given policy objective and in the
.illtancy of
its elicited response.
We in the West have shown a willingness to give our tacit approval
to such a formula. American policy makers have exhibited a tendency to
place strategic arms control and reduced thermonuclear hostility on such
a high plateau of priorities that any "minor" area of concern could
be sacrificed on this altar of peace in the nuclear age. Hence, in
the case of Angola, in the face of serious encroachments by the Soviet
Union and its Cuban ally in that nation, the United States pursued a
policy that, in effect, stated that this area was not strategically
important enough to warrant a response that would either threaten the
ongoing strategic arms negotiations or invite a direct confrontation
between Moscow and Washington. Such a reaction on the part of the
American government might well serve to foster an era in which the fear
of a nuclear exchange can act as the catalyst for the further dissemin-
ation of Soviet influence, as outlined in their program of detente. In
the past detente provided the Soviet Union with a breathing spell, a
respite in war as Lenin described it, whereby the young Soviet state
could concentrate its efforts on strengthening its power and overcoming
the massive gap in the scientific-technological, and military capabil-
ities, vis-a-vis the West. All of this was done in preparation for the
inevitable and fatalistic confrontation with the capitalist powers.
The present era of detente, pursued in the environment of nuclear parity,
may well provide the fulcrum, without the necessity of a direct
catastrophic confrontation, by which the ultimate objectives of Soviet
ideology may be more easily and gradually realized.
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The history of Soviet-Z^erican relations, with the notable
exception of the mercurial period immediately following the Bolshevik
revolution, can be seen as the history of detente. Yet, it is obvious
that such a view is not uniformly held by all observers. Detente is
still often referred to as a new or unique phenomenon engendered by the
needs of the international political environment of the 1970's. In the
official report of the Secretary of State for 1972, for example, it is
noted that the Moscow summit, highlighted by the "signing of a declara-
tion embodying twelve basic principles of relations," had "helped to
usher in the beginning of a new era in U.S.
-Soviet relations
. Such
a reference to a "new" era of U.S.
-Soviet relations was characteristic
of the general theme espoused by the American government in the days
immediately following the Moscow summit. In his address to a joint
session of Congress upon his return from the Soviet Union, Richard Nixon
fostered the same view of detente as a unique and unprecedented process:
The foundation has been laid for a new relationship be-
tween the two most powerful nations in the world. Now it is
up to us, to all of us here in this chamber, to all of us
across America, to join with other nations in building a new
house upon that foundation, one that can be a home for the
hopes of mankind and a shelter against the storms of conflict.^
Much of the substance of this view can be explained by the need
for political bombast on the part of the president, and by the general
state of euphoria that permeated the immediate post-summit days. Yet,
it is still clear that detente was being defined as a process born of
the contemporary political milieu and, as such, constituted an unheralded
phenomenon. In his report to the Congress nearly a year after the
conclusion of the summit, Nixon asserted that this new era should be
all-inclusive since, "it is not a question of whether certain elements should
be separable, or conditional, but whether we wish the entire process of a
broadly based new relationship with the Soviet Union to unfold. ^ore
Importantly, the former president inexorably linked this "broadly based
new relationship" to the central themes elaborated upon in the "Declarati
of Basic Principles." In describing the Moscow Declaration, Nixon
accorded it the following place of Importance:
This far reaching step placed all our other efforts on
a broader foundation. A new relationship would require new
^e":"eit:rira^^;^^::^staJL:ni--°----^^^^
These principles are a guide for future action, not acommentary on the past.^
It must be remembered that the "Declaration of Basic Principles"
entails the primary elements of detente. Thus, when Nixon claims that
the declaration is representative of "new attitudes and aspiration,"
he is only representing, at best, one-half of the bi-lateral equation;
that of the American perspective. The doctrine of detente, it is argued,
was a symbol of Soviet attitudes and aspirations long before the term
became a fashionable addition to the American political lexicon.
In much the same manner, Arthur Hartman, the then Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, made detente synonymous with a
"new" period of U.S. -Soviet relations:
I am convinced that it is important for us to under-
stand the circumstances that have led to the beginning of this
new period in relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union and to ask ourselves hard questions about the meaning and
durability of these relationships that we sum up in the word
"detente." 5
Such a representation of detente can lend an air of misappre-
hension to the policy as we have come to know it today. To ignore the
historical roots of detente and perceive it as something new, might be
to ignore much of the underlying Soviet motivation for this process
that the Kremlin has manifested for more than fifty years.
It is interesting, in this light to ask just what the "newness"
of this relationship actually is. There is no doubt that the U.S. govern
ment, through its authoritative spokesmen, is referring to the new period
Of the™onuclear technology. Hence, in a lengthy address, devoted
solely to an exposition on the detente posture between Moscow and
Washington, Henry Kissinger elaborated on the unique feature of contem-
porary international life:
There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from
al previous historical periods; the existence of enormous^destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almotinstantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach Nopart of the globe would be spared the effects of a general
nuclear exchange. ° y^-'cr i
There is certainly no question that the emergence of vast nuclear
capabilities has added an unprecedented dimension to the conduct of
international affairs. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that the
process of detente, pursued within this environment, represents a new or
unique formula in itself. What is new, in this writer's view, is the
aforementioned strategic parity that has transformed the latest variation
of detente into a significant facet of contemporary world politics.
Throughout Soviet history the Kremlin leaders have constantly
asserted that their pursuit of peaceful coexistence represented a direct
continuation and fulfillment of an ideological doctrine established by
Lenin. In order to leave no room for misunderstanding, the Soviet press,
on the very day of the signing of the "Declaration of Basic Principles,"
implacably linked the present process of detente with that which was
established by Lenin:
The great Lenin put forward and fully substantiated the
principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different
social systems. In the very first hours of Soviet power, while
addressing the Second Congress of Soviets, he said: "We reject
all clauses concerning robberies and violence, but we shall
step from Its eo ogical n i ie
'
tu7T'''"^
With Richard Nixon still 1n Moscow, about to give his formal
approval to the principles of detente, the Soviet hierarchy left no doubt
that the American president was extending diplomatic recognition to a
Leninist policy that the Kremlin was faithfully and diligently imple-
meriting :
Backin the early days of the Soviet state, its founder
bilUy of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different
In^ll I'. ^^"^ore, the Soviet Union is readyto develop and deepen relations of businesslike cooperation
system 8
advantageous ties with states of the other social
Such a perspective, while exhibiting a greater sense of historical
accuracy than the aforementioned American view, is still imbued with a
number of misleading tenets. The Soviet perception of detente, although
much closer to the truth by virtue of its recognition of its historical
context, still posits some very convenient lapses of memory and indulges
in a bit of historical revisionism, something not altogether foreign
to Soviet propagandists. There is evidence to show that the present
variation of detente differs in fundamental ways from the theory as
established by Lenin.
In the first place, at the time of the Second Congress of Soviets
the policy of peaceful coexistence, despite the contrary claims of con-
temporary Soviet spokesmen, not only did not exist but represented the
antithesis of the Leninist view in respect to relations with the capitalist
world. The first months of Soviet-American relations, as will be discussed
was an
in detail below, were not characterized by any Leninist desire to
co-habitate the globe with the enemies of socialism. Rather, it
era noted for the intransigent view of Lenin pertaining to his belief
that the immediate overthrow of the opposing system should be implemented
Detente should not be seen as a process created immediately after the
Bolshevik seizure of control. It could,
.ore accurately, be viewed as
a strategic concept that was fully developed by Lenin only after the
Soviet leader, confronted with the failure of the socialist revolution
in Germany, realized that tne primary Soviet objectives could not be
achieved without the breathing spell that coexistence would provide.
Secondly, the present variation of detente differs fundamentally
from the Leninist conception of the doctrine in relation to the emphasis,
or lack thereof, which is attached to the issue of war and its inevita-
bility and necessity. The basic difference in this respect rests with
the fact that the present concept, especially after the 20th C.P.S.U.
Party Congress of 1956, constitutes a strategic theory that denies the
necessity of waging total war between the nations of socialism and
capitalism (although the continuing possibility of such a conflict is
not ignored). The Leninist concept, on the other hand, gave priority
to the objective necessity and inevitable eventuality of a final
Armageddon between the two systems. In this manner, the surviving
system, which historical objectivity dictated would be the Soviet state,
would transform the world by implanting its way of life on the ruins of
the vanquished.
The third basic alteration has to do with the nature of detente
as a temporary or perpetual foreign policy stance of the U.S.S.R. The
present leadership, it will be argued, has made detente the primary and
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fundamental guideline to which all aspects of Soviet foreign policy are
to be subordinated. As such, the concept Is permanent in essence,
since as a mode of conducting relations with different social systems,
it will only cease to function when there Is no opposing system with
"
Which to relate, i.e.. when the complete and final victory of socialism
and the total defeat of capitalism have been realized. Lenin, however,
clearly perceived detente as a strategy that was transient in nature, as it
was designed as a response to a specific and limited situation at a
particular time. When, In the Leninist view, the Soviet state had
strengthened itself sufficiently during the respite of detente, the
policy would be discarded and the two systems would engage in their life
and death struggle.
The present Soviet contention that detente constitutes a direct
continuation of Leninist policies, notwithstanding the obvious differ-
ences that have manifested themselves over the years, is a viewpoint
that still possesses more truth than fallacy. In fact, it may be safe
to assume that Lenin, a most resolute pragmatist and a strategist always
mindful of the need to alter or compromise principles and theoretical
beliefs, might very well approve of the strategy of detente politics as
practiced by the present Soviet regime. The current manifestation of
detente has not abandoned the basic Leninist ideological tenet of altering
the world in the communist order. As such, it can be seen as a strategic
concept adhering to the behests of the founder of the Soviet state.
It is important to ask ourselves now, in just what manner we have
arrived at the present epoch of Soviet-American detente. How has this
policy evolved and matured over the years to the point that we are now
witnessing its fruition as the accepted form of governing the behavior
between the world's two nuclear superpowers? The answers to these
questions can be ascertained by an elaborate and detailed examination
of the history of detente as a concept of managing East-West, and .ore
specifically, U.S.
-Soviet relations.
The ensuing chapters will therefore, serve as an inquiry, that
will focus on an historical analysis of the process of detente from
1918 to the present.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III
1
1973), pp. l!9-310 ^
U.STG^^^^iFEF^^
2.,
Relatinn."^^%HH''°'' k"T^^: ^'"^ Opportunities in U.S. -Sovietons. Address by Richard Nixon before a joint sesJinn nf th.Congress, June 1, 1972. Ibid
., p. 611.
s o of the
U.S. Government Printinn nffiVo^ n -jc > '^/o ^wdbmngion.g O ce), p. 35.
^Ibid
. , p. 37
5
Fn.nno n/^^ u ^^^^ ' Testimony before the Subcommittee onEurope of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 15 1974 u SDepartment of State, Bulletin
, Vol. LXX, No. 1823 (June 23, 1974)^
Henry A. Kissinger. Address made in San Francisco CaliforniaFebruary 3, 1976. Ibid., LXXIV, No. 1913 (February Tll^e), p. 206
'
^"For the Benefit of Peace and Security." Pravda, May 29, 1972,
g
N. Podgorny, Pravda
,
May 23, 1972, p. 2
77
ernac-
CHAPTER IV
THE LENINIST PERCEPTION AND
APPLICATION OF DETENTE
The political philosophy of V.I. Lenin is a very complicated
subject. Lenin not only revised a good deal of Marxism, but added a
prolific body of theoretical literature of his own. It can be argued
that the combination of the two, or Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet v
ular, formed the basis of the ideological content of detente. For all
intents and purposes, however, detente bears the distinct imprimatur of
Lenin, who was faced with the formidable challenge of making a revolutionary
theory work in the face of a hostile world.
In order to fully understand the intricate complexities that
dictated the necessity for Lenin's formulation of detente, one should
subject two important variables to an in-depth examination; 1.) the
tumultuous historical setting in which the process was born, and 2.) the
fluctuating characteristics of Leninist ideology which, in response to
this particular historical environment, provided both the rationale and
justification for a strategy of action based on reducing tensions with
the West. Primary emphasis will be given in this chapter to the adaptive
qualities of Leninist ideology that allowed for the creation of detente.
The Historical Setting
One is hard pressed to depict accurately in words the chaos and
turmoil that accompanied the fall of the Czarist autocracy and the eventual
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seizure of power by Lenin and his Bolshevik cohorts. The holocaust
Of world War I and the concomitant political, social, and economic
disarray engendered by that conflict had all but reduced the Russia of
1917 to a prostrate nation. The military situation was one of complete
turmoil. The disillusioned Russian anny, having suffered intolerable
losses of human life, became a disorganized and bedraggled fighting
force that could offer little, if any, resistance to the crushing enemy
onslaught. Internally, the turbulent storm of discontent forecast a
far more onerous turn of events fnr fho ovtc + -;««fejnts To tne existing government. With the
near complete breakdown of governmental control, the destruction of
communications and transportation, and widespread problems of famine,
disease, and social upheaval, Russia in 1917, it can be argued,
represented one of the most complete cases of turbulence and social
collapse ever suffered by a modern government.
This situation was further aggravated by the existence of a
number of diverse revolutionary political parties. While often working
towards self-exclusive ends and engaging in bitter and violent conflicts
among themselves, these forces managed to manipulate the frantic con-
vulsions of wartime Russia and the disillusionment of the masses into an
effective revolution that destroyed the Czarist monarchy. However, the
fall of Czarism and the ensuing reigns of the Provisional Governments,
with their weak and ineffective coalitions of irreconcilable individuals
and parties, failed to stem the tide of revolutionary fervor and agitation
that had swept the country. The new government also decided to continue
Russian participation in the war. In so doing, the Provisional Government
sowed the seeds of its own destruction and provided the catalyst for the
metamorphic transformation of power into the hands of a relatively small
band of conspiratorial revolutionaries who. to this day, have not
relinquished their control.
The governments of the West, and most notably the United States,
apparently possessed little understanding of the complicated and diversi-
fied events that were unfolding in this traumatic drama in Russia.
Guided by a perspective that was dictated by the exigencies of the First
World War, American politicians and policy makers had little time to con-
cern themselves with the bizarre and puzzling series of revolutions
and ensuing governments on Russian soil, except as they pertained to the
pursuance of the war itself. As though no drastic alteration of the
basic structure of Russian power had ever occurred the United States
seemed to look upon the new regime as a manifestation of Czarist Russia
without the person of the Czar.
Hence, the United States wasted little time in extending formal
diplomatic recognition to the new government based on the hope that "the
cordial relations existing between the two countries continue" and "prove
mutually satisfactory and beneficial . "'' Likewise, President Wilson,
amidst the background of the chaos and havoc of post-Czarist Russia,
expressed both the "deep friendship of the American people for the
people of Russia," and his hope that they would find "the best and most
practical means of cooperation between the two peoples in carrying the
present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful con-
2
summation." This policy seemingly involved a continuation of policies
pursued with Nicholas II. It also apparently ignored the horrendous
series of misfortunes that the Kerensky government was experiencing.
The catastrophic military losses suffered in the new offensive, the
further spread of famine and governmental collapse, the armed uprisings
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and revolts, and the Increased disenchantment of the «sses, all combined
to render the Provisional Government useless and Interjected a new and
volatile variable into the already advanced state of mass confusion
that existed on Russian soil.
This new factor, of course, was the formidable rise of the
Bolshevik Party which, through its irrepressible and tenacious leader
V.I. Lenin, called for an immediate and violent revolution, not only in
Russia, but throughout the entire capitalist world. This new Bolshevik
phenomenon, as will be explained below, would confront the United States
with a heretofore unseen foreign policy dilemma. Guided by the dictates
of Leninist ideology, the new Soviet government would add a complicated,
and often misunderstood, variable to the overall pursuit of American
objectives. The Bolshevik Party first irritated the United States by
refusing to continue military participation in the war. The Soviets then
added insult to injury, and no doubt confused a good many people, by
asserting that their revolution would not be complete until it had
successfully crumbled the pillars of the American government itself.
The means by which Lenin was able to seize power and maintain it
during these turbulent years is a fascinating historical pnenomenon in
its own right. The main focus of this chapter, however, is on the flexible
aspects of Leninist ideology that allowed for the formulation of detente.
Leninist Ideological Revisionism :
The Foundation of Detente
By carefully analyzing Leninist ideology, in regard to its
flexible and adaptive qualities, three areas of detente will be more
clearly understood. First, the necessity of creating detente, from
Lenin's perspective, will be demonstrated. Secondly, the changing
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characteristics of detente, that became obvious during Lenin's lifetime,
will be highlighted. These two characteristics will then shape much
of the ideological content of detente that persists to this day.
As will be shown below, Marxist-Leninist ideology has exhibited
the ability to be adapted to a format that can conform to many prevailing
historical or political situations. This is not to say that Marxist-
Leninist ideology has been totally perverted, or that its basic fundamentals
have been eliminated. At the same time, however, it cannot be seen as an
overall inflexible or ironclad dogma with no room for interpretation and,
in some cases, revision. The present Soviet leadership, as will be shown
in the ensuing chapter, steadfastly adheres to the most crucial and
fundamental principles of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, in
regard to specific details of action, the ideology in many aspects appears
to serve more as a blueprint for acceptable activity than as a prescriptive
guide to specific behavior. It can be demonstrated that Lenin opened
many of the floodgates of human voluntarism and permitted the interpreta-
tion and alteration of ideology. This was seen by Lenin as a means by
which he could both seize power in economically backward Russia, and then
formulate a foreign policy for a socialist state in the midst of an
unreceptive capitalist world.
Marxism, as a reflection of socialist theories originally espoused
by Marx and developed by his followers and successors, utilized a set of
scientific principles that were based on a commitment to the laws of
historical and economic determinism. A socialist revolution, in this
sense, would occur first in the most advanced states of Europe. Here,
the basic preconditions for a socialist transformation, including a
class conscious and exploited proletariat, a state of high capitalist
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productivity, and an advanced level of Industrialization, would first
be realized. These factors would Inevitably lead to the Increased
.Isery
of the proletarian class and the eventual
"dialectical leap" whereby
capitalist would pass into the higher for. of socialise. A™ed uprisings,
«ars. riots, strikes, revolts, conspiracies, propaganda, and assassinations
were of relatively minor importance in this body of thought. While these
variables may exist in any era of socialist transformation, they would
be subordinated to the more crucial factor of advanced capitalist
development.
Lenin adhered to the spirit of these laws of Marxism. In fact,
Lenin dismissed any "nonsense" about "Russia, for instance, being able
to avoid capitalist development, jump out of capitalism, or skip over it,
by some means other than the class struggle on the basis, and within the
limits of capitalism. "2 Thus, it would appear to have been incumbent
upon Lenin to show that capitalism had indeed become fully developed in
Russia in 1917. Earlier, Lenin had made a rather unpersuasive attempt to
chart the progress of capitalist development on Russian soil from 1895
to 1898.^ In 1917, in the face of the lack of the precondition of advanced
capitalist development, (e.g., Russia's small proletariat and capitalist
class, rural-based economy, etc.), Lenin asserted that "objective con-
ditions show that the war has accelerated the development of capitalism
which advanced from capitalism to imperialism, from monopoly to state
5
control."
Lenin, however, apparently realized that the development of
capitalism in Russia had not reached its fullest proportions as envisioned
by the laws of Marxism. It was imperative therefore, for Lenin to inject
the hand of human intervention and voluntarism as an alternative to any
ng.d determinism. To this end. Lenin would "bring" the revolution to
Russia, and bypass some of the essential economic requirements. This
would be done by use of his dedicated corps of clandestine and con-
spiratorial revolutionaries and propagandists who would serve as contriving
agitators in "rousing political discontent among all classes, rousing
the sluggards, pushing on the laggards and providing a wealth of material
for the development of the political consciousness and political activity
of the proletariat."^ It was a belief of Lenin that the "only serious
principle the active workers of our movement can accept is strict secrecy,
strict selection of members and the training of professional revolutionaries,"^
who, as he had earlier stated, would "devote to the revolution not only their
spare evenings but the whole of their lives. "^ The revolution had therefore,
been given a push by the Bolshevik Party which was aware of the backwardness
of Russia as well as its total lack of socialist revolutionary zeal. They
then, would "go among all classes of the people as theoreticians, as
propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers," bearing in mind Lenin's
behests that "the principal thing is propaganda and agitation among all
strata of the people."^ In this and many other ways, such as his revolu-
tionary alliance with the peasantry which Marx and Engels had denounced as
"reactionary," and his belief in the primacy of the need for violent and
armed uprisings, Lenin gave his revolution a much-needed touch of pragmatic
reality. By so doing, he effectively bypassed some of the more basic
teachings of Marxism and brought a socialist transformation of power to an
underdeveloped, agrarian-based, and rural country.
The most crucial aspects of the Leninist revision of Marxism, in
this writer's view, occurred in the treatment that Lenin accorded the
theories of imperialism, war, and the forcible exportation of socialist
85
revolutions abroad, all of which played a critical role In the initial
formulation of the policy of detente. In .uch the same man,^r that
contemporary Soviet propagandists justify their
"Independent elaboration"
of Marxist-Leninist Ideology. Lenin had little difficulty In explaining
the need for updating Marxism in the "era of Imperialism." Lenin
Incessantly criticized those who would "fix for all time the point of
view Marx held in a different epocji." as an attempt to use the Utter
of Marxism against the spirit of Marxism. "''O m this light, Lenin
showed the proper relationship of Marxism to the revolutionary struggle
in Russia.
We do not by any means look upon the theory of Marx assomething final and inviolable; on the contrary, we a^e con-
vinced that it only laid the cornerstone of the science wMchSocialists must advance in all directions, if they do not want
J?n^^ M ^ ^^^'"^ ^^^^ independent elabora-tio of Marx's theory is especially necessary for Russian
Socialists since this theory provides only the general guidingprinciples which in detail must be applied in England in a
manner different from that applied in France, in France in a
manner different from that applied in Germany, and in Germany
in a manner different from that applied in Russia. ""^
Lenin, as contemporary Soviet leaders, claimed that "we are
Marxists and we take as our basis the Communist Manifesto . "^^ However,
as he admitted earlier, those "who are in the least acquainted with the
actual state of our movement cannot but see that the spread of Marxism
was accompanied by a certain lowering of theoretical standards . """^ It
can be reasoned that this lowering of theoretical standards and independent
elaboration of Marxism provided Lenin with the theoretical basis for formu-
lating the policies that guided Soviet relations with the West; policies
that would eventually lead to the strategy of detente.
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Jh^arly Months of U.^
-^2:l::tJVTj_^
The first Official action in the history of Soviet-y^erican
relations took place the day after the Bolshevik seizure of power on
November 8, 1917. At that time the Second All-Russian Congress of
Soviets issued the "Decree on Peace." The new Soviet government, dis-
avowing any allegiance to the Czarist wartime alliance, called for all
belligerent parties to submit to "the immediate opening of negotiations
for a just and democratic peace. "^^ At the same time, the Soviet
government instructed its military authorities to enter into preliminary
negotiations with the military representatives of the Central Powers.
The objective of these negotiations would be the immediate ceasing of
all military operations on the Russian front and, if need be, the
establishment of a separate peace treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia.
The American response to this action was stern. The United States,
committed to a military victory over Germany, could not but "categorically
and energetically protest against any separate armistice which may be
made by Russia. "''^ Thus, the United States announced an embargo on supply
shipments to Russia and warned that "the exports to Russia will be resumed
only after the formation of a steady government which can be recognized by
the United States, but if the Bolsheviks will remain in power and will
put through their program of making peace with Germany, the present embargo
on exports to Russia will remain in force. "^^ Furthermore, the new
Soviet government was reminded of the treaty of September 5, 1914 which
precluded any separate armistice. The United States warned the Bolsheviks
therefore, that "any violation of the treaty by Russia will be followed
by most serious consequences."^^
Undaunted, Lenin pursued the negotiations with Germany. Against
majoritarian opposition within his own party.^^ ^enip then submitted
to the treaty of Brest-Li tovsk. The initial phase of U.S.
-Soviet
relations was overshadowed therefore, by the hostility and animosity that
resulted fro. different perspectives on the need to pursue military
operations against the Central Powers.
Notwithstanding the obvious impact that it had on the exacerba-
tion of tensions between the United States and Soviet Russia, Lenin's
"Decree on Peace" should be noted most for the apparent contradiction
that it represents in Leninist ideology. Here was a revolutionary
obsessed with the need for violence, armed revolutions, and revolutionary
wars as important determinants in any socialist transformation. Yet, his
first official proclamation after assuming control of the seat of
Russian power was one that called for peace and a termination of military
hostilities. This apparent paradox is easily dispelled upon a closer
examination of the ideological thought of Lenin in regard to the topic
of war. It was this view of war that dictated the strategy pursued by
the Bolsheviks during World War I, and also provided the guiding principl
for the formulation of the policy of detente.
The subject of war and peace constituted a major portion of
Leninist ideology. In addition, a good deal of Lenin's philosophy
regarding war has, to this day, lingered in the official volumes of
communist doctrine.
Lenin adhered to the definition of war developed by Clausewitz.
Hence, he could claim that, " as applied to wars, the main thesis of the
dialectic is that 'war is simply the continuation of politics by other
(i.e., violent) means . ' " Lenin further felt that this view was "always
the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded every war as the
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°f the politics of the given interested powers.""
Furthermore, Lenin applied this theory to the peace that would ensue
after any war:
Just as all war is but the continuation by violent meansOf the politics which the belligerent statesVn th cla ses
^^^rh^^e been conducting for many years o the
u d' List?a?? n ir/. ''''''' '''' ^han a summingp an registratio of the changes in the relation of forces
g^ven wa? 2^
consequence ol, the
Lenin had not always subscribed to the belief that wars, especially
of an international magnitude, could provide the needed stimulus for a
socialist transformation. His vacillation in this regard provided one
of his first cases of "lowering of theoretical standards." As a delegate
of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party to the 1907 Congress of the
Second International, Lenin agreed with the resolutions of that conference
that called for the immediate termination of any international war.
Such wars, in the view of the International, could not assist the world
socialist movement. Rather, they could only succeed in causing greater
hardships and agonies for the already oppressed masses. Hence, Lenin had
clearly sided with those who believed that a worldwide conflagration, such
as World War I, must be opposed by all Marxists with a resolute and
unyielding pacifist stance.
Lenin, however, proved his mettle as one of history's greatest
opportunists, and quickly saw the inestimable revolutionary value provided
by the massive spread of the world's first international military holocaust.
As the First World War brought its unparalleled destruction and devastation
throughout the entire European continent, Lenin devoted all his tireless
energy to a campaign that would eliminate any pacifist stance toward the
war. Lenin replaced this view with revolutionary action aimed at
transforming the conflict into a socialist revolutionary war that not
only would topple the Czarist monarchy, but would herald the complete
downfall Of the entire world capitalist system. In addition, Lenin
argued that any imperialist alliance during or after this war was tempor-
ary in nature, as murderous wars between them were inevitable:
Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars and in
the other, giving rise to alternating forms of peacefuland non-peaceful struggle out of one and the same bali of
i:S"or]"pom?^5r^ r^KTit^^ economics
The first four months of U.S.
-Soviet relations were characterized
by the Leninist quest to export the new socialist revolution to the
nations of the West. Overcome with the euphoria that accompanied their
swift acquisition of power, the Bolsheviks wasted few diplomatic courtesies
and points of protocol in their attempt to topple the governments of the
capitalist-imperialist system.
It is not surprising that American statesmen were quite aghast
when listening to this steady flow of unheard of progaganda from a
government that stood for every policy and belief that was inimical to
the interests of the United States. Here was a government that had
repudiated all codes of ethics and morality, outside of their own, and
denounced them as "a deception, a fraud, which clogs the brains of the
workers and peasants in the interests of the landowners and capitalists."^^
The Soviets had deprecated the notion of a God as "a complex of ideas
begotten by the cross submissi veness of man, by external nature and
by class oppression - ideas which tend to perpetuate this submissi veness
,
to deaden the force of the class struggle." The United States quite
accurately saw a nation, in Soviet Russia, which was unheralded in its
own obsession with war, violence, terror and an indomitable passion to
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export its successes to every non-socialist nation on the globe
Furthermore. Lenin let it be known that this exportation of the socialist
transformation would not involve peaceful methods. As Lenin claimed:
"the proletariat cannot achieve victory without breaMnaJhej:esisMce
Of the bourgeoisie, without forcibly s uppressing its enemi.. ..^^ :„
regard to the United States. Lenin was emphatic on the need for violence.
Lenin felt that "the replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian
state is impossible without a violent revolution." and that "today, both
in England and America, the 'precondition of any real people's revolution'
is the breakup, the shattering of the 'ready-made state machinery. '"^5
Lenin and his Soviet spokesmen were also something less than
courteous in other remarks about the United States in this early period.
In his treatise State and Revolution. Lenin had clearly marked the United
States as one of the most obvious examples of a ruthless state serving
as the instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed classes. This
was true, according to Lenin, by virtue of the government's "direct corrup-
tion of officials" and by "the alliance of the government with the stock
26
exchange." Furthermore, Lenin castigated the United States for the
unprecedented extremes of its class contradictions:
...America has become one of the foremost countries as
regards the depth of the abyss which divides a handful of
brazen billionaires who are wallowing in dirt and in luxury
on the one hand and millions of toilers who are always on the
verge of starvation. 27
When President Wilson sent his message to the new Soviet govern-
ment expressing his solidarity with the Russian people in their "attempt
to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become masters
28
of their own life," the Bolsheviks responded in a manner that the
American chief executive had never before experienced. The Soviets
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caustically replied that they take "the opportunity of President
Wilson's message to express to all peoples, suffering and dying from
the horrors of imperialist war, its warm sympathy and its firm belief
that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all
the bourgeois countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and
establish a socialist state of society. "'29 ^he Soviet preoccupation
with the exporting of their revolution would cloud every issue of early
Soviet-American relations, and would come to an end only after Lenin
realized that this "happy time" might well be in the very distant future.
1918: The Birth of Detente
Most Western experts on Soviet foreign policy characterize the
year 1921 as the starting point for a basic re-aligning of Soviet foreign
policy objectives. Consequently, 1921 is often seen as the time when
peaceful coexistence became a viable alternative to the heretofore
inalterable policy of revolutionary confrontation. In his classic
Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967
.
Adam B. Ulam labels 1921 as a "watershed in Soviet internal as well as
external politics" as it ushered in an era that "witnessed the elaboration
of a new pattern of Soviet foreign relations . ""^"^ Likewise, George Kennan
saw 1921 as a time when "relations with the Western governments achieved
a new seriousness in the eyes of the Soviet leaders; and they now allotted
a high priority to their development."^"' It would be difficult to dis-
pute the claims of such noted scholars that 1921 marked an important and
critical time in Soviet history. To be sure, this year was highlighted
by the beginning of a new era in the theoretical and practical formulation
of the Soviet world outlook. However, there is evidence to show that the
Kremlin hierarchy, as early as March of 1918 with the signing of the
treaty of Brest-Li tovsk
,
had already started the process of realigning
Soviet foreign policy. At that time Lenin, as will be presented below,
realized that a detente relationship with the West in general, and the
United States in particular, was necessary.
The detente of 1918 can be seen as a policy that was unilateral
in nature. This detente did not include the full ramifications of the
policy that would be developed later (e.g. formal diplomatic relations,
treaties, reciprocal trade, etc.), but entailed a detente from the
Soviet perspective. Lenin was convinced that the new Soviet regime should
pursue a policy of coexistence based on a number of realistic assessments,
including the objective reality that a breathing spell was needed for the
implementation of internal consolidation. Yet, no Western government,
due to their preoccupation with the war and their basic mistrust of the
Bolsheviks, would engage in any reciprocal relationship with the Soviet
government at this time.
Lenin, in his frenzied quest to implement a socialist revolution
in all parts of the capitalist world had hinged much of his hope on the
success of an immediate uprising in war-weary Germany. It was here,
in Lenin's view, where the entire fate of the European socialist trans-
formation was being determined. If Germany had met with success from
Lenin's perspective, then the worldwide socialist transformation might
well have been realized as an immediate goal of his revolutionary party.
As Lenin declared:
If the German revolution were to break out and triumph
in the coming three or four months, the tactics of an immedi-
ate revolutionary war might perhaps not ruin our socialist
revol ution . 32
However, Lenin realized that the prospects for an immediate
German uprising were not good. He then stated that "it would be
absolutely impermissible tactics to stake the fate of the socialist
revolution...merely on the chance that the German revolution may begin
in the immediate future, within a matter of weeks. Such tactics would
be a reckless gamble. We have no right to take such risks. "33
^he
fact that the global socialist transformation depended on the events
in Germany, and that this revolt was not forthcoming as planned, then
became a matter of official policy.
At all events, under all conceivable circumstances ifthe German revolution does not come we are doomedThe revolution will not come as quickly as expectedHistory has proven this, and we must be able to take this,as a fact, to reckon with the fact that the world socialist
revo ution cannot begin so easily in the advanced ou tr esas the revolution began in Russia. 34
"
Lenin was also aware that a number of internal difficulties had
made it imperative to secure a breathing spell and to postpone any
external revolutionary activity for the time being. With the outbreak
of the civil war in Russia, Lenin, although convinced of the ultimate
Bolshevik victory, was forced to concede that "some time must inevitably
elapse, no little exertion of effort will inevitably be required, a
certain period of acute economic dislocation and chaos, which accompany
all wars, and civil wars in particular, are inevitable, before the
resistance of the bourgeoisie is crushed. "^^ In addition, as Lenin
admitted, his government was plagued by sabotage and terror from the
newly disenfranchised bourgoisie. This sabatoge had, in his words, "proven
so stubborn and capable of assuming such diversified forms that the
fight against it will inevitably require some more time, and in its
main forms, is hardly likely to end until several months have passed. "'^^
Lastly, Lenin had to take note of the critical food situation and the
danger of famine and concede th;it " + ^a the organizational problems of the
socialist transformation of Russia are so immense and difficult that
their solution..
.Will also require a fairly long time.''37
,,,,
required then was a "certain amount of time, several months at least
during which the hands of the socialist government must be absolutely
free to achieve victory over the bourgeoisie first in our own country
and to launch far-reaching mass organizational work on a wide scale. "^^
Lenin then announced, in detailed form, in his article "The Immediate
Tasks of the Soviet Government," a policy that can be equalled with
detente, in its earliest form:
make use of the respite given us by the combination of
nict d^bfthP
''''
'i:
''''
''^y -°-ds
RnH r.nH K T T"" ^"^^'^^ organism of
a re ? ?nto'c"^
-'^^"^ revUa}
,
without which
conceivable
countries defense potential is in-
It also goes without saying that we shall be able to
render effective assistance to the socialist revolution inthe West, which has been delayed for a number of reasons
only to the extent that we are able to fulfill the task of
organization confronting us. 39
°^
To do otherwise, in Lenin's view, and to embark upon a course of
direct confrontation with the West would be of the utmost folly. While
answering "the human yearning for the beautiful, dramatic and striking,"
it "would totally disregard the objective balance of class forces and
material factors at the present stage. To ignore the objective balance
of class forces on the issue would be a fatal error. "^° Thus, it was
necessary for Lenin to enter a period of detente, and to direct the
energies and activities of the new government to the formidable array of
enemies, both of man and nature, that had aligned themselves against
the Bolsheviks. To do this Lenin created the world's first detente be-
tween the two conflicting socio-economic systems. This detente, although
temporary 1n nature, would then become a ™ajor component of Soviet
foreign policy.
The concept of detente, in view of this evidence, was not coinci-
dental with the formulation of Soviet Russia, as contemporary Soviet
historians would have us believe. The evidence would also show that it
was not designed at the same time as the implementation of the New
Economic Policy, as some Western observers claim. Rather, it can be
reasoned that it was a product of the Leninist realization that the mass
of serious domestic problems had made co-habitation of the world with
the capitalist powers an unfortunate though temporary necessity. This
program was detailed in its entirety by G.V. Chicherin in his report on
foreign policy to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This report
deserves some attention on our part here since it graphically outlines
the basic principles of detente that would remain uniform for decades to
come. According to the Soviet Comnissar for Foreign Affairs, "in the
period following the conclusion of the Brest treaty, Russia's foreign
policy has gone along lines different from those followed in the first
months after the October revolution. "^^ Chicherin then fully enunciated
the meaning of this difference:
At the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 the basic
feature of our foreign policy was the revolutionary offensive.
It took its bearings from the immediate prospect of the world
revolution, for which the Russian revolution was to serve as
the signal
.
...For the last four months it (Soviet Russia) has been
compelled to pursue the aim of pushing off and postponing the
dangers threatening it from all sides, trying to gain as much
time as possible.
. .for the new forms of political and social
relationships established by the Soviet Government to take
root among the popular masses of Russia.
The position of Soviet Russia between two imperialist
coalitions, like being between two fires, is extremely diffi-
cult, but we can say with full confidence that the best and
indeed the only way that we can overcome this position is by
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internal consol I'dation
. . .and bv the re. ^-^^t-
force for the protection o? the concues^rorn" ' V^'^''^The nearer we come to rean,?n„
™'?''^^5ts of our revolution.
position abroad : 1 °bet r f re on oolir*''
our internal policy. 42 ' dependent on
It is debatable as to how long this period of detente was to
last, or exactly what its full dimensions and parameters would be. The
key variable, outside of internal consolidation and a military resur-
gence, was the now less than enthusiastic prospect of other socialist
revolutions. As Chicherin declared, the Soviets were resting and
recuperating but still "awaiting the moment when the proletariat of other
countries will help us to complete the socialist revolution we began in
n 43October." Much the same sentiment was expressed by Lenin when he
claimed
:
H./\^''\"°V^"''^ ^ beleaguered fortress until otherdetachments of the international socialist revolution come
to our rescue. But these detachments exist
,
they are more
"^'^^'"o^s than ours, they mature, they they becomi
stronger as the bestialities of imperialism continue. 44
However, such incantations may have served as no more than an
exercise in the ritualistic recital of propaganda verbiage paying homage
to a long-awaited dream that had been dashed upon the rocks of the
failure of the worldwide socialist revolution. The Soviet government,
although paying lip service to the cause of global socialist transforma-
tion, had already begun to test the waters of reciprocal economic and
trade relations with the United States in the Spring of 1918. Chicherin
in his aforementioned report had alluded to the Western willingness to
engage in normal state-to-state relations in the economic realm, and
claimed that "instead of a policy of robbery, these elements in both
coalitions would prefer a policy of trade, of concessions and economic
45
conquests." Earlier, Trotsky, as Soviet Commissar for War, had
addressed an appeal to the United States government, through Colonel
Robins, the head of the American Red Cross mission in Russia, in which
he inquired as to "what kind of support would be furnished particularly
and especially by the United States," should the German government break
the treaty of Brest-Li tovsk in order to renew "its robber's raid."^^
Incidentally, Trotsky had earlier stated his belief that the United
States was, or would soon be, interested in developing an economic
rapport with the new Soviet regime. According to the Commissar for War:
America can be tolerant with regard to the existence ofthe Soviet Government, since it is satisfied with the ex-haustion of the Allied countries and Germany. Apart from
Russia'^47^"
^'^ interested in investing its capital in
Lenin himself, on May 14, 1918 gave his official stamp of
approval to the normalization of trade relations, in a lengthy and elab-
orate plan for Russian-American commercial relations that he sent to
Colonel Robins. In this plan Lenin, in great detail, delineated a system
of trade whereby the fledgling Soviet state would gain much needed "tools
of production" by granting concessions to the United States for the
development of Russian raw materials. According to this preliminary
plan, Lenin fully realized that "without the assistance of countries,
which are producing a large quantity of the tools of production for
agricultural purposes as well as parts of railroad stock, it will not be
easy for Russia, and she will not be able with any degree of speed to
overcome all the difficulties of re-establishing the economic life of the
48
country." Furthermore, Lenin acknowledged the fact that the United
States, as the nation that was not ravaged during the havoc of World
War I, would, if it so desired, become the leading trading partner with
Soviet Russia. Lenin fully conceded the fact that Germany, the chief
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commercial dealer with pre-war Russia, had been so devastated by the
war that it was •'compelled to surrender her leading place as the source
for the economic life of Russia for the next few years to a country
which has not been disorganized as much as Germany by the war. Only
America can become that country. "^^ Aware that Russia would be unable
to pay for the American products imported by his government, Lenin de-
vised a system of economic concessions, which would be repeated and
emphasized with greater intensity in 1921 with the implementation of
the more elaborate coexistence strategy. The May, 1918, plan for paying
the United States called for the following concessions and guarantees to
America, which could:
_
...participate actively in the exploitation of the marine
riches of Eastern Siberia, of coal and other mines, as well as
in the railroad and marine transportation construction in
Siberia and northern European Russia. Especially in the con-
struction of the Northern Sea route with the Enisei River, the
improvement of water routes, building of ports and using of
the water power, there is great need.
As security of payment for products brought into Russia,
America could be given the privilege of participating in cer-
tain construction enterprises.
. .The United States could also
participate on a large scale in the development of certain
well-known extensive agricultural tracts, by introducing
modern methods, receiving in return a large proportion of the
products
.
Further, Russia guarantees that the military stores which
are on hand in Russia will not be sold to Germany, and that all
war materials which were manufactured in England and America for
Russia will be transferred to the United States. 50
As early as the Spring of 1918, Lenin had conceived and graphically
detailed both the imperative need for a period of detente as well as the
course that this policy would take in the economic realm. If we assume
that Lenin was quite serious in his belief that the economic revival of
Soviet Russia was of utmost paramountcy, and that he honestly wished
to enlist the direct participation of the United States in effecting this
goal, it is logical to further assume that the policy of coexistence
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was to be Of a fairly long duration. As Lenin explained, the internal
and economic difficulties confronting his government were of such
magnitude that a rather long period of time would be required to solve
the.. It can then be logically reasoned that in 1918 Lenin had created
and substantiated the policy of detente that, while being relatively
temporary in nature, would, nonetheless, serve as the main determinant
of Soviet foreign affairs for the foreseeable future. Moreover, detente
would continue until such time as the new government could fully consoli-
date its economic and military power. These variables would come to the
fore again in 1921 when Lenin, further convinced of both the failure and
poor prospects of an immediate socialist revolution outside of Russia,
and of the need for Western credits and economic assistance, would advance,
in greater detail, a blueprint for coexistence with the powers of the
capitalist-imperialist system. However, it would be incorrect to ignore
the fact that only four months after the Bolshevik takeover Lenin had
already acknowledged the urgency of effecting a much needed breathing spell
in order to forestall any immediate confrontation with the West. The
preliminary plan for U.S. -Soviet commercial relations, drafted by Lenin
and presented to a representative of the American government, bears
testimony to this early realization on the part of the Soviet leader.
On the same day that Lenin publicized his plan for economic
relations with the United States, he addressed the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet government. Here, he presented a sober and
realistic assessment of the present Soviet conditions and outlined a
course of action that would be followed for an indefinite period of time.
Taken together, these two reports, delivered on the same day, will pro-
vide us with a complete enunciation of the Leninist policy of peaceful
coexistence including the underlying motivation and rationale for the
policy as well as the manner in which it would be pursued.
In his report to the Central Committee Lenin acknowledged the
fact that the socialist revolutions in the Western capitalist states
had stalled. Therefore, he claimed that "for a number of reasons of an
economic and political character which you are aware, the different
rate of development, the difference between conditions here and in the
West, our Socialist republic remains, for the time being, an oasis in
the middle of a raging sea of imperialist rapacity
. With the hopes
for an immediate revolutionary surge in Germany diminished, Lenin, as
he reported, had to resort to a strategy of waiting and employing new
tactics against the West. According to Lenin, the Soviets had to hold
on to and consolidate their present position "until our ally, the
international proletariat, catches up with us - and it undoubtedly will
although incomparably more slowly than we would have liked. We must
stick to our waiting tactics and exploit the conflicts and antagonisms
among the imperialists, slowly accumulating strength and maintaining
the oasis of Soviet power in the middle of the raging imperialist
sea." These particular "antagonisms" were identical to those which
Lenin would delineate in 1921. In the first place, Lenin recognized
"the struggle between Germany and England on the western front, which
has reached the limit of ferocity," and secondly the severe antagonism
between Japan and America which had only been "concealed for the time
being by their alliance against Germany. "^^ At this time, Lenin was
still totally committed to the view that the imperialist powers would,
sometime in the future, align themselves in a joint and massive assault
on the government that had dared to construct a socialist socio-economic
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system. However, Lenin reasoned that the imperialists were locked in
their own life and death struggle for the moment, and consequently, had
precluded any chance of an imperialist alliance. This condition had
afforded the Soviet regime a life saving respite. Faced with this
situation. Lenin had but one choice in regard to the tactics and strategy
his government would employ:
...we shall do everything to prolong that brief and orecarious respite which we got in March, for we are f??mlvconvinced that we have tens of millions of workers nd
'.luT." '''r\''l gathering new st?en ?h nd con-so idating the Soviet power with every week, every month thatthe respite lasts, and within whom the determination ?s
w!c'h^ ^° ^^t ^'^^ decisive battle when externalfor es descend upon the Socialist Soviet Republic. 54
If we sum up the arguments advanced by Lenin in his two statements
of May 14, 1918, we will find a complete portrait of the Leninist detente
policy. This strategy was based on the convictions that; 1.) the Soviet
republic urgently and desperately required a breathing spell, a respite
by which the new government could concentrate all its efforts at consoli-
dating its power and overcoming the awesome political, social, and
economic problems which confronted it in the domestic sphere; 2.) the
worldwide socialist upheaval, especially in Germany, had been delayed for
a number of reasons, thus forcing the Soviet government to remain isolated
in an imperialist world and compelling it to render little, if any,
meaningful assistance to the cause of global revolution; 3.) the inordin-
ate East-West military imbalance and the relative anemia of the Soviet
armed forces made it impossible for the Bolsheviks to engage in any
military confrontation with the West, and underscored the need for a
drastic realtering of the East-West military equation; 4.) the prospect
of a final and fatalistic military confrontation between the powers of
capitalism and socialism was guaranteed as an historical inevitability;
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5.) the capitalist-imperialist nations would eventually for. an alliance
and launch an offensive against Soviet Russia, an offensive that could
not be precluded by detente, which was geared to preparing for this
inevitability; 6.) Lenin could not effectively restore economic stability
to his country without securing the much needed economic assistance
and trade credits from the West, and specifically from the economically
powerful United States which possessed the most advanced level of
scientific and technological expertise, and which was the least impaired
of the warring nations of World War I; 7.) the Soviet government could
prolong this life-saving respite by exploiting and manipulating the
inherent contradictions in the imperialist camp and by doing all in its
power to transform these contradictions into open warfare between them so
as to postpone the eventual anti-Soviet alliance of imperialists; and
8.) the socialist system would inevitably gain a complete triumph over
the capitalist-imperialist system. The tactics of waiting and consolidatir
strength were therefore, logistical components of a strategy that had
the final destruction of capitalism and the concomitant socialist trans-
formation of the world as its ultimate objectives.
A major hypothesis of this dissertation is that detente in
1972 was a continuation of the detente of 1918. Detente, it will be
shown, was created by Lenin and developed by Stalin, Khrushchev, and
Brezhnev. In fact, the detente of 1980, though tempered by recent events,
will be viewed as a direct descendant of the policy conceived by Lenin
less than one year after the Bolshevik seizure of power.
It is important therefore, to analyze the eight major components
of the Lenin detente of 1918. By so doing, the historical continuity
in detente from 1918 to the present will be more clearly manifested.
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The different eras of detente, and most importantly the Brezhnev era,
will be discussed in some detail below. However, a cursory glance at
these periods would be in order here, in light of the eight initial
factors that originally governed the creation of detente in 1918. The
main focus in this brief overview will be on the similarities in the
basic constitution of detente as practiced by the four major Soviet
regimes
.
In the first place, it should be noted, as will be discussed
below, that all eight variables that served as motivational factors for
detente in 1918 were identical to those that provided the stimulus for
the same policy in 1921. At that time, it was still necessary for Lenin
to secure a breathing spell with the West in order to focus on the goals
of internal consolidation. This was especially true in the light of
the further domestic problems caused by the civil war. The prospects for
a European socialist revolution appeared to Lenin to be even more remote
in 1921 than they were in 1918. The imperialist nations had also escaped
from the First World War unscathed, in terms of any Bolshevik-styled
upheaval. The East-West military equation, which would determine the
outcome of the inevitable inter-camp war, was still heavily weighted
in the favor of the capitalist-imperialist camp. The possibility of
an anti-Soviet alliance among the Western nations was a more ominous
threat by virtue of the fact that the capitalist-imperialist nations
were now free of the war. The Soviet regime was still desperately in
need of Western trade and economic benefits and, while trying to secure
them, was mindful of the urgency of exploiting the contradictions and
inherent antagonisms in the imperialist camp. Finally, the Soviet
leaders in 1921, as they were in 1918, were convinced of the inevitability
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of the historically-guaranteed triumph of the socialist transformation,
and the ultimate defeat of the antithetical socio-economic system.
These eight variables, which dictated the efficacy of pursuing
a policy of coexistence in 1918. were very similar to those which made
detente a primary requisite for the formulation of Soviet foreign policy
during the Stalinist years. There would, of course, be obvious
tactical variations injected into the politics of detente during this
era. The Stalinist period covered nearly thirty years of Soviet history,
and witnessed, among other things, the transformation of the Soviet state
from an "oasis in the raging sea of imperialism," to the acknowledged
head of a system of socialist countries. However, at one time or
another, the policies of rapid industrialization, forced collectivization,
socialism in one country, capitalist encirclement, the blood purges,
the alliance of World War II, the tremendous Soviet wartime losses, the
American nuclear capability, and a host of other factors all contributed
to the utmost urgency of maintaining a detente posture as outlined by
Lenin in 1918. The Khrushchev years, for their part, saw the policy of
detente being transformed from a tactic of waiting and consolidating
strength to an offensive strategy, whereby the concept of coexistence
itself, would serve as the stimulus for the dissemination of socialist
influence. This period witnessed the demise of three variables in the
Leninist formula. The Soviet Union no longer had to consolidate its
strength internally, was not isolated as a socialist oasis, and did
not adhere to the theory of wars as a fatalistically inevitable guarantee
of historical development. Yet, at the same time, the strategic
military superiority of the United States, the existing possibility of
a reckless anti-Soviet thrust by the imperialists, the need for expanding
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economic contacts with the West, the urgency of exploiting the antagonists
of the imperialist world, and the dictates of the ideology of world
domination remained fixed in the Soviet strategy of detente during
Khrushchev's tenure in power.
The present regime, as we have seen, has further altered some of
these principles of detente. The major revision, in this writer's view,
is concerned with the "correlation of world forces," an important con-
sideration for Soviet theoreticians from the very inception of Soviet
power. This equation has finally, from Moscow's point of view, been
weighted in favor of world socialism. With the achievement of an effective
strategic parity with the United States, the Soviet Union, unlike past
years, is not overwhelmingly concerned with erasing an awesome gap in
the military capabilities of the two competing systems. However, much
of what Lenin said in 1918 can, with a good deal of accuracy, be applied
to the present situation. Contemporary Soviet leaders must, as they have
often repeated, guard against a possible imperialist attack. The
capitalist world, hopelessly frustrated by the advancements of the
socialist camp, might very well attempt one desperate, and fruitless
assault in order to thwart the unstoppable march of communism. The
present leadership is also cognizant of the urgent necessity of infusing
mass amounts of much needed Western scientific and technological
advancements into the Soviet economy, and of expanding reciprocal trade
and economic agreements with the West. Brezhnev, although somewhat less
obtrusive than Lenin, has also realized the need for exploiting every
manifestation of antagonism and conflicting interests among the powers
of world imperialism. Finally, the present Soviet government has rein-
forced its belief, based on the convictions of Marxist-Leninist
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Ideology, that, through gradual and incremental changes, the capitalist-
imperialist system will inevitably give way to the communist world
order
.
For a number of reasons, however, the detente policy of 1918.
although fully defined and elaborated by Lenin, was never fully incorpor-
ated into a bi-laterial and reciprocal code of conduct with the nations
of the West. The apparent reason for this was that no nation of the
capitalist system was either willing or able to entertain any thoughts
of entering into a mutually acceptable political or economic arrangement
with a revolutionary government that had vowed to destroy it. It can
be reasoned that there were two elemental factors that prompted this
unreceptive stance on the part of the Western powers and precluded any
meaningful rapport on their part with Soviet Russia. In the first place,
the capitalist nations were still concerned with the First World War,
and placed a premium on effecting changes that would permit the
Russian military forces to reopen the Russian front. Thus, in no way,
would the creation of amiable relations with the government that had
closed the Russian military theater and induced a potentially fatal
military predicament in the West, have served the primary interests of
any country in the Allied camp. Secondly, the nations of the West
held nothing but the most utter contempt for the Bolsheviks and looked
upon their government as some form of temporary madness that, in due
time, would give way to more responsible and traditional forms of leader-
ship. Lenin and his henchmen were, it was held, nothing more than
fanatical, conspiratorial terrorists whose reign could never stand the
tests of time. When the Russian people came to their senses the Bolshevik
faction would, in this view, be overthrown. Both of these perceptions
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would Change in 1921. The governments of the West, free of their
conmitment to the war, and more inclined to believe, in light of the
Red Army's victory in the Russian civil war, that the Bolsheviks were
there to stay, were more receptive to negotiating with the Soviet
government. The fact that the West was not receptive to the Soviet
overtures for detente in 1918, however, does not mean that detente did
not exist then. Similarly, the United States may not be strongly
pursuing detente today in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;
yet detente, as will be shown, still exists in 1980. A major theme
of this study is that detente is a long-term and fundamental Soviet
policy. Detente was designed and implemented by the Soviet regime as
the best means by which it could protect, and eventually expand upon the
revolutionary gains that it had achieved. From the Soviet perspective,
there would be no major qualitative changes in the basic composition of
detente from 1918 to 1921. It will be shown that the primary difference
in the policy would be in the more receptive response given to it by
the nations of the West.
The Revital ization of Detente: 1920-1921
The two and one-half year period from the ratification of the
Brest-Li tovsk treaty to the winter of 1920-1921 witnessed a low level
of understanding in the relations of Soviet Russia and the non-socialist
nations of the world. For the reasons outlined above, the capitalist
nations were unwilling to conduct anything resembling amiable relations
with the new and radical Soviet government. The strains in Soviet-Western
relations were manifested in many ways by the policy of intervention in
Soviet Russia; a policy that did little to enhance the possibilities of
fostering a mutual detente. The Allied Intervention 1n Russia is a
subject that is far too complex for any lengthy discussion here. It
1s interesting, however, to examine the effects that /taerican participa-
tion in this joint Allied venture had on the Soviet policy of detente
with the United States.
Contemporary Soviet historians are fond of portraying American
intervention in terms of an attempt by the United States to assist in
the overthrow of the Soviet regime. Such a view engages in a bit of
historical distortion that is not altogether foreign to Soviet
propagandists. Historical evidence indicates that the United States
was the last of the Allied powers to concede to the policy of interventi
and did so with the incessant urging of the British and French
governments. Moreover, it can be shown that the United States pursued
objectives in Soviet Russia that were directly related to the final
consummation of World War I.
The United States sent a total of 3,950 troops under British
command to the northern Russian port of Arkhangelsk.^^ The objectives
of this small contingent were to: 1.) safeguard the 162,495 tons of war
supplies from German acquisition;^^ 2.) forestall any German advances
in the northern regions of Russia; 3.) preclude the establishment of a
German submarine base at Murmansk or Petchenga,^^ and 4.) keep the
northern front open in the hopes of eventually persuading the Soviets
to re-enter the war.
The American forces dispatched to Siberia were sent with a set
of objectives that were less clearly defined than those in the north.
As the coimander of the U.S. contingent in Siberia, General William S.
Graves, stated, "I was in command of the United States troops sent to
Siberia and I .ust ad.it, I do not know what the United States was trying
to accomplish by military intervention. "^^ Officially, the United
States attempted to achieve three basic goals in Siberia: 1.) the pro-
tection of a stockpile of war munitions; 2.) assisting a legion of
Czech-Slovak troops in leaving Soviet Russia, and 3.) guarding sections
of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Unofficially, however, the United
States was alarmed by the presence of some 72,000 Japanese troops there,
and hoped to discourage any military designs by Japan with the existence
of a strong American military contingent.
As a contributing factor to the development of hostile Soviet-
American relations, the American intervention should have been a variable
of little concrete substance. Yet, the Soviet government of Lenin did
not look upon it as such. The Bolsheviks immediately launched an
intensive propaganda campaign against the United States and claimed that
America was trying to kill the infant Soviet state. Such a view was
epitomized by Chicherin in an official protest that he sent to President
Wilson. Chicherin first reminded the American chief executive of his
promise "to collaborate with Russia in order to obtain for her the
unrestricted and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determin-
ation of her political development and her national policy." Chicherin
then listed the tangible results of this pledge of good will:
In fact this collaboration took the form of an attempt,
first on the part of the Czech-Slovak troops and later, in
Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and the Far East, of your own allies'
troops, to force on the Russian people the rule of those
oppressing and exploiting classes whose power was overthrown
by the workers and peasants in Russia in October of last
year .61
Lenin further claimed that, "Wilson proved to be a fool," and
that "the roots of Wilson's policy amounted only to the piffle of
no
parsons-petty Bourgeois phrases-and the utter failure to understand
the class struggle. The United States' response typified the level
of animosity that existed between the two countries. In the words of
Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, "the existing regime in Russia
is based on the negation of every principle of honor and good faith,
and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of inter-
national law."^^
Lenin was aware, however, that U.S.
-Soviet relations, regardless
of the animosities caused by the intervention, had to be immediately
re-channeled into the detente framework that he had created in 1918.
In Lenin's mind there were now two decisive factors that compelled him
to embark on a more energetic and substantive form of detente with the
United States. The first of these centered on Lenin's accurate assess-
ment that the imperialist countries would be more receptive to the
Soviet overtures for initiating traditional forms of diplomatic relations.
In addition, the nations of the West would now find it to their
advantage to expand what could prove to be mutually beneficial economic
and trade agreements with Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks had demonstrated
by this time that they were not the leaders of a "short-lived" fanatical
movement, but were the recognized heads of the Russian government. The
nations of the West, if indeed they wished to conduct a Russian policy,
would have to do so with the Bolshevik regime. Having survived the
Allied intervention, and having defeated the formidable array of anti-
Bolshievik forces in the civil war, the Soviet regime had dispelled
any hopes, certainly for the time being, that their government would
soon be overthrown and replaced with a more amiable political organization.
Furthermore, Lenin reasoned that the potential exploitation of the vast
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resources of Russian raw materials now,
.ore than ever, loo.ed as an
attractive temptation for the economically ravaged combatants of the
First world War. Thus, Lenin reasoned that the mitigating circumstances
that induced the West to ignore his original detente plea in 1918 had
dissipated to the point that the nations of the capitalist system would
now be forced to both recognize and negotiate with his government.
The second consideration is that Lenin, after carefully analyzing
the internal and international situation of the Soviet state, deduced
that peaceful coexistence, even more so than in 1918, was a compelling
necessity for his government. For a number of reasons, which will be
detailed below, Lenin realized that the detente of 1918 had not, by 1920,
solved the problems to which the detente-inspired respite was addressed.
Consequently, Lenin felt that the policy had to be extended and revitalized
This is not to say that Lenin altered or revised his detente strategy,
since, as was outlined above, the basic principles of the policy were not
changed. However, the intensity and vigor with which the coexistence
plan was pursued had been noticeably increased.
Lenin was now confronted, as he had forecast, with the further
proliferation of economic and social dislocation caused by the waging of
a fierce civil war. This, coupled with the already existing breakdown
of communications, and transportation, and the general state of economic
instability made for a rather unenviable domestic environment. This
situation was further aggravated by the great famine which plagued the
country, and by the shattering reality of political discontent that was
manifested by the Kronstadt rebellion. Lenin also knew that the prospect
of a worldwide transformation had grown dimmer during this time. The
war had not, as he had hoped, sparked a revolutionary upsurge in the West,
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and the socialist parties there, unwilling to employ the Bolshevik
tactics Of terror, violence, and illegality, had forced Soviet Russia
to remain as an ''oasis" for some time to come. The urgent necessity
of securing foreign credits and of engaging in a beneficial trade
relationship now became all the more imperative for Lenin if he were
to meet with any success in completing the objectives of internal
consolidation and of restoring the economic vitality of the nation. It
can be argued that the most important realization by Lenin at this time
was the potential anti-Soviet alliance that could be a result of the
termination of the First World War. Lenin felt that the imperialists, at
the first given opportunity, would unite in a joint venture aimed at the
destruction of the socialist intruder. Yet, as he mentioned during the
war, "the imperialist war, which has divided the imperialist powers into
two hostile groups locked in a life and death struggle, has for the time
being, and in the given conditions, made this alliance of the imperialists
of all countries impossible. "^^ Now that World War I had ended there
was nothing to prevent such an alliance, and it behooved Lenin to augment
and replenish the tactical strategy he devised to postpone this
occurrence. The Bolsheviks were compelled, in their view, to exploit
and utilize every contradiction and antagonism that existed in the
imperialist camp and to instigate and generate inter-imperialist
hostilities so that the imperialists, in the interest of protecting their
vested economic interests, might more readily fight among themselves.
The end of World War I was the one factor that apparently
worried and distressed Lenin the most in regard to the disastrous effects
it held for his socialist government. The imperialists would never
quietly acquiesce in the demise of their system, which was heralded by
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the formation of a socialist state. Rather, they would, in Lenin's
mind, resort to any and all means, now that the war was over, to crush
the Bolshevik regime. That such a view was basic to the Soviet world
outlook was reinforced by a resolution of the Seventh Communist Party
Congress
:
At this time, when the era of socialist revolution hasopened recurrent military attacks on Soviet Russi theimperialist states (both from the West and the Ea t) arehistorically inevitable. The historical inevitabil ty ofsuch attacks given the extremely acute stage now reachedboth in the internal class relations and in'the international
situation may at any moment, perhaps in the immediate future,perhaps within the next few days, lead to an imperialist
offensive against the socialist movement in general and againstthe Russian Socialist Republic in particul ar .65
Reasoning on the basis of the theories he espoused in Imperialism
,
Lenin in late 1920, concluded that an "economic war," fostered by the
imperialist quest to protect their own interests, was just around the
corner:
That war is brewing, that war is inevitable, is beyond
doubt.
. .anybody who studies the history of economic rela-
tions and diplomacy cannot entertain the slightest doubt
that an economic war is ripe and is being prepared
pol itical ly.66
Lenin also felt that the lack of proper party organization and
cohesion and the existence of "bureaucratic distortions" (all summed up
in the "sickness" of the Party) would help foster this imperialist thrust.
As he claimed, "undoubtedly, the capitalists of the Entente will try to
take advantage of our Party's sickness to organize a new invasion."^''
That the future inter-camp war was inevitable, and that the termination
of World War I had hastened its development, was a Leninist dictum of
paramount importance in 1921. However, Lenin reasoned that the nearly
prostrate Soviet state in 1921 was no more ready to wage this cataclysmic
fight to the death than it was in 1918. To do so would have been, in
Lenin's view, an inexcusable and fatal error. Fully aware of the
military inferiority of the Soviet regi.e, Lenin, in 1920, declared that
"to accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the
enemy and not to us is a crime; and absolutely worthless are those
political leaders of the revolutionary class who are unable to 'tack,
maneuver^and compromise' in order to avoid an obviously disadvantageous
battle. Lenin needed time, much more time than his coexistence policy
of 1918 had allotted him, in order to fulfill the tasks of military
preparations and combat readiness needed for a successful conclusion of
the impending intercamp war. Thus, it was incumbent upon Lenin to
maintain an absence of war for an extended period of time and to engage
in peaceful relations with the imperialist world. This was necessary,
he reasoned, in order to utilize Western economic resources and expertise
to both support his policies of domestic reconstruction and military
efficiency, and to ready himself and his nation for the inevitable
showdown
.
Therefore, in 1921 Lenin, with great finesse, and in carefully
elaborated detail, again launched his peace campaign which, in the main,
amounted to a more vigorous and intensified version of his earlier
detente. Lenin attached the greatest significance to this policy and
devoted the majority of his time and his energy toward the acceptance and
correct application of his strategy by his fellow Bolsheviks. There
still existed many elements in the Party who desired more orthodox
and revolutionary methods and who viewed detente as no more than a
tactical selling out of basic Bolshevik principles. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Lenin, in his usual virulent manner, to denounce any
such radical beliefs. It was also necessary to convince all Party
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members of the correctness of the policy of adopting tactical flexi-
bility and compromise of principle in regard to the strategy pursued
at a time of relative weakness. Lenin began his campaign with a caustic
denunciation of the "left wing" elements of the Party:
Genuine revolutionaries have most often broken theirnecks when they began to write "revolution" with a capital
to something almost divine^ ^olose their heads, to lose the ability in the coole Jandmost somber manner to reflect, to weigh up and ?o ce?uin
at what moment, under what circumstances and in which spheren IS necessary to act in a revolutionary manner nd w n tIS necessary to adopt reformist action. 69
Furthermore, in Lenin's view the revolution would perish if the
Party leaders "lose their sobriety of outlook and take it into their
heads that the 'great, victorious, world revolution' can and must solve
all problems in a revolutionary manner under all circumstances and in
all spheres of action. "''^ To rely on such revolutionary and radical
principles was an unpardonable mistake for Lenin. As he stated, "whoever
'takes such a view into his head' must perish, because he invents some-
thing stupid in connection with a fundamental problem; and in the midst
of a fierce war (and revolution is the fiercest sort of war) the penalty
for stupidity is defeat. "'^^ Coexistence with the West would require a
classic case of Leninist compromise, fluctuation, and alteration of
principles. Lenin, unable, to condone the beliefs of those who would
remain steadfast in their adherence to firm convictions, made this theme
one of his favorite subjects, and one on which he dwelled at great lengths
History, according to Lenin, "knows all sorts of metamorphoses," and to
"rely on firmness of convictions, loyalty, and other excellent spiritual
72qualities is not being serious in politics." For Lenin, it was
imperative to combine such firmness of conviction with the necessary
adaptiveness to the present negative situation, such as the military
weakness of the Soviet state. The Bolsheviks
.ust adhere to the belief
that "the strictest loyalty to the ideas of co..unis.
.ust be combined
with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to
maneuver, to make agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on."^^
The entire phenomenon of coexistence, although the only sane
and logical method of conducting international relations, was, as Lenin
admitted, a defeat of sorts for his Party, in that it represented a
somber realization of the fact that the "complete (i.e., worldwide)
victory of socialism" was a matter of future concern. It was important
therefore, for Lenin to make his Party learn from such defeat and use
it as a catalyst for future successes:
Do not be afraid of admitting defeat. If we agreed withthe point of view that, like the surrender of positions
admission of defeat gives rise to despondency and relaxation
ofeffort in the struggle, we would have to say that revolution-
aries who give way to such despondency are not worth a damn. 74
This view is synonymous with the position held by Lenin in
March of 1918, when faced with the failure of the immediate German revo-
lution, he advanced his original concept of detente as a result of a
defeat:
The most serious defeats await us, because we have no
army, because we have no organization, because we cannot
solve these two problems all at once. If you cannot adjust
yourself, if you cannot bring yourself to crawl on your belly
in the mud, you are no revolutionary, but a chatterbox, because
there is no other way, because history did not work out so
agreeably as to start the revolution in both countries simul-
taneously. 75
According to Lenin, it was precisely this kind of "defeat" that
had confronted the Bolshevik Party in 1921 and it became apparent to him
that the time had come for the Soviet revolutionaries to "crawl on their
bellies" and abandon any attempt to reinstill the radical and violent
revolutionary policies that had characterized their first few months
116
117
of existence. Whereas in the past the Bolsheviks, as Lenin claimed, had
placed a premium and "the main weight of emphasis on the political
struggle, on revolution, on winning power, etc." it was now imperative
to "shift the weight of emphasis to peaceful, organizational,
'cultural'
work."^^ Lenin further reasoned that this peaceful work should not be
limited to the domestic policies of the Soviet state. Instead, it
would pertain primarily to foreign affairs, where the Bolsheviks had
to conduct nonviolent and productive economic relations in order to secure
much needed western assistance. The "proletarian state," according to
Lenin, "must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd 'businessman,'
a punctilious wholesale merchant - otherwise it will never succeed in
putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet."''^ So as
to leave no doubt as to the ultimate objective of such a policy, Lenin
graphically illustrated the aims of the peaceful "merchant and businessman"
approach:
Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side
with the capitalist (capitalist for the time being) West,
there can be no other way of transition to communism. . .no
matter what the costs, no matter how severe the sufferings of
the transition period may be - despite disaster, famine, and
destruction, we shall not lose heart and shall carry our
cause to a triumphant conclusion .^^
Lenin was fond of using realistic historical analogies to illus-
trate and clarify his particular philosophy. It is not surprising
therefore, that the detente strategy was heavily imbued with such allegorical
comparisons. If we take the time to examine one of these lengthy Leninist
expositions we will obtain a clearer picture of detente as Lenin saw
it. Lenin was particularly impressed with a certain incident in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905, whereby the Japanese General Nogi had
captured Port Arthur, The main importance of this episode is that it
occurred in two distinct stages, as the celebrated Japanese cormander
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was forced to alter his tactics in the miH<:t n-Pin ds of the operation. The
original strategy was one of direct assault and storming of the fortress
which resulted in a smashing Japanese defeat with heavy casualties. The
general, faced with the hopelessness of winning by direct assault was
forced to alter his strategy and employ the lengthy and arduous policy
of seige tactics. This approach, while delaying the realization of the
ultimate objective, and forcing the cinder to "retreat" and formulate
a new approach, ended, as Lenin claimed, "in complete victory, although
it took a much longer time to achieve than was anticipated."^^ The
parallel to be drawn from this analogy by the Bolshevik readers was quite
clear. If one were to substitute the world capitalist-imperialist
system for Port Arthur and replace General Nogi with the forces of
socialism, then one would have the policy of detente and the struggle
against imperialism that Lenin was forced to wage in 1921. As Lenin, in
summation of his historical metaphor, concluded:
If an army which had become convinced that it is unable
to capture a fortress by direct assault said that it refused
to leave the old positions and occupy new ones, refused to
adopt new methods of solving its problems, one would say about
such an army that if it has learned to attack but has not
learned to retreat at the dictates of certain severe conditions
itwill never win the war. Wars which began and ended with an
uninterrupted victorious advance have never occurred in world
history, or else they have been very rare exceptions .80
Lenin had earlier claimed that a "revolutionary epoch" was to
his Party what "wartime is to an army," and that the revolutionaries must
"extend the ranks of our army, increase it from peace to war strength,
mobilize the reservists, call up those on furlough, organize new
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auxiliary corps, units, and services." Now, it was incumbent upon
this army to adopt new tactics and concern itself more with the peaceful
operations of a nation that was not at war and which could not use the
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tactics Of direct and forceful assaults. It was necessary therefore,
to "master all methods of warfare." and. if the Bolsheviks were able'
to do so. they, as Lenin claimed, will "certainly be victorious, because
we represent the interests of the really advanced and really revolutionary
class, even if circumstances do not permit us to use weapons that are
most dangerous to the enemy, weapons that are most swift in dealing
mortal blows."
If Lenin were unable to employ such lethal weapons, due to the
weakness of his "army," he would have to formulate a new arsenal to
forestall the impending attack by the imperialists. Lenin reasoned that
the best way to effect this end was to make it economically unfeasible
for the capitalist powers to attack by entangling them in a system of
lucrative economic concessions. Thus, the policy of extending concessions
to the West appeared to be a dual-edged strategy. It not only would pro-
vide Lenin with the industrial and technological assistance he needed
for the task of economic reconstruction, but would also act as a buffer
against any immediate imperialist aggression. As Lenin stated in a
speech in November, 1920, the capitalists are still seeking pretexts
for fighting and for destroying the Soviet state. However, "if they
accept the proposals and agree to concessions it will be harder for them.
On the one hand we will have the best conditions in the event of war;
on the other hand, those who want to go to war will not agree to
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concessions." It was logical for Lenin to assume that concessions, as
an economic incentive for the capitalists, are "an economic and political
argument against war," and that "from the point of view of the danger of
a collision between capitalism and bolshevism, it must be said that
84
concessions are a continuation of the war, but in a different sphere."
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This position, which is characterized by the paradox of building a
military capacity with the aid of those countries against who. the
capacity would be used, is best summarized in a dispatch sent by
Chi Cher in to the Allied governments:
Since the capacity for resistance of the enemies whichSoviet Russia has to fight depends entirely on the aid whichthey receive from the Allied Powers, and since these are there-fore Its on y real adversaries, it is precisely to them thatthe Russian Soviet Government addresses its statements con-
cerning the concessions which it would be possible to make withthe object of putting an end to all conflicts with these
powers .85
Lenin then clearly delineated the second edge of this two-edged
sword of detente; that of restoring the economic productivity destroyed
by the war. According to a decree of the Council of People's Commissars,
the "process of restoring the productive power of Russia, and with it
of world-economy as a whole, can be greatly accelerated by means of
attracting foreign public and municipal institutions, private under-
takings, joint-stock companies, co-operative and workers' organizations
of other states, to the business of extracting and working up the natural
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wealth of Russia." Furthermore, these proposals were directed
primarily toward the economically powerful United States, which possessed
an "abundance of free capital," making it especially attractive for
American capitalists to "exploit the natural wealth of the vast expanses
of the RSFSR.
"^^
Lenin realized that Soviet Russia, in order to build a strong
industrialized sector, (on which the socialist revolution was to be
founded in the first place) required both the technology and widespread
application of vast amounts of electricity. As Lenin claimed, "communism
is the Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country."
Otherwise, he reasoned "the country will remain a smal 1 -peasant country.
and that we must clearly realize. -'^^ The importance of the application
of electricity as the stimulus for transforming the economic basis to
one of large-scale industry was not underestimated by Lenin. As he
claimed, "only when the country has been electrified, when industry,
agriculture and transport have been placed on the technical basis of
modern large-scale industry, only then shall we be finally vi ctorious
.
Lenin was quite aware of the fact, however, that the electrification goal
"without the help of foreign capital and means of production," could not
be realized and, as he further stated, "to obtain assistance we must pay
1.90for It." The United States was the most prosperous of the capitalist
states and therefore, the logical choice as the most obvious source of
economic assistance. Yet, as Lenin asked in a rhetorical fashion, "In
order to enlist the Americans we must pay them: They are businessmen.
And what are we to pay them with?" Lenin concluded that there was no
choice as to the form of payment, since he could not pay for the much
needed assistance with gold, ("we cannot throw gold about."), raw
materials ("we have not yet fed all our own people"), or grain ("we are
bargaining for every trainload of grain"):
What then shall we give? Rubbish? They have enough
rubbish of their own. They say let us trade in grain; but
we cannot give grain. We are therefore solving the problems
by means of concessi ons . 91
There are two interesting aspects of this concession policy of
Lenin that have a direct bearing on his views towards detente. In the
first place, Lenin argued that it was imperative to continue the fierce
ideological and political struggle with the West during the era of
peaceful coexistence. The economic arrangements and agreements made
with the imperialists were but another manifestation of this unceasing
war. It was important therefore, to insist that such agreements be
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negotiated and implemented "on terms carefully formulated so as to
ensure that the conditions in which these concessions are operated
do not in any way conflict with the economic and social order of
92Soviet Russia." Furthermore, these concessions would bring the
Soviet republic in direct confrontation with the West, whose governments
would be allowed to interject capitalist practices on Russian soil.
Thus, Lenin would claim that "concessions are also a form of struggle,
they are the continuation of the class struggle in another form, and
under no circumstances are they the substitution of class peace for
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class war." Concessions, in this light, were "nothing but a new form
of war," and while the Soviets had a "vast deal to gain from concessions,"
it was important to remember that these agreements merely highlighted
and underscored "the military rivalry of two methods, two formations,
two kinds of economy - communist and capitalist, we shall prove that we
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are the stronger." Thus, it can be reasoned that detente of 1921 did
not imply any de-emphasis of the class struggle. Rather, it incorporated
an intensification of the ideological competition between the two com-
peting socio-economic systems who, for the time being, had to coexist at
close quarters. The second note of interest concerns the duplicity of
Lenin in playing upon the cupidity of the enemy to whom these economic
concessions would be granted. This point is illustrated by the case
of a certain American industrialist Vanderlip who travelled to Moscow
to negotiate a concession to "exploit oil, coal, and the fisheries of
95
the Primorye Region and Kamchatka." Vanderlip insisted on negotiating
long-term contractual arrangements, during which time the Soviets
could not exercise an option of buying them back. This was done
despite protestations to the contrary by the Soviet representative
A.I. Rykov. Unable to resolve the impasse, Rykov wrote to Lenin for
instructions and received the reply, "you will concede a 50-year period
for the concession. Lenin, it can be argued, felt that the Soviet
Union would not tolerate a fifty year period of capitalist intrusion,
and based much of his ideological reasoning on the assumption that the
capitalist system would soon be overthrown and destroyed. Yet, it was
perfectly consistent with the Leninist strategy of detente to simultan-
eously strive for the inevitable collapse of capitalism in the not too
distant future and concede long-term contractual guarantees in order
to enlist immediate assistance.
It was equally justifiable for Lenin to augment his detente by
entering into alliances with any and all imperialist states in order to
use one nation, or bloc of nations, as a counterbalance to any potential
threat by another group of imperialists. As Lenin claimed, "to carry
on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoise," a war which
in Lenin's view was "a hundred times more difficult, prolonged, and
complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars," and to "refuse
beforehand to maneuver, to utilize the conflicts of interests (even
though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and com-
promise with possible (even though transitory, unstable, vacillating
and conditional) allies - is this not ridiculous in the extreme?"^^
Moreover, this policy of transitory socialist-imperialist alliances
required a constant sense of shifting, changing, and adapting to the
particular international environment at any given moment. To refuse to
enter into such alliances with the "imperialist robbers" was, in Lenin's
words tantamount to extremism:
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Is it not as though, when making a difficult ac-rpnt
of an unexplored and hitherto inacLsible mouJta n wewere to refuse beforehand ever to move in zigzags everto retrace our steps, ever to abandon the coSr e onceselected to try othersT^S ""^^
From Lenin's perspective this policy had seen its practical
adaptation as early as 1918 when the Soviets "shook hands with the
French monarchist although we knew that each of us would readily hang
99his partner." Yet, whether or not Lenin would have relished the
"hanging of his partner," he knew that their interests coincided for
the moment. Lenin next claimed that "to throw back the rapacious
advancing Germans we made use of the equally rapacious counterinterests
of the other imperialists thereby serving the interest of the Russian
and the international socialist revolution. """^^ However, such an alliance,
in Lenin's view, was purely temporary in nature and served only one short-
term objective. Thus, Lenin, with no qualms, could state:
I would not hesitate a single second to come to the same
l^ind of an "agreement" with the German imperialist robbirsT
should an attack upon Russia by Anglo-French troops demand'
An agreement of this kind would require the most inglorious
and humiliating compromise which, as the "compromise" of Brest-Litovsk,
would yield tremendous benefits; most noticeably the respite it would
provide for the tasks of socialist construction. As Lenin depicted in
analogical form:
Imagine that your automobile is held up by armed bandits.
You hand them over your money, passport, revolver and automo-
bile. You are spared the unpleasant company of the bandits.
That is unquestionably a compromise. . .Our compromise with the
bandits of German imperialism was a compromise of such a kind.^^^
These compromises and alliances might have appeared to the most
radical of Bolsheviks to be unacceptable tactics, as they involved a
surrender not only of principles and convictions but a good deal of
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territorial sovereignty as well. Lenin, however, saw these temporary
alliances as a new form of struggle. If properly manipulated, they
would prove to be invaluable assets to the cause of socialist prolifer-
ation in a global sense. As Lenin claimed, the Soviets must employ these
new tactics, not for the purpose of reconciliation "but for the purpose
of converting every and all form, new and old, into a weapon for the
complete, final, decisive, and irrevocable victory of communism. "^^^
The teeth of this new weapon would be exposed in the form of exploiting
the antagonisms of the imperialists. No matter how much the economic
plan of concessions made it unfeasible to attack Soviet Russia, the
imperialists, if not fighting among themselves, would eventually see
the urgency of jointly destroying the center of a new and inimical form
of government. This realization then became a canon of Leninist coexis-
tence ideology:
...the fundamental thing is the rule which we have not
only adopted theoretically, but applied in practice, and
which will be our rule until the final victory of socialism
throughout the world, that is: to exploit the contradictions
and antagonisms between the two imperialisms, between the two
systems of capitalist states, inciting them one against the
other. So long as we have not won the entire world, so long
as, from the economic and military point of view, we remain
weaker than the rest of the capitalist world, so long shall
we keep to that rule: we must know how to exploit the contra-
dictions and antagonisms among the imperialists .104
Lenin attached the utmost urgency to this topic of exploitation
of antagonisms as he knew that the Soviet state was still in no condition
to wage a 1 ife-and-death struggle in the military realm with any one of
the advanced capitalist powers. He was also aware that the exploitation
of imperialist contradictions as but one manifestation of his detente
strategy, had yielded impressive results already, and to a large degree,
had been the one variable that had preserved Soviet existence. As Lenin
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claimed, "had we not adhered to this rule, every one of us would have
long ago been hanging from an aspen tree, to the satisfaction of the
capitalists. "^05 The most noticeable result of this strategy was the
chance it afforded Lenin to launch his detente policy of 1918. Lenin
let it be known that the success of that policy and the breathing spell
it created, would serve as a model for Soviet tactics in 1921:
,
Wetook advantage of the hostilities between the twoimperialisms in such a way that in the long run both lostGermany got nothing from the Brest-Li tovsk Peace except
"
several million poods of grain,. ..but we gained time, inthe course of which the Red Army began to be formed.. That
on which our antagonists counted, the rapid collapse ofthe Soviet power in Russia, did not eventuate. It was justthis period which history accorded us as a breathing space,,,,that we took advantage of in order to consolidate ourselves
It now remained for Lenin to define exactly which antagonisms
and contradictions his country had to exploit. In answer to his rhetor-
ical question, "are there such fundamental disagreements in the contemporary
capitalist world which we must exploit?", Lenin listed three areas of
major concern to which the Bolsheviks must address themselves immediately.
"The first, and the closest to us," according to Lenin, "are the
relations between America and Japan. War is being prepared between them.
They cannot live peacefully together in the Pacific. "^°^ It was imperative
therefore, for the Soviet state, at the same time that it was
wooing the United States to invest its capital in Russia, to do all in
its power to exacerbate U.S .-Japanese tensions to the point that a major
war would break out between them. If the Soviet republic, due to a
number of internal problems, was forced to coexist with the "imperialist
robbers," it would be tolerable only if they would slaughter each over.
As Lenin asserted, "if we are obliged to tolerate such scoundrels as
the capitalist thieves, each of whom is preparing to plunge a knife into
us, it is our direct duty to make them turn their knives against each
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other." The second area of antagonisms concerned the United States
and the rest of the capitalist world. As Lenin asserted, "'America is
strong, everybody is now in her debt, everything depends on it, everybody
hates America more and more, everything indicates that America cannot come
to terms with other countries, because the most profound economic
differences divide them, because America is richer than the others.
"""^^
The third antagonism that had to be exploited and utilized for the
Bolshevik cause centered on the Entente and Germany, a nation "crushed,"
as Lenin phrased it, by the Versailles treaty. In a bit of prophetic
realism Lenin reasoned that Soviet Russia and Germany would soon come to
terms and form a mutual pact. As Lenin deduced, Germany "cannot endure
the Versailles treaty, and it must seek an ally against world imperialism,
for although itself imperialist, it is being throttl ed . "^ ^ ° This, in
Lenin's view, was the only manner in which his country could break out
of the oppressive ring of capitalist encirclement. It was the only way
in which they could survive in an imperialist-dominated world, and the
only means by which the Soviet state could prolong the invaluable respite
that detente of 1918 had afforded it. This tactical consideration of
Lenin was something that he clarified in no uncertain terms:
We are at present between two foes. If we are unable
to defeat them both, we must know how to dispose our forces
in such a way that they fall out among themselves; because,
as is always the case, when thieves fall out, honest men
come into their own.^H
Throughout this entire period it was extremely important for
Lenin to establish and maintain an outward manifestation of friendliness
with the capitalist world. Lenin, as he claimed, needed the extension of
the respite he was enjoying, and he knew that the Soviet regime could
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not endanger it by presenting a radical, bellicose, and revolutionary
i^age to the West. It was clear to Lenin that he had no choice but to
exploit and utilize the antagonisms and contradictions among the
imperialists. These contradictions, as he reasoned, would prove stronger
and more intense than the fundamental contradiction that existed between
the capitalist system as a whole and the lone representative of world
socialism. However, if the Soviet Union were seen as hostile, violent,
and uncompromising the imperialists might very well embark upon a course
of action aimed at silencing forever this radical source of difficulty.
Therefore, Lenin utilized the occasion of one of the first formal post-
war conferences, in which the Soviets sat side by side with their capitalist
adversaries, as a vehicle for formally launching the "new" posture of the
Soviet peaceful businesslike image to the West. In his draft of a
speech to be delivered at the opening session of the Genoa Conference in
April, 1922, G.V. Chicherin had included a number of militant remarks
regarding the inevitability of violent wars, the Soviet belief in violence,
and the need for pursuing armed struggles. In a message passed on to
Chicherin before he delivered his speech to the conference, Lenin made
a number of drastic revisions, which he hoped would have a telling effect
on the future course of capitalist-Soviet relations. Lenin eliminated
any and all remarks that he felt might arouse suspicion on the part of
the imperialists, and emphasized the fact that "having come here as
merchants, we positively consider it our duty to give our fullest support
to any attempts at a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems."
According to Lenin "all mention of 'inevitable forcible revolution and
the use of sanguinary struggle' must definitely be thrown out,... the words
stating that our 'historic conception includes the use of forcible measures'
Should definitely be deleted
.the words about our historic conception
being definitely based on the inevitability of new world wars should
be definitely deleted." In summation Lenin concluded:
Under no circumstances should such frightful words be
^nt^ '^i' rS'^^ into the hands of our oppon-e ts We should confine ourselves only to mentioninq thafthe views of the Communists do not coincide wt?e views
"%l""\n''V'^' beginn ng negot at onswith but that we consider it our duty, in order ?o a e ethe economic agreement we are desirous of concluding, to doeverything in our power for the broadest possible fu fillmentof at least a certain part of this pacifist program. 112
This pacifist stance would only be the side of the Leninist
strategy of detente that would be exposed to the view of the capitalists
While conceding to the economic wishes of the imperialist states,
while entering into alliances and pacts with them, while clamoring for
diplomatic recognition, and incessantly promising to refrain from inter-
fering with their internal sovereignty, while pursuing a foreign policy
of peace, Lenin was doing all in his power to both instigate wars among
the capitalists and to incite domestic upheaval in all the nations of
the imperialist system. Lenin, as he stated, was constantly waiting for
a "spark" to kindle the conflagration of violence and revolt that would
lead to the socialist transformation. Since there was no way of tellini
where this spark was, he realized that the Bolsheviks "must with the aid
of our new communist principles set to work, to stir up all and sundry,
even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres," in order to
fulfill the tasks of "complete socialist victory . "^ Lenin knew that
the revolution in Russia had been achieved with the relative ease
primarily because the capitalist and bourgeois elements in his native
land had not become fully entrenched, due to the absence of the full
development of capitalism. The situation in the advanced capitalist
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states was quite different. The powerful bourgeois elements there had
shown an obstinate and effective resistance to any change, thus making
illegal, clandestine, surreptitious, and conspiratorial activity the
only effective means of achieving success abroad. What is more, Lenin
further lowered the "theoretical standards" of Marxism and set his sights
on countries that had not even entered the capitalist stage of development.
In view of the necessity of gaining allies during this era of coexistence,
Lenin proceeded from the proposition that "with the aid of the proletariat
of the most advanced countries, the backward countries may pass to the
Soviet system and, after passing through a definite stage of development,
to communism, without passing through the capitalist stage of development."""^^
This is perhaps the essence of what detente really was for Lenin, and
still is for contemporary Soviet leaders; a sophisticated and complicated
deception based primarily on duplicity, cunning and actions aimed at
luring the unwary nations of the capitalist system into disadvantageous
circumstances that would hasten their ultimate demise.
It would be worthwhile, by way of summation, to outline the
basic elements of the Leninist detente before moving on to the later
stages of historical development. This is important because Lenin laid
the foundation of this strategy in such a manner that subsequent Soviet
leaders, in their interpretation and application of detente, would be
making alterations in a strategy that had evolved and matured long before
their assumption of power.
Immediately after seizing power in Russia, the Bolshevik Party,
overcome with the euphoria of its success, concentrated its efforts at
stimulating socialist upheavals in other countries, and most notably
in Germany, based on an exploitation of the war weariness and general
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disillusionment of the masses. However, in 1918 Lenin, upon realizing
that the Bolshevik revolutionary experience would not be duplicated in
the near future, yearned for a breathing spell, a respite with which he
hoped to achieve the goals of internal consolidation and economic recon-
struction that he would need for a successful consummation of the
impending imperialist-socialist war. This initial phase of detente,
although marked by a good deal of diplomatic hostility and general
unreceptiveness by the capitalist states, lasted until the winter of 1920-
1921 when it became apparent that a longer respite was needed and that
a concomitant modus vivendi had to be found. Reinforcing and intensifying
his detente policy of 1918, Lenin adopted a 1 ive-and-let-live ethic,
which coupled with economic concessions and a peaceful outward stance,
would preclude an imperialist invasion. Such a policy would also prolong
the much needed breathing spell, and allow the inherent contradictions
and antagonisms of the capitalist system to intensify and hasten its
ultimate collapse.
Detente can be seen therefore, as a self-serving strategy con-
ceived, implemented, and developed by the Soviet regime. It is aimed,
according to the Leninist formula, at effecting situations and environments
that are advantageous to the Soviet cause of increasing its relative
strength vis-a-vis the West. Furthermore, detente, although addressing
itself to all nations of the "other" socio-economic system, has always
considered the United States, the Soviet's most formidable economic and
military adversary, as the one nation that must be defeated if peaceful
coexistence is to achieve its full and complete victory. Detente is also
a policy characterized by a very high degree of tactical flexibility,
alteration, compromise, and adaptation. The policy of detente was designed
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to achieve prolonged periods of peace, whereby the weakened socialist
state could gain strength. Yet, peace, as Lenin told us, is no more
than a respite between wars, and a war, in whatever form it might take,
was purely inevitable in Lenin's mind. Lenin realized that it was
necessary to swallow his pride, to alter his principles and to endure
the humiliation of living and working with the capitalists until his
socialist state was strong and capable of challenging its enemies. Yet,
he never lost faith in his conviction that "as soon as we are strong
enough to defeat capitalism as a whole, we shall immediately take it by
the scruff of the neck.""^^^ m the final analysis, this can be seen as
the ultimate concern of detente, the basic and inalterable principle on
which the policy is based. As Lenin asserted in the last year of his
life, this is a struggle against capitalism and "there can be not a
shadow of doubt as to the final conclusion of the world struggle. In
this respect, the final victory of socialism is fully and unconditionally
guaranteed. "^^^
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CHAPTER V
THE POLICY OF DETENTE AS IMPLEMENTED BY BREZHNEV
The Soviet Union, during the tenure of Leonid Brezhnev has, as
the following evidence will indicate, employed the process of detente,
as originally designed by Lenin. However, as will be shown, the present
regime has incorporated some basic changes in the eight-part detente
strategy that was initially created in 1918. Some of these revisions
were inherited by the present leadership from the predecessors of
Brezhnev. A brief overview of these regimes is therefore, in order, so
that the historical and ideological continuity of detente from Lenin to
Brezhnev, from 1918 to the present, can be more clearly shown.
The Stalinist Perception of Detente
Historical evidence indicates that the policy of detente that was
developed by Lenin was both recognized and continued by Stalin. Stalin
both conceded the existence of detente and acknowledged its now long-term
nature. In his report at the 14th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1925,
Stalin claimed:
There is now, as it were, a kind of "peaceful cohabita-
tion" between the land of the Soviets and the lands where
capitalism prevails. What seemed at first as if were only
to be a short breathing space after the war, has become a
whole epoch of comparative repose. That is why there is an
equilibrium of forces; that is why there is a period of
"peaceful co-habitation" between the bourgeois world and the
proletarian world.
^
It then became important for Stalin to ensure the fact that this
140
"co-habitation-' would continue, for the purpose of further strengthening
the Soviet state. In 1925 therefore, Stalin informed party
.e.bers that
the first task of the party was to "carry on the struggle against new
wars, the struggle to maintain peace and to secure the persistence of
the so-called normal relationships towards capitalist countries
. It
can be reasoned that the major motivating factor for the maintenance of
peaceful relations with the West in the late 1920's was identical to that
of 1918. Stalin was still forced, by the devastation of the war, to do
all that he could to restore the Soviet economy to its pre-war levels.
This effort, pursued within the confines of the five year plan, necessi-
tated, in Stalin's mind, a detente relationship with the West. In the
words of the then Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov:
The new, additional, and wholly objective proof of our
peaceful aspirations is provided by our five year plan; to
carry out our plan we must strive for conditions of unin-
terrupted peace. It should be clear to everybody that it
would be insane to start out on this gigantic plan... if at
the same time we had not resolutely determined.
. .not to
allow the peace to be broken.
^
Upon his appointment to the position of Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, Litvinov expanded on the philosophy of detente:
We have to build socialism in our own country, surrounded
by capitalist countries occupying five-sixths of the earth's
surface... we are therefore trying to discover and put into
operation methods for the peaceful co-existence of the two
social systems. We have, and shall have in the future, to
make the greatest efforts to combat the aggressive tendencies
of certain capitalist groups making for the creation of con-
stant disputes and conflicts between the two systems; therefore,
these efforts will be directed to the consolidation and
maintenance of peace among the nations.
^
The manner in which this maintenance of peace was developed con-
tinually shifted throughout Stalin's reasonably long tenure in power.
Yet, throughout a period in history that saw local wars, a world war,
alliances, communist expansion, socialism in one country, containment,
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encirclement, purges, and a host of other diverse policies and actions,
the underlying current of detente was not lost. This 1s not to say that
Stalin was motivated solely by Ideological concerns. Certainly, there
Is evidence to show that Stalin was pragmatic in his development of
Soviet foreign policy. In fact, many of the policies outlined above
can be seen as showing a blend of ideological and pragmatic determinants
on Stalin's part.
It was mentioned above that the separation of short-term, pragmatic,
or national interest objectives from long-term ideological objectives
might lead one to conclude that the Soviet Union is motivated solely by
concerns of national interest to the exclusion of ideology. A brief glance
at two (2) foreign policy developments during Stalin's rule might clarify
this point in regard to the foreign policy of Stalin. In the first place,
it can be argued that Stalin's military alliance with the West during
World War II was pragmatic in nature in that it addressed the needs of
survival for the Soviet state in the face of the invasion by Nazi Germany.
However, it is also reasonable to assume that Stalin, who did not abandon
the goal of the worldwide victory of socialism, could not achieve this
goal if the Soviet Union were permanently crushed by Hitler. Secondly,
in the aftermath of World War II, and in light of the military and
territorial victories enjoyed by the U.S.S.R., albeit with a staggering
loss of Soviet lives, Stalin reverted to pre-war animosities with
the West. Stalin's "two camp thesis" of 1946, among other pronouncements,
re-affirmed the Soviet belief that the world was still divided into two
opposing camps with totally irreconcilable ideologies and socio-economic
structures, with one destined to eventually triumph over the other. It
can be argued that Stalin was motivated in breaking the alliance with
the West by pragmatic concerns of Soviet national interest, i.e. the
need to be intransigent in consolidating Soviet gains in post-war
Europe and to establish "friendly nations there so as to protect the
Soviet European flank against any future attack, to protect Soviet
security on its borders, etc. In light of a central thesis of this study,
it can also be reasoned that Stalin had favorably addressed the cause of
achieving the eventual worldwide victory of socialism by altering the
correlation of world forces to the benefit of socialism. Whether inspired
by pragmatism or dogmatism, Stalin, as Vojtech Mastny argues in his
Communism, 1 941-194 5, can be assumed to bear the responsibility for the
disintegration of the wartime alliance and the creation of the Cold War.
Stalin's designs and the incompetence of the leaders of the West in dealing
with Stalin, as argued by Professor Mastny, served as the major determining
factors for the consolidation of Soviet gains and the emergence of the
Cold War.^
The point to be made here is that Stalin, as Lenin before him and
Khrushchev and Brezhnev after him, did not abandon the long-term goal of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, the eventual worldwide triumph of socialism.
Thus, it can be argued that Stalin was not devoid of any theoretical
motivations, and that his short-term pragmatic objectives were components
of a much larger long-term ideological goal that the U.S.S.R. has not
rel inquished
The eight components of Leninist detente, when analyzed against
the background of Stalin's rule, would provide the best means of assessing
the continuity of detente through 1953.
Stalin, as did Lenin, required a continued breathing spell, a
144
respite by which he could consolidate the domestic problems confronting
the Soviet government. In many ways, it can be argued that Stalin
created his own domestic concerns that necessitated a position of detente
with the West. Forced collectivization, rapid industrialization, and
the blood purges consumed a good deal of the country's attention, if
not its basic strength. Much of Stalin's concerns were, of course,
beyond his control. The inherited ravages of World War I and the eventful
destruction of World War II placed Stalin in a position of constantly
consolidating internal strength.
The Soviet Union remained an "oasis" in a sea of capitalists
during Stalin's early years in power, owing to the continued failure
of the socialist revolution in Europe, particularly in Germany. Yet, at
his death the East-West balance of forces had tilted to the side of the
socialist camp. The second Leninist variable had therefore, been decreased
as a source of concern for the Soviets who would now be free to render
"assistance" to the worldwide socialist movement.
Stalin greatly improved, but did not eliminate, the military
imbalance that favored the United States. In the transition from the
conventional to the nuclear age of weaponry, Stalin consistently found
a quantitative and qualitative superiority enjoyed by his imperialist
adversary. Hence, Stalin was always forced to concentrate his efforts
at eliminating the military superiority of the United States, which, it
can be reasoned, had effectively precluded any Soviet-inspired confron-
tation between the two.
Stalin fully adhered to the belief that a final and fatalistic
confrontation between the East and West was an historical inevitability.
In fact, Stalin felt that the growing might of the Soviet Union, in the
face of renewed crises and intensified antagonisnis within the imperialist
camp, would hasten this eventual confrontation.
Threats of intervention and armed assaults against the U.S.S.R.
were also seen by Stalin. It can be argued that imperialist crises,
the rise of Nazism in Germany, the Great Depression, and the capitalist
fear and mistrust of the Soviet Union all contributed, in Stalin's mind,
to the belief that an anti-Soviet alliance and eventual invasion were
imminent.
Stalin fully realized the need for, and reaped the benefits of,
economic assistance and trade relations with the West. It was equally
as necessary for Stalin as it was for Lenin to secure the tools of
production and scientific and technological expertise in industry and
agriculture from the West.
Stalin was also mindful of the need to exploit rivalries and
antagonisms within the imperialist camp so as to preclude any permanent
reconciliation among his adversaries that might eventually evolve into
a strong anti-Soviet alliance. It apparently was necessary for Stalin
to walk a fine tightrope on this point, however. To stir up many animos-
ities and tensions could lead to another general war, an action that the
Soviets wanted to avoid at all costs. It can be reasoned therefore, that
Stalin was quite satisfied with the hostilities that existed between the
nations of the West, until such time as they laid the groundwork for a
global war that would certainly involve the U.S.S.R. However, Stalin was
not only a pragmatist, but a good pupil of Lenin as well, and Lenin had
shown the need to come to an agreement with one imperialist "dog," or
group of "dogs," to avoid being decimated by the rest of the pack. Hence,
Stalin shifted from complacency with the imperialist crises, to an
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anti-Hitler rapprochement of sorts, to the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression
pact, to the anti-Hitler wartime alliance, and finally back to the
anti-Western "two camp" Cold War posture.
Historical evidence indicates that the most important of the
eight components of Lenin's detente remained intact through Stalin's reign.
The socialist system would inevitably conquer its antithesis and create
a new world order of socialism. Thus, it can be argued that the ultimate
defeat of the West and the final victory of the proletariat was not a
smokescreen for Soviet expansionism or a ritualistic or manipulative
justification for Stalin's actions; it was rather, an objective of
Stalin's foreign policy.
By way of summary it can be stated that Stalin maintained the
core of Lenin's detente but made some subtle shifts with the changing
historical environment. The Soviet Union was now stronger militarily,
more stable economically, far more secure internally, and more powerful
internationally as the head of a system of socialist states.
Khrushchev's Perception of Detente
The legacy inherited by the Soviet leadership upon the death of
Stalin can be seen as being far more enviable than that which Lenin
bequeathed to his successor. With the situation of the U.S.S.R. in a
near stable position, the new leadership saw no immediate need to radically
alter the policy of detente with the United States. In fact, in his
eulogy at Stalin's funeral Georgi M. Malenkov, the assumed heir to
Stalin's throne, first sanctified the name of "the great genius of man-
kind," and "the great thinker of our epoch," then gave the official
Bolshevik blessing to the policy of detente:
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The peoples of all lands know Comrade Stalin as thegreat standard bearer of peace. Comrade Stalin d recLdthe great force of his genius toward championing the Jauseof peace for the peoples of the countries
. .The Sovie^Unionhas waged and is waging a consistent policy of preserJat?inand strengthening of peace, a policy of i nLrnat^oLTcoiper-
ation and development of business relations with all countries
a policy based on the Lenin-Stalin premise of the poss?b lUy
'
of prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition of twodifferent systems, capitalist and socialist.
8
It has been said, however, that all things are subject to change,
and in the Soviet Union these changes often assume a drastic if not
metamorphic nature. Stalin would soon lose his position in history as
a "great genius," as "the great thinker" who served as a comrade in arms
with Lenin, and as a great contributor to the holy scripture of Marxist-
Leninist ideology. Malenkov would never succeed in replacing Stalin as
the acknowledged head of the U.S.S.R. In each case, Nikita Khrushchev
proved to be the major catalyst, as he both disposed of Malenkov as a
serious political challenger and disposed of the memory of Stalin and
his policies.
Unlike Stalin and Malenkov, however, detente would not become
an "unpolicy" under Khrushchev. Stalin was "de-stal inized ," the
"anti-party group" was purged, and Soviet foreign policy changed its
course sometimes subtly and sometimes drastically during the Khrushchev
reign. Yet, while Khrushchev altered many of the basic guidelines for
Soviet foreign policy, he did not eliminate detente as the cornerstone
of Soviet activity in the international forum. Indeed, with the many
variations added by Khrushchev, it can be argued that detente became a
very strong policy that served as the catalyst for all aspects of Soviet
foreign policy.
While Khrushchev did not eliminate detente, he did give the policy
a thorough facelift. The Khrushchev application of detente might best
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be judged against Lenin's eight criteria.
First, it can be argued that Khrushchev no longer needed the
breathing spell that detente had afforded his predecessors. At least
Khrushchev did not require this respite as desperately as Lenin and
Stalin since the Soviet government and the C.P.S.U. had consolidated
their strength rather well and the country had overcome the awesome
domestic problems that had confronted it. Khrushchev may not have been
faced with a major post-war reconstruction effort, a civil war, or general
havoc, but his own political struggles, purges, an attempted ouster,
"thaws," and economic miseries appear to have all contributed to an
environment that necessitated peaceful relations with the West.
Khrushchev inherited an international environment that saw the
U.S.S.R. far-removed from the position of an "oasis," as the "socialist
transformation" had taken place in a number of countries. This evolution
may have been brought to these nations by the Red Army, Chinese peasant-
soldiers, and Cuban guerillas as much as by any principles of Marxism-
Leninism. Nonetheless, the socialist-capitalist balance of forces now
favored the socialist camp and Khrushchev was at the helm of a monolithic,
and eventually fragmented, communist world. This, and Khrushchev's
incessant, though peaceful, drive to further augment the ranks of the
"friendly and fraternal" commonwealth of nations provided a renewed
fuel for detente.
The continued East-West military imbalance that had plagued
Lenin and Stalin continued to haunt Khrushchev as well. The arena for
this military competition had shifted from the conventional to the
strategic realm and Khrushchev, it can be argued, constantly found the
technological superiority of the United States in this area to be a
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deterrent to any excessively hostile Soviet action, m an apparent
attempt to lessen the impact of his nuclear inferiority Khrushchev
unleashed his short-lived "sputnik diplomacy" and his short-sighted
Cuban missile venture. The missile "gap" «as shown to be on the Soviet
side, strategic parity was never achieved, and continued peace with the
United States remained a necessity.
The major innovation that Khrushchev added to the detente
formula, in this writer's view, had to do with the theory of war and
violent means to achieve revolutionary ends. Unlike Lenin who saw wars
and violent revolutions as necessary components of revolutionary change,
Khrushchev implemented the strategies of "peaceful transition to socialism,"
"non-violent roads to power," and the "non-capitalist path of development,"
among others. In addition, Khrushchev radically altered the Leninist
concept of the inevitable cataclysmic clash between the Soviet state and
world capitalism. Arguing from his new premise of gradual and peaceful
erosion of the capitalist system, Khrushchev reasoned that wars between
the two camps were no longer "fatalistically inevitable." Moreover,
wars of any kind that might provoke an East-West, or more importantly
a U.S. -Soviet, confrontation were no longer seen as viable options for
the U.S.S.R. In their place Khrushchev would use economic, diplomatic,
and peaceful efforts to attract the non-socialist, and especially Third
World nations, away from the American sphere of influence.
The prospects of an anti-Soviet alliance and invasion had
diminished in one regard as the growing military might of the Soviet
Union coupled with the ever-expanding socialist camp would serve, in
the Soviet view, as a viable deterrent to such intentions. On the other
hand, it was reasoned that these same factors could serve to provoke a
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reckless attempt by the capitalist-imperialist system to thwart the
threatening and unstoppable march of communism. In short, the rationale
for the phobia had changed but the fear remained.
The reliance on favorable economic relations with the West
remained a viable tactic for Khrushchev whose "hare-brained schemes,"
according to his successors, may have done as much to create as to solve
the many problems facing the Soviet economy. Advantageous trade agree-
ments, foreign credits, and an influx of Western technology were still
vital aspects of the Soviet policy of peaceful relations. An inordinate
share of the Soviet wealth was being allocated to military and space-related
expenditures, leaving precious little to appropriate to other commodities.
It was incumbent upon Khrushchev therefore, as it was for his predecessors
and would be for his successors, to turn to the West for economic assistance.
It remained quite necessary, from Khrushchev's perspective, to
exploit the inherent contradictions and antagonisms within the imperialist
camp, although the rationale was again changed. The "divide and conquer"
syndrome was no longer primarily seen as a means for postponing the anti-
Soviet alliance (although the possibility of such was still conceivable
in Khrushchev's mind) or for providing the catalyst for open warfare among
the imperialists. Rather, it can be shown that this strategy now provided
the possibility to breach the capitalist front and open opportunities
for American-controlled, non-aligned, and Third World nations to move into
the "non-capitalist" Soviet sphere of influence.
Lastly, the Leninist view of the ultimate victory of socialism
and the concomitant demise of capitalism-imperialism remained as the
main objective of detente throughout the Khrushchev years. Yet,
Khrushchev had taken Lenin one step further in regard to the tactical
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means by which to achieve this final goal. Lenin had told us in his
aforementioned analogy that the best way to capture Port Arthur was to
use the time-saving direct approach, i.e., a frontal military assault.
When that fails, however, Lenin preached the time-consuming graudal
approach, i.e., a long military siege. Khrushchev added a new wrinkle
to Lenin's parable and advocated the much longer incremental and peaceful
approach that, under the right conditions, would not even require an
army.
Detente had now come full circle. Conceived as a desperation
policy aimed at buying time, detente had now become the means by which
Soviet/communist goals could be realized. Detente was originally a
defensive ploy, a means by which a respite, a breathing spell could be
bought so that the Soviet state could prepare itself for the inevitable
military confrontation with the United States and the rest of the capitalist
system. Khrushchev transformed detente into an offensive strategy, a
policy that would allow the U.S.S.R. to tilt the global correlation of
forces heavily, if not totally, to the Soviet sphere and throughout it
all never provoke an American military response.
Yet, the detente formula was not complete, in this writer's view,
as the Soviets had yet to achieve thermonuclear parity or superiority.
It remained for the successors of Khrushchev to add this last variable
and revitalize detente as we know it today.
The Brezhnev Adaptation of Detente. 1972-197 6
The purge of Khrushchev in 1964 brought the "collective
leadership" of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny to the helm of Soviet
power. By relative comparison to their predecessor the three new Soviet
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leaders gave some the impression of being far less ambitious, aggressive,
and unpredictable. In fact, the new triumvirate was often stigmatized
as being overly bureaucratic, slow to move, and as lacking revolutionary
zeal. The fact that there were three apparent co-equals did much to
foster the belief that the new bureaucratic leadership might well herald
a period of status quo, and certainly a period of reduced Soviet
aggressiveness in the international arena. After all, none of the three
had actively participated in the Bolshevik revolution and could not be
expected to produce the inspiration or charisma that was Lenin's.
Certainly, the new leadership could not, in the view of most observers,
achieve the level of personal dominance and complete control possessed by
Stalin. Even Khrushchev's unique brand of charisma and party dominance
may have seemed to be beyond the reach of the new uninspiring Soviet
leadership.
It became fashionable therefore, to look upon the new Soviet
regime as a rather unexciting group that would pose no serious immediate
threat to American interests abroad, and one that would not embark on
any provocative or terribly hostile foreign policy ventures. It is
understandable that this view was espoused in the early days of the new
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny regime, as indeed the new collective
leadership did not appear to be extremely dynamic by any standard. That
such a view persisted for a number of years however, both underscores
the misinterpretation of the Brezhnev style of detente, in this writer's
view, and pays a good deal of tribute to the effectiveness of detente as
a functional tool of Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev.
Detente, as will be reasoned below, did not become a passive
policy under Brezhnev, and Soviet foreign policy did not become stagnated
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with the changing of the guard in the Kre.lin. Rather, it will be shown
that detente became a far more ominous weapon in the Soviet foreign
policy arsenal as the new leadership embarked upon a more forceful
course of relations with the West. It is important that this point be
emphasized. Khrushchev, as historical evidence indicates, had presented
the West with a very direct, and oftentimes threatening posture, as visibly
manifested in Berlin and Cuba. The response from the United States was
predictably strong and tended to thwart any major Soviet aspirations
that threatened American interests. Consequently, Khrushchev may not
have achieved tremendous foreign policy successes as the American govern-
ment easily justified a firm response to an easily identified enemy who
had promised Americans that their grandchildren would grow up under
communism.
It can be reasoned that Brezhnev realized that it was counter-
productive to maintain the United States in a state of total preparedness
against Soviet aggression and, at the same time to achieve any measure of
success in foreign policy. To present a constant and ominous threat to
the United States, whose economic, military, scientific, and technological
resources far exceeded those of the U.S.S.R., would, in this view,
permanently drain the weak Soviet economy and perpetuate the status quo
in the relative position of each country. Thus, it was necessary for
Brezhnev to reduce the visible threat and replace tanks in Berlin, missiles
in Cuba, and "sputnik diplomacy" with cultural exchanges, economic
cooperation, and Soyuz-Apollo space ventures. Brezhnev, rather than promising
communism for Americans' grandchildren, chose to speak on American television
about "greetings," "friendly feelings" and a commitment toward "improving
9
relations between our countries and strengthening universal peace."
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Thus, to play on the naivite^ of the enemy could, in Brezhnev's
.ind,
yield tremendous results. The more threatening a posture presented to
the United States, the more direct and unified the response to the Soviet
Union would be. If this point had become lost on Brezhnev he need only
have been reminded of the American reaction to Khrushchev's flagrant
flaunting of his "sputnik diplomacy." Alarmed by the imposed menace
of a strategically superior Soviet space program, the dormant American
space enterprise in an extremely short period of time was able to match
and then far surpass the Soviet effort. By harnessing its vastly superior
economic resources, and backed by a unified popular consensus, the United
States had easily rendered useless what had been a key component of Soviet
foreign policy. Brezhnev could not possibly sustain the same firm
American response in the political and military field for any long period
of time. Yet, Brezhnev, as he has often stated, was firmly committed to
the pursuit of foreign policy objectives that would permanently tilt
the balance of forces to the Soviet side at the direct expense of American
interests, thus precluding a realistic peaceful rapprochement or status
quo posture with the United States. However, to alarm the United States
with a menacing and hostile picture of Soviet aggression would elicit
a firm and tenacious American reaction, and Brezhnev's economy was no
better suited for this intense competition than was Khrushchev's. It
became imperative therefore, to revitalize detente, this time under the
guise of the Peace Program.
The creation of the Peace Program can be seen as a manifestation
of both the importance of the policy of detente, in the Soviet view, and
the personal primacy of the architect of the latest variation of Soviet
detente, Leonid Brezhnev. In his keynote address at the 25th C.P.S.U.
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Congress Brezhnev asserted that:
fnrih r'"^"^ ^^^^'^^ 24th Congress seto t the Peace Program. Its main purpose was relvinn nnthe might, solidarity and activeness o^world socillon ns strengthening alliance with all progrL ?$e a d oeaceloving forces to bring about a change of di'rection ?n thldevelopment of international relations. A change ?rom the
soi?ar:ys?ems je^^^^^"^ "-^'^^-^ states"^- t^dif^f^^nt
Throughout the course of the 25th Congress, almost all delegates,
including Brezhnev, called for the further strengthening of the widely
acclaimed Peace Program, established at the 24th Congress. In his report
Brezhnev reported that in regard to the newly-presented proposals of
the 25th Congress:
We regard these proposals as an organic continuation anddevelopment of the Peace Program advanced by the 24th Party
Congress, as a program of further struggle for peace andinternational cooperation and for the freedom and independence
of the peopl es . 1 I
It is important to note, however, that in the documents
of the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress in 1971, and in praticular Brezhnev's report
at that congress, no mention is made of a Peace Program as such. To be
sure, Brezhnev, in his address, made repeated references to the "Soviet
Union's struggle for peace," "peaceful coexistence," the "defense of peace"
and so on. In addition, the report addressed in summary form much of
what would later constitute the actual Peace Program. ""^ Yet, it remainsa fact,
that no new program was actually unveiled by Brezhnev at the 1971 congress.
In the years since the congress the Brezhnev report itself has been
acclaimed as the actual Program of Peace. One can logically question, there-
fore, why such a heralded program was never presented in the form of a
document at the congress, was not referred to as such during the congress
proceedings, and was retroactively accorded a place of paramount importance
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in the days following the congress.
It can be argued that Brezhnev's keynote address at the 24th
Congress represented a personal gamble for the General Secretary. The
keynote address at a Party Congress is generally not delivered in the form
of a surprise presentation by one man, but rather is almost always
scrutinized in close detail and approved by the Politburo of the C.P.S.U.
well in advance of its delivery. (The report by Brezhnev, as is customary,
was officially entitled "The Report of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee
to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.") Thus,
it can be reasoned that the Politburo did not fully endorse any major
program, at least in the form of an official party document. (If indeed,
Brezhnev attempted to present his speech in the form of an officially
sanctioned program.) Nonetheless, Brezhnev took the initiative at the
congress and was apparently prepared, and allowed, to either damage or
improve his party position and personal career with the delivery of his
report and his pursuit of the policy of detente after the congress. The
historical evidence would indicate that Brezhnev succeeded very well in
this regard as the Peace Program was hailed, and Brezhnev ascended to an
unmatched level of party supremacy in the years between the 24th and 25th
Party Congresses.
It is quite normal that a good deal of attention be paid to
analyzing and discussing the resolutions of the C.P.S.U. Congresses.
Surely, the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress was no exception as widespread notoriety
was given to the decisions of the congress in the Soviet media. Yet,
nowhere in the mass of early post-congress discussion was mention made
of a definitive peace program adopted by the 24th Party Congress. However,
Brezhnev, in a flurry of post-congress activities, used many occasions
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to carefully refer to a progra. that was developed at the congress.
Thus, in his May Day speech of 1971, four weeks after delivering his
report to the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev claimed:
True to the behests of the great Lenin, the 24th Conqressof our party advanced a clear and constructive program orpeace-loving foreign policy, which has met wUh^warm suDDortfrom the fraternal socialist countries and approval frombroad masses of people the world over. The st^Sqq e for it.imp ementation is the correct path toward the fur er con o
;He^rh?^ T;eZr::% '-'''''^ strengthen^nrSfthe
Two weeks later, Brezhnev took the occasion of the Ceremonial
Session of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the Georgian
Republic Supreme Soviet to assert:
fy.J^ZllT''^
Leninist traditions of Soviet foreign policy,the 24th Congress put forth a comprehensive program of strugglefor peace and international cooperation, for the freedom andindependence of peoples. This is a program for struggle for
the triumph of the principles of peaceful coexistence, a program
of the friendship of peoples and their free and independent
development, this is a program of curbing the aggressors and
preventing a world war. 14
Therefore, Brezhnev had established the fact, at least in his own
mind, that his report at the 24th Party Congress constituted a program,
and that this program was unmistakingly linked with the policy of peaceful
coexistence. Shortly thereafter Brezhnev reaffirmed the existence of
a party program in his speech at the Eighth Congress of the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany:
A comprehensive program of struggle for peace and inter-
national security, for the freedom and independence of the
peoples was put forward at the 24th Congress of the C.P.S.U.
It determines the main tasks and directions of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy activities at the present stage.
It now remained for Brezhnev to finalize the establishment of
his program and to ensure its widespread acceptance. Brezhnev utilized
the occasion of a "friendly meeting" of the heads of a number of communist
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parties who were on "vacation- in the Soviet Union to reinforce the
primacy of his peace program. (This is the first official reference to
a peace program as such that this writer has found in Soviet source
material.) The meeting, which was held in the Crimea on August 2, 1971.
was attended by Brezhnev. Podgorny and Shelest on the Soviet side and
Zhikov (Bulgaria), Kadar (Hungary), Honecker (G.D.R.), Tsedenbal
(Mongolia), Gierek (Poland), and Husak (Czechoslovakia). It was reported
that the meeting "touched upon urgent questions of the development of the
world Communist movement, as well as foreign policy problems of mutual
interest." Most importantly, the meeting touched upon the Brezhnev peace
program. As reported in the Soviet press:
The meeting participants emphasized the great importance
of the peace program advanced by the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress
and supported by the fraternal Communist and Worker's Parties
The implementation of this program is called upon to play a
very important role in the genuine easing of international
tension and in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples.^
In the course of the next five years Brezhnev was able to expand
the acceptance of the new program to the point that it was hailed as a
momentous contribution to the cause of peace, the cornerstone of all
Soviet foreign policy, and the most critical aspect of contemporary
international life. Thus, Brezhnev could look back upon his report at
the 24th Party Congress and claim:
Invariably basing its actions on this (Leninist) platform,
our Party, following Lenin's behests and proceeding from the
half-century experience of its peace-loving foreign policy,
came out with the Peace Program at its 24th Congress. This
program laid down a realistic path to the elimination of the
cold war and set clear-cut tasks in the struggle for a trans-
ition from the danger of war to peaceful cooperation . 17
It can be argued therefore, that Brezhnev, through the presenta-
tion and implemention of the Peace Program, achieved an impressive personal
victory. In July, 1973 Brezhnev was awarded the International Lenin Peace
Prize, one of many awards bestowed on the General Secretary after the 24th
C.P.S.U. Congress. In his acceptance speech Brezhnev demonstrated his
belief that his Peace Program was a success. In Brezhnev's words:
^/L.^^r"^"^^'^^"^"^ ^^^^s^s 0^ the great Lenin the24th Congress of our Party put forward a realis??c and asdevelopments have shown, fruitful Peace Program Thai ?why our Peace Program enjoys great esteem and recognitlamong workers and peasants, among all who are engaged n
L^riffe^?;:; sTppo^t^!""^""^
''''' ^-"^^^
our^Partv'^J^p^^^' t'"'" i''" ^ ^^'^^ to assure
luLl IJ:
the Soviet people, and people of good will every-where that I will continue to do everything in my power toachieve the most wonderful and most humane objective - the
objective implicit in the very name of the award conferred
,upon me, namely, that of strengthening peace among nations.
It will be argued that through the implementation of the Peace
Program, Brezhnev sought to both reduce the tenacity of American reactions
to Soviet policies and, more importantly, afford the U.S.S.R. a larger
risk-taking potential in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.
Khrushchev's style of detente, although eliminating the need for a direct
confrontation between the two superpowers, still presented a visible
threat, and the American government had no difficulty in responding to
this threat and generally enjoyed widespread support for taking a hard
line with the Soviet Union. By extending the hand of friendship and
entangling the United States in a web of bi -lateral accords however,
Brezhnev had made the process of firmly responding to Soviet actions a
more difficult one. Consequently, it would appear that Brezhnev had
given himself a measure of control over American-Soviet relations to the
degree that he could pursue foreign policy objectives, specifically in
the world of developing nations, without necessarily inviting a hard
line anti-Soviet position in Washington. Thus, Brezhnev can claim, as
he did in a speech at the White House, that the U.S. -Soviet summits:
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...encourage us to make new big strides durina thepresent meeting, to give greater stability to SoJiej!American re ations and thereby increase the con?r bJtion
deteiit'ej"''^" '° ''''' P^^^ internatS
It can be reasoned, therefore, that the initial image of the new
collective leadership as perceived in the West was incorrect. In the
first place, it is questionable whether or not a collective leadership
ever existed. Leonid Brezhnev as one member of the new triumvirate had
already suffered two major political setbacks in his career and consequently
did not seem to possess the ability to assume sole control of the Soviet
ruling hierarchy. However, as historical evidence shows, it did not
take long for Brezhnev to do just that and to firmly place himself in a
position of preeminent stature and importance. In fact, it can be
hypothesized that Brezhnev has been accorded a level of prestige and
eminence in Soviet politics that surpasses that which was achieved by
any Soviet political figure save Stalin. It would appear that Kosygin,
Podgorny and the rest of the Politburo have for some time been relegated
to a position of secondary importance as Brezhnev has pursued his own
"cult of the personality." Moreover, as indicated above, Brezhnev's
stature has been most evident in the area of detente where the General
Secretary has clearly stamped the policy of detente with his personal
imprimatur
.
Brezhnev therefore, has been able to pursue the policy of detente
without the inhibiting constraints that characterize a collective leader-
ship, oligarchy, or any form of rule short of a one man dictatorship.
There are, of course, conflicting opinions regarding the overall political
20
well-being and party dominance of Brezhnev. Yet, in view of his pursuit
of the Peace Program and the acclaim he has received as noted above.
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Brezhnev may be seen as a major determining factor, certainly more than
any political figure of group of policy makers in the Soviet Union, in
regard to the formulation and pursuit of detente with the West in
general and the United States in particular.
Secondly, the image of a slow moving, bureaucratic Soviet
leadership may be misleading in light of some aggressive tendencies
displayed in Soviet foreign policy in the last ten years. The Kremlin
regime has, during that time, shown no apparent unwillingness to confront
the United States in areas that are considered to be important to American
global interests. Furthermore, as will be argued in detail below, the
U.S.S.R. has clearly set its sights on effecting pro-Soviet and anti-
Western alterations in nearly all Asian, African, Latin-American, "Third
World" and non-aligned nations. Such a tendency may well be caused in
part by the existence of a dominant if not overwhelming party and govern-
ment leader. However, it can also be argued that the appearance of an
aggressive Soviet foreign policy stance is equally determined by the
existence of the long sought after parity in thermonuclear capability
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Together, these two factors may well have contributed to the
creation of a detente policy by the U.S.S.R. that is not only rather
dynamic and vigorous in scope but also threatening to American interests.
The threat, in this writer's view, is posed in many ways not the least
of which is the American uncertainty as to how to denounce a policy of
peaceful coexistence and reconciliation with the U.S.S.R. both effectively
and wisely. It would, it seems, be politically unfeasible for any
American political figure, especially one occupying the White House, to
categorically reject a policy of peace and friendly relations with the
Iican
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world's other thermonuclear superpower. Ronald Reagan, the Republ
Party's presidential nominee, made fairly direct references to such
foreign policy stance during much of his campaign. Yet, it has also
become apparent here, despite minority opposition within his own party,
that Reagan was willing to be advised by Henry Kissinger, the chief
engineer of the latest U.S. version of detente with the U.S.S.R.
President Carter pursued what appeared to be a hard line in dealing with
the Soviet Union, but only after a flagrant military intervention by
the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan. Even here, the American president was com-
pelled to utilize such unheralded foreign policy responses as the boycott
of the Moscow-hosted Olympic Games and a partial grain embargo to register
the American opposition to Soviet actions.
The result, and a basic hypothesis of this dissertation, is that
the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev in particular, enjoys a fairly enviable
position at the present time in regard to relations with the West. The
policy of detente is very aggressive, especially in terms of the pursuit
of Soviet objectives in the "developing nations" of the world, or in the
Soviet vernacular, the nations "seeking national liberation." Yet,
the Soviet presentation of detente is quite appealing to most, in that
it offers no overt manifestations of hostility or direct confrontation.
Hence, it can be argued that detente becomes quite attractive politically
to those who are weary of a cold war posture between the East and West.
Thus, it is not surprising that many West European political leaders,
most notably in France and the Federal Republic of Germany, have found it
difficult to wholeheartedly endorse any American denunciation of the
Soviet Union. Detente, in the view of most observers, is popular among
the West European masses, and popular support can easily translate into
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election votes as witnessed by Helmut Schmidt's victory in October,
1980. What Brezhnev has been able to achieve therefore, is
impressive. Brezhnev has succeeded in maintaining the aggressive
tendencies of detente as practiced by Khrushchev while at the same time
making the policy attractive, or at least
"un-rejectable" to the West.
Thus, Brezhnev can outline the aggressive scope of detente as follows:
...Our common duty is to move tirelessly forward alonathe chosen path, to move steadily, perseverinqlv alona .
a wide front, resolutely breaking down The resisUn e ofthe adversaries of detente, and the proponents of "cold war "As we in the Soviet Union see it, the task is to make the
?.tw ll^lV''.'' l^.' '''''''' ''''' internationai re-lations stable, durable, and, what is more, irreversible. 21
In addition, Brezhnev can issue a warning in regard to those who
might see a passive Soviet foreign policy in light of the U.S.
-Soviet
detente. As stated by Brezhnev:
Let me remind you that Lenin, that greatest of revolution-
aries, used to say: Revolutions are not made to order or by
compact. And we might add that neither can revolution, class
struggle, nor the liberation movements be abolished to order
or by agreement. No power on earth is capable of reversing
the inexorable process of the resurgence of social life.
Wherever there is colonialism, there is bound to be struggle
for national liberation. Wherever there is exploitation, there
is bound to be struggle for the emancipation of labor. Where-
ever there is aggression, there is bound to be resistance. 22
In short, an argument can be made that the style of detente as
practiced by Leonid Brezhnev has been a far more successful enterprise
than that which was implemented by any of his predecessors. The Soviet
Union under Brezhnev enjoys the military, political, and economic stability
that was never realized by Lenin. Hence, detente lacks the oftentimes
desperate and "necessary evil" characteristics that marked detente
during Lenin's lifetime. In much the same way Brezhnev has found himself
in a much more enviable posture than that which was achieved by Stalin,
who also found detente to be an unpleasant yet quite necessary policy.
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Thus, Brezhnev has been able, with a good deal of success, to transform
Stalin-s defensive and hostile detente into an offensive but apparently
non-threatening device. The achievement of thermonuclear strategic
parity with the West has also provided Brezhnev with the final factor
that rendered the Khrushchev formula of detente incomplete. However,
Brezhnev has proven to be a better practitioner of detente than was
Khrushchev and has balanced aggressiveness with outward signs of
reconciliation and friendliness.
Brezhnev has therefore, given the detente policy a thorough over-
haul and clearly differentiated his detente from any that was practiced
by preceding Soviet rulers. Yet, the Soviets claim that detente today
is a continuation of the detente initiated by Lenin. This is true to a
degree; the ideological and historical continuity of the Soviet policy
of detente is quite strong from 1918 to 1980. In Brezhnev's view, the
continuity from Lenin to the present is obvious. In the words of Brezhnev:
The founder of our Soviet state, Valdimir Ilyich Lenin,
put forward and made a persuasive case for the principle of
peaceful coexistence of states belonging to different social
and political systems - this was many decades before the
word detente acquired its present meaning. The principle
demand is that states not interfere in each others internal
affairs and they not use force to decide disputed issues, and
that normal peaceful and businesslike relations be maintained
between socialist and capitalist countries.
Again, as stated by Brezhnev:
...The very notion of peaceful coexistence, which is these
days increasingly becoming the generally recognized foundation
for developing relations between states with differing social
systems, was formulated by the founder of the Soviet state,
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 24
It is necessary therefore, to examine the eight detente variables
that Lenin established in 1918 in comparison to those employed by Brezhnev
in his revital ization of detente.
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Detente as a breathing spell
.
It was shown above that one dominant
characteristic of detente as employed by Lenin was detente as a breathing
spell, a respite in war whereby the Soviet Union could concentrate all
its energy and resources on the tasks of guaranteeing its basic survival.
Lenin's detente was a desperate one and was compelled by the utmost
necessity of diverting any major military thrust against the Soviet Union
so that Lenin could establish the conditions for consolidating the
economic, political, and military strength of his new regime. Above all,
detente would establish the necessary preconditions, for first ensuring
the continued existence of the Soviet state and then for the construction
of socialism within the U.S.S.R.
Brezhnev was obviously not confronted with the level of despera-
tion that was faced by Lenin, as the very survival of the Soviet Union
was not threatened. Yet, Brezhnev was equally in need of a respite from
war and for a peaceful posture with the West. For Brezhnev this peace
would establish the preconditions not for survival or internal socialist
construction but rather for the worldwide proliferation of socialism and
of communist construction. The Soviet Union has made no attempt to
conceal the fact that detente provides an advantageous position for the
pursuit of these objectives. In the words of Brezhnev:
...I would like to assure you that we shall continue
consistently and steadfastly to implement the principled
class course defined by the Party Program and the decisions
of the Party Congresses, a foreign policy line aimed at the
defense and strengthening of peace and at the creation of the
best international conditions for the construction of a commun-
ist society. We see this as our revolutionary duty to the
Soviet people and to the working people of all countries. 25
In Brezhnev's view, the pursuit of the Peace Program offered the
U.S.S.R. new opportunities in the international arena. In Brezhnev's words
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fh«':;^?/f''7'''^ °^ general alignment of forces inthe world led us several years aao tn thic rnl.i ,
that a real opportunity e^istL^Lti n^ ur^^fundr^''mental change in the international situation The imoortantthing was to furnish a broad basis for construct vedsSs onand solution of the problems that had accumulated Theseconsiderations and our policy were summed up in the PeaceProgram proclaimed by the 24th Congress of the C.P.S.U 26
Brezhnev can also claim that the Party's foreign policy is
designed to protect the Soviet Union against war and "opens vast vistas
for promoting friendship and co-operation between nations and advances
the cause of social progress on our planet."^'' A similar view is
expressed by Mikhail Suslov, a member of the C.P.S.U. Politburo and the
acknowledged party theoretician and ideology expert. In the words of
Suslov
:
At the same time, a certain easing of international
tension, the retreat of the policy of war and aggression
and the failure of the "cold war" are opening up to the world's
progressive forces additional possibilities for developing the
struggle of the working people against the oppression of the
capitalist monopolies and for their own rights and interests
and for upholding and strengthening democratic freedoms. 28
In analyzing the changes in U.S. -Soviet relations inherent in
the new detente Georgi Arbatov depicts the new relationship in the terms
of Soviet foreign policy. This foreign policy, according to Arbatov,
"has always been determined by a sincere desire to put an end to war and
aggression, to ensure peace and security for the peoples, and to create
for the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries
29the most favorable conditions for the construction of a new society."
Detente has been criticized by many Western observers as accruing
unilateral advantages to the Soviet cause. In the face of such criticism
Brezhnev resolutely maintains that detente is, in fact, a policy geared
to the "supreme good for all peoples and an important condition for the
30
progress of mankind in our time." In his keynote address at the 25th
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C.P.S.U. Congress, Brezhnev elaborated further:
We make no secret of the fact that we see detente asa path leading to the creation of more favorable condUionsfor peaceful socialist and communist construct on TMonlvconfirms that socialism and peace are indiv i u.' Whe ware reproached for saying this, it is hard to keep fromthinking that those who reproach us lack confidence thatcapitalism is capable of existing without resorting to
aggression and threats of arms, without encroaching on theindependence and interests of other peoples. 31
In an interview granted to French television some eight months
after the congress, Brezhnev was questioned on the allegation that detente
did indeed appear as a policy that was "advantageous only to the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries." In his response Brezhnev first
claimed that "such a viewpoint seems strange to us, to say the least,"
then continued:
Of course, we have not concealed and do not conceal the
fact that plans for the internal development of the Soviet
Union are built on the expectation that peaceful external con-
ditions will be ensured, and therefore detente is beneficial
to us. But does peace really threaten something bad for other
peoples? Is there really a people that can hope to win anything
from unleashing a world war using today's means of mass annihila-
tion?32
One of the major components of Brezhnev's detente formula is the
fact that the growing might of the Soviet Union and the alignment of
world forces in favor of socialism have made the creation of this
favorable detente possible. While this "alignment of world forces" theory
will be examined in detail below, it is important to draw the connection
here to the view of detente as a necessary breathing spell. In the words
of Arbatov detente has "become possible thanks to the growing might of
the Soviet Union, and the entire socialist commonwealth, thanks to the
vigorous actions of the international working class and the national
liberation movement and the strengthening of the forces of peace and
33
progress the world over." Arguing this position, Arbatov can conclude
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that the West was forced to enter into a detente relationship with the
Soviet Union in the face of the growing
.ight of world socialism. The
Soviets, in this view, had always pursued the objectives of world peace
and relaxation of tensions; yet as Arbatov claims:
However the goodwill of the Soviet Union and the other
tSes'e 00 if'l? '''' '''''' reaiiza?? n Ofhes goa s. It was also necessary to have definite obiectivepreconditions, and these preconditions have appeared ?n'ourdays.
-
the willingness and agreement of the other side the
capitalist world to build its relations with the woHd o?'
socialism on the foundation of the principles of peaceful
coexistence. 34 ^ K'=a^'=iui
Brezhnev has often claimed that the correlation of world forces is
an important concern. As stated by the General Secretary:
We are deeply convinced that the current change-about
from "cold war" to detente, from military confrontation to
a more solid security and to peaceful cooperation is the main
tendency in present day international relations.
How has this become possible?
The main factor, we are certain, is the general change in
the correlation of world forces - a change that is against the
exponents of "cold war" and the building up of arms and those
who fancy diverse military ventures, a change in favor of the
forces of peace and progress. 35
In much the same manner Brezhnev can argue that "thanks to the
growth of the might and international influence of the Soviet Union and
the entire socialist commonwealth.
. .the cause of easing of tensions has
advanced and the security of the peoples has been strengthened.""^^
Moreover, Brezhnev can claim that:
As a result, international conditions for communist and
socialist construction and for the struggle for the social
progress of the peoples have become more favorable. This
makes it possible for us to an increasing extent to concen-
trate on the accomplishment of peaceful, constructive tasks.
Naturally, we are satisfied with this course of events.
Lenin had always claimed that the primary objective of the
detente policy was the immediate internal consolidation of power and
socialist construction within the U.S.S.R. By accomplishing this goal
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Lenin, as well as Stalin and Khrushchev later, felt that the Soviet
Union could better render assistance to the worldwide socialist movement.
The first task, however, was internal consolidation and construction.
Much the same sentiment is echoed by Brezhnev in implementing the
latest detente. While detente does provide favorable conditions for
the further dissemination of socialism abroad, it also provides the
needed breathing spell for the internal "construction of a new society"
as outlined above. Brezhnev therefore, draws a direct link between the
foreign and domestic components of detente:
Our Party, loyal to the great ideas of proletarian inter-
nationalism, has never separated the destiny of the Soviet
land from the destiny of the countries of Europe and the whole
world. The U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy aimed at consolidating
peace and the freedom of peoples, and our domestic policy,
whose goal is the building of communism, not only correspond
to the fundamental interests of the Soviet people but also, we
are convinced, are our contribution to the common struggle'of-Q
the whole world's Communists for a better future for mankind.^
In a similar fashion, Brezhnev can argue as follows:
Our peaceable foreign policy is an expression of the
very essence of our society, an expression of its profound
internal requisites Our aim is to ensure that tomorrow
the Soviet people will live even better than today. Soviet
people feel tangibly the results of these collective efforts.
Lenin's respite was transient in nature and would come to an
abrupt end when the Soviet state was capable of waging a victorious
war against the West. Brezhnev's breathing spell, under the right con-
ditions would be nearly eternal, and would end only after the victorious
construction of communism, first in the Soviet Union, then in the rest
of the socialist and non-socialist world. The Soviets have long advocated
that detente should be made irreversible and that the breathing spell
offered by detente should be transformed into a permanent peace. While
Lenin's breathing spell was a respite between wars, Brezhnev's breathing
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spell would be the catalyst for permanent communist construction without
the need for any war. As Brezhnev has stated:
The best way of defending peace is to continue activelypursuing our policy of peace, to continue our - as peoplenow call it - peace offensive. ^ ^
of ^IJl'
P^en^p Meeting in April, the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union instructed thePolitburo to carry on its vigorous efforts to implement thePeace Program in its entirety and to make irreversible thefavorable changes that are now being increasingly felt inthe international situation. 40 ^
In analyzing the Leninist detente format, Soviet cormientators
can claim that "it took the genius and unbending will of Lenin and the
wisdom and political maturity of the Party that he reared to work out
and then to consistently implement the only correct policy - a policy of
peaceful coexistence.
. .of two systems of ownership, two opposing economic
and socio-political systems. "^^ Yet, in the words of Politburo member
Yuri Andropov, this policy was a temporary one aimed at providing the
much needed breathing spell:
Of course, at that time there could be no talk of excluding
war from the people's lives. As a great realist, Lenin realized
that the imperialist powers would not leave revolutionary Russia
alone, that the peace won in a painful struggle would only be a
"postponement of war," only a breathing space of peace.
And our country received this breathing space. We gained two
decades. This helped us to be victorious in a war that was the
most terrible, the most bloody of all wars mankind has gone
through... 42
The Soviet Union does not attempt to conceal the fact that detente
has provided and continues to provide the breathing spell that is quite
necessary for internal consolidation and/or socialist or communist con-
struction. However, the theory of detente as a breathing spell for Lenin
must be added to the theory of the present alignment of forces in favor
of socialism, to show the permanent nature of the present respite. By
continuing the reasoning of the Leninist breathing spell, it can be argued
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that "today this question
- which is certainly not a new one - is being
posed and resolved in a different way."^^ ^^.^ ^^f^,,,,^
^^^^ ^^^^^^^
is dictated by the "alignment of world forces" in favor of socialism,
which "creates the prerequisites for... the total elimination of the
danger of a new world war... and expands the limits of peaceful
44
coexistence." Andropov can conclude the argument then by asserting that:
'The Party now sets itself the goal not of winning a breathing space of
peace but of establishing a lasting and just peace on earth. "^^
Soviet spokesmen from Lenin to Brezhnev have always argued that
the prerequisite for internal consolidation and the building of a
socialist/communist society is the absence of war. Lenin told us that it
would be foolish to embark upon the goals of domestic construction in
the face of anything but peaceful relations with the capitalist-imperialist
world. Peace, in Lenin's mind created the most favorable, indeed the
only, condition for the creation of his new society. Likewise, Soviet
commentators in the era of the new detente realize the same truism:
It is a class policy (the policy of detente) because
above all else it is based on the vital interests of social-
ism and the interests of socialist and communist construction.
The new society needs peace - it is easier for the new society
to build in conditions of detente and a diminished arms burden.
It is also easier for the "new society" to build in an era when
vast amounts of financial resources from a limited and relatively weak
economy are not allocated to a burgeoning arms race. As mentioned above,
the Soviet Union has appropriated an inordinate percentage of its
national economy to its military/defense budget. With a Gross National
Product far inferior to that of the United States, the U.S.S.R. still
matches its chief rival in military expenditures. Accordingly, it can
be argued that the "new society" must be built with the relatively low
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budget that remains after the military appropriation has been made. As
outlined above, Brezhnev cannot sustain this intense ruble- for-dollar
military spending and still hope to achieve any measure of success in
addressing major domestic concerns. The breathing spell therefore,
would afford Brezhnev the opportunity to divert funds to just such
domestic enterprises. In speaking of the arms race, and specifically
the unanswered questions of arms limitation, Brezhnev asserted that:
However they remain on the agenda. There is really no
Ih!
^"^i^l their implementation would be fort e strengthening of mutual confidence. Moreover, both sides
would receive an opportunity to save substantial sums of
money and to use this money for productive purposes, for im-proving people's lives. 47
It is reasonable to surmise that Brezhnev has had to temper his
policy of detente with assurances that military vigilance and military
expenditures would not be drastically reduced. Hence, he has repeatedly
claimed that the Soviet Union will "continue to maintain the country's
Armed Forces at a high level, so that Soviet fighting men will always
have the most up-to-date weapons, arms that the imperialists must take
into account - this is our duty to the people, and we will fulfill this
48
sacred duty." Yet, Brezhnev again is mindful of the need to secure
a breathing spell so as to re-channel much of this military spending into
other areas of the Soviet economy. Therefore, after promising military
and defense vigilance at the highest level, Brezhnev can argue as follows:
At the same time, we have no greater desire than to
transfer the resources that are now of necessity diverted
from the national economy into raising the working people's
living standard, into constructive purposes. We are pre-
pared tomorrow to start disarmament measures - either major,
radical measures or, as a start, partial ones - on a
genuinely fair reciprocal basis. ^9
It can be argued that a constant state of intense competition with
the United States, be it in the military, economic, or foreign policy
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realm, has never suited the needs of the Soviet Union. Such a state has
always placed the U.S.S.R. in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis its
more economically powerful adversary. Hence, a breathing spell has often
been quite necessary for the Kremlin regime from the earliest days of
Soviet power. Lenin, of course, needed this breathing spell to survive.
Brezhnev, assured of his nation's survival, needs this respite to focus
energies on some rather ambitious domestic objectives. However, Brezhnev,
unlike Lenin, is in a fairly good position to make his breathing spell a
permanent fixture of Soviet foreign policy and an irreversible component
of East-West relations.
The Soviet Union as a socialist oasis . One of the major determining
factors motivating Lenin to embark upon detente in 1918 was the fact
that Soviet Russia was, as he depicted it, "an oasis in a raging sea of
imperialism." Hopelessly outnumbered by his more formidable capitalist-
imperialist enemies, and thwarted by the abortive socialist upheaval
in Germany, Lenin reasoned that he had no choice but to reach an accommoda-
tion of sorts with the West. This may have been the most evil of
necessities for Lenin, yet until the balance of power could be shifted or
allies found, he had no choice but to coexist with his hated enemies.
Brezhnev has not been confronted with such a desperate position.
Far removed from the position of an oasis, the Soviet Union has for some
time stood at the head of an ever-increasing commonwealth of socialist
states. Soviet influence may have been forced upon many countries, allies
may have been created and not earned, and the communist world may have
become fragmented. Yet, there is no denying that the communist world's
size and strength is impressive and that the Soviet Union is in a
position of international strength beyond that which Lenin had achieved.
This fact has radically altered this particular component of
detente fro. Lenin to Brezhnev. Lenin found detente to be a necessity
because of the weakness of Soviet Russia and the non-existence of a
socialist camp of allies. Brezhnev, on the other hand, has found
detente to be a policy that would be forced upon the West with the
realization there of the growing might of the Soviet Union and the new
alignment of world forces in favor of the socialist camp. What Lenin
could not achieve was used by Brezhnev as a springboard to launch his
new aggressive detente. Brezhnev, in analyzing the present alignment
of world forces, has claimed:
Our optimism is based on the successes already achievedby the policy of peaceful coexistence, on the fact that the
ruling circles in some of the capitalist countries are
showing a growing appreciation of the real correlation of
world forces and are coming to realize that war is unaccept-
able as a means for solving international problems. 50
This point has been reinforced by Brezhnev a number of times.
Again, in Brezhnev's words:
The relaxation of international tensions has become possi-
ble because a new correlation of forces now exists on the world
scene. Today the leaders of the bourgeois world can no longer
seriously expect to decide the historical dispute between
capitalism and socialism by force of arms. 51
Much the same sentiment has been voiced by Suslov:
As a result of the vigorous foreign policy of the Soviet
Union... the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence is
being affirmed more and more in international affairs...
Having run into a resolute rebuff from the united forces of
world socialism, the workers' and national liberation move-
ment and all fighters for peace, international imperialism
has been compelled to retreat, and its representatives are
sitting down at the negotiating table... 52
The Soviet Union on a number of occasions, has reiterated this
basic foundation of detente in the 1970's. Detente, in the Soviet view.
was not a mutually agreed to rapprochement between the two conflicting
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socioeconomic systems. Nor was detente the result of an American
willingness to peacefully coexist with the Soviet Union. Detente,
according to Brezhnev, was always practiced by the Kremlin rulers, and
was always thwarted by the United States. The United States agreed to
formalize detente with the U.S.S.R. because it had no choice but to do
so. Faced with the awesome military might of the Soviet Union, and con-
fronted with the alignment of world forces in favor of socialism, the
United States finally realized the hopelessness of pursuing an anti-Soviet
and anti-communist foreign policy. The United States did not agree to a
detente with the Soviet Union; detente was forced upon the United States by
its realization of the objective factors underlying the balance of power in
the world. Suslov again underscores this point, in relation to the
increased ideological struggle:
...With the changes in the world situation that favor
socialism, the hopelessness of any attempts to bring military,
economic, or political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union
or the socialist commonwealth as a whole becomes more and more
obvious. This being the case, the struggle becomes particularly
acute in the area of ideology, an area in which there is not and
cannot be peaceful coexistence between socialism and capi tal i sm . 53
In his keynote address at the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress, Brezhnev
boastfully claimed that "the world is changing before our eyes, and it
is changing for the better. Our people and our Party are not passive
54
onlookers of these changes. No, we are active participants in them."
What Brezhnev saw changing before his eyes was the growth of socialist
influence abroad and the consolidation of strength by the socialist
commonwealth. Brezhnev could point to victories in Vietnam, national
liberation victories among the developing nations, communist party gains
in Western Europe, socialist construction in Cuba and a host of other
real or imagined triumphs. The relations with the capitalist states could
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then be summarized by Brezhnev as follows:
The main element in our policy with respect to the
capitalist states has been and remains the struggle for the
affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence forlasting peace, and for lessening and in the long run elimin-
ating the danger that a new world war will break out
The transition from the cold war and the explosive'con-
frontation of two worlds to the easing of tension was connected
arena Is"
^ alignment of forces in the world
This alignment of forces in the world arena, and specifically
the alignment in favor of the socialist camp, provides the main character-
istic of international relations from the Soviet perspective. Georgi
Arbatov, in analyzing Soviet-American relations reasons that:
As a matter of fact this constitutes one of the principal
features of the present world situation. Recent international
events, including events bearing on the relations between the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., provide practical confirmation for
these conclusions and show that the change in the alignment of
forces is not some abstract formula but a tangible reality
that makes it possible to bring about major positive changes
in the international situation. The important shift in the
alignment of forces in the world arena and the favorable new
opportunities that this opens up have been created to a
significant extent by the Soviet Union itself... 57
The Soviet view of the present international environment is
based on an analysis of what the Soviets feel are unquestionable objective
factors. The most obvious of these objective criteria, and one that
has finally been realized by the United States, is the aforementioned
theory of the alignment of world forces. Soviet commentators can assert
therefore, that the improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations was conditioned
by a number of factors, and that:
Among these factors, a special place is held by the
alignment of forces in the world arena, which is steadily
changing in favor of socialism. In the final analysis, it
was this factor that made the capitalist world, after pro-
longed and fierce resistance, recognize the changes that
have been wrought as a result of socialist revolutions on
a substantial part of the globe - and this is an important
aspect of what is now taking place in Europe and in anumber of other parts of the world. 58 ^
^
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Brezhnev is especially fond of asserting the alignment of world
forces dictum in regard to the situation in Europe where the heart of
the Soviet bloc is still to be found and where communist parties have
made some impressive inroads. Brezhnev has often claimed that con-
temporary Europe is far different from the continent that was embroiled
in World War II. This, according to Brezhnev is a positive change that
was brought about by the fact that "the alignment of class forces has
changed, both on the international level and within many states. The
role that the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Parties,
play in European public life has grown tremendously..."^^ This alignment
then yields tremendous benefits, in Brezhnev's view, for the European
continent:
The Europe of today is to a large extent the fruit of
the successful construction of socialism and communism in
a number of the continent's countries. It is also the fruit
of the persistent and steadfast struggle for peace the socialist
countries are waging in the international arena...
Today it is clearer than ever that imperialism can no longer
dictate the destiny of Europe. The socialist states and the
workers' and democratic movement in the capitalist countries
now have an important say in deciding this destiny.
The all-European security conference held in Helsinki was of
great importance to the Soviet Union in that it confirmed many of the
Soviet claims that the re-alignment of world forces in favor of socialism
was a reality on the European continent. Brezhnev has stated, in light
of the Helsinki accords, that the proper preconditions for solidifying
detente have been created in Europe:
The most important results of the liberation struggle
of the European peoples during World War II and thereafter
have been consolidated. Preconditions have been created for
lasting peace and good-neighbor cooperation both in Europe
and outside it.^'
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The Helsinki accords, in Brezhnev's view, have legalized and
accorded widespread recognition of the post-World War II socialist gains
in Europe. Thus, Brezhnev can claim-
The positions of socialism and the influence of the con-certed policy of the socialist states are stronge t n E^roDeThe 24th Congress posed the task of ensuring European securi';on the basis of recognition of the territorial and pol ticaP^realities that came about as a result of World War II tsalong these lines that our Central Committee has acted. 62
The convocation of an all-European conference on security had been
an objective of the Soviet Union for some time.^^ To convene and
successfully complete such a conference would, in the Soviet view, pro-
vide the means by which the process of detente could best be served in
Europe. In effect, the Helsinki accords provided the means by which
many of the Soviet objectives inherent in detente could best be realized.
In the first place, it seems evident that the U.S.S.R. would hope to
realize a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe; a reduction
that might be prompted by a reduced image of the Soviet menace. As
Brezhnev has claimed:
Common sense notwithstanding, "responsibility" is
ascribed to the socialist countries for internal political
events in other states and for civil wars and wars of national
liberation. The man in the street is intimidated by the idea
of 'hordes of Russian tanks" and is told that the U.S.S.R. and
the other Warsaw Treaty countries are building up armaments
on a vast scale and .preparing for "war against Western Europe."
But these fabrications collapse like a house of cards as
soon as we look at facts, at reality. 64
Secondly, it would appear that the Soviet Union hoped to use
detente, as expressed in the Helsinki documents, as a means for reducing
European dependency on American economic assistance. This, it would seem,
could best be accomplished by expanding the levels of intra-European and
Soviet-European trade and economic contacts. In the words of Brezhnev,
when analyzing the Helsinki accords:
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It is also extremely important to create, so to soe^^k thematerial fabric of peaceful cooperation in urope Tfll^lthat would strengthen ties among European peoples 'and talesand would give them an increasing stake in the preservationof peace for many years to come. I have in mind vaHou ?ormsof mutually advantageous cooperation - trade and product oncooperation and scientific-technical ties. 65
P-^oaucti
It can be argued that the Soviet Union hoped to gain a major
psychological victory through the Helsinki accords and to demonstrate that
detente had indeed become an irreversible process on the European con-
tinent. One of the features of this strategy, again, was to portray the
U.S.S.R. in terms of a cooperative and non-threatening neighbor. As
stated by Brezhnev:
The main thing now is to implement in practice all the principles
and understandings agreed upon in Helsinki. The Soviet Union is
acting and will continue to act in precisely this way. Recently we
offered certain proposals on the development of all-European
cooperation in a number of important fields. We shall continue to
make efforts in this direction. We expect the same approach
from all other participants in the all-European conference.
Thus, there have been achievements in the establishment of
peaceful relations in Europe, and, comrades, these are considerable
achi evements .65
The Helsinki conference would lay the formal groundwork for the
consolidation and official recognition of the favorable realignment of
forces that had already taken place in Europe and provide the means by
which the offensive strategy of detente could further this favorable realign-
ment in the future. It seemed important to the Soviet Union that the
final recognition of the widely accepted facts of post-World War II
socialist gains in Europe be granted by the West. It appeared to be
imperative that the U.S.S.R. solidify the detente process with the nations
of Western Europe so as to ensure the attainment of Soviet objectives in
the future. These two concerns, as expressed by Brezhnev, were both
addressed by the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference:
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The results achieved are worth the efforts expended THp
b??n:TA'''r:'^'P'K"'5 collectively reaffirmed ' ^ioUDility of existing borders. A set of nrinrinioc Z '
between states wJ worked out, prlnclpfer a^ u ?]l'Zlletter and spirit
- correspond to the requirements of Deace?ulcoexistence. Jhus, favorable conditions have bee crea^eS forthe^preservation and consolidation of peace throughouf^he con-
futJ?e!67^'
^'"^ conference's results are aimed at the
It has been claimed that the Soviet victory at Helsinki was not a
major one in that the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was no, more
legitimate after August, 1 975 than it was before'.^^ The Soviet Union,
for the reasons outlined above, holds a vastly different view. In the
words of Brezhnev:
The principles of peaceful coexistence have become the
leading trend in relations among states. The most complete
reflection of this was the successful holding of the all-
European conference, in which the U.S. and Canada participated...
This was an enormous political victory for the forces of peace.
However, it is specifically in regard to the United States that
the Soviet Union has most adamantly asserted the theory of the alignment
of world forces. For, as Brezhnev has claimed; "speaking of our relations
with the United States, we regard their improvement as an organic com-
ponent in the overall progress of fundamental changes in the international
climate on our planet. "^'^ The United States not only represents the
most formidable opponent that the Soviets must face, it also embodies
what the U.S.S.R. has claimed is the essence of hostile anti-Soviet
activity. To transform U.S. -Soviet relations, and more importantly to
force the United States to recognize the objective international factors
confronting it, represents a triumph in the Soviet view. It was in the
United States that the U.S.S.R. was confronted with the "most primitive
forms of bellicose anticommunism," with charges of the "red menace," and
with the policy of communist containment, among others. However, the
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Soviets can now claim, by reasoning from their analysis of the new
"objective" international factors, that:
In the new conditions, the complete bankruptcy of theformer view of the world, a view dictated by rabid anti!
communism, a view according to which the main and mostimportant goal of the U.S. foreign policy was to inflictthe greatest possible damage on the Soviet Union and the
other socialist countries, became apparent. 71
As will be shown below the U.S.S.R. steadfastly adheres to the
belief that the realization of these factors does not in any way diminish
the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.
On the contrary, the new detente presupposes an increased ideological
warfare with the United States which now must resign itself to a position
of coexistence with the U.S.S.R. Thus, Suslov can claim that:
The fact that anti communism faces inevitable doom in no
way signifies that it will lay down arms of its own free
will, however. Our class enemies are trying to compensate
for the inner shakiness of their ideological positions by
intensified development of the mass media and employment of
the most sophisticated methods of ideological sabotage.
They are building up the capability of the press, radio and
television, and they are evidencing a clear intent to make
their progaganda global in character. ^2
In regard to the new alignment of forces, the Soviet Union
claims that: "Needless to say, this does not mean that the American
monopolies revised their attitude toward socialism and communist ideas.
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No, nothing changed in this respect." Yet, as Arbatov is quick to
point out:
But the world in which the imperialist powers have to
live and act has changed. It is to these changes, to the
objective reality of the present situation, that they have
to adapt their domestic and foreign policy. 74
The stark realization by the United States of the objective
correlation of world forces and increased might of the Soviet Union is
not, in the Soviet view, limited to any one political party or
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presidential administration. Richard Nixon may have been the first to
recognize these objective factors. Yet, Gerald Ford, and any succeeding
chief executive, would be equally compelled to pursue the only rational
course of action with the U.S.S.R.; the detente course. The Ford-Carter
presidential campaign was quite closely observed by the Soviet Union
in regard to the question of detente. Brezhnev, in analyzing the
campaign, was concerned with the hard line posture with the Soviet Union
and the calls for increased defense appropriations. However, in summary
the C.P.S.U.'s General Secretary was led to conclude:
Nevertheless, no matter who is in power in Washington
after the election, the United States apparently will have
to reckon with the actual alignment of forces in the world
which in recent years has impelled American ruling circles'
after soberly appraising the situation, to begin a search
'
for accords with the socialist world... 75
By way of summary, it can be argued that the Leninist position as
a socialist "oasis" in a capitalist world does not pertain to the situation
during the period of rule by Brezhnev. In fact, the Soviet Union today
could argue that the present international environment, replete with
the favorable alignment of forces in the world arena, is the antithesis
of the international situation as it existed during Lenin's lifetime.
Detente in 1918 was forced upon Lenin by his recognition of the objective
reality confronting him. Detente in 1980 is being forced upon the United
States by its recognition of the same objective factors; the international
balance of power that has shifted heavily to the camp of the enemy.
Detente as a reaction to American military superiority . A serious
constraint placed upon Lenin in his quest to expand Soviet influence
abroad was the inordinate military superiority that was enjoyed by the
capitalist-imperialist camp. In fact, the elimination of the military
1imbalance favoring the West became the main objective of Lenin's long-
term detente strategy. Arguing from his theory of war and its
inevitability, Lenin reasoned that military equality, and eventual
superiority by the Soviet Union, was of utmost necessity if he were to
realize any success in foreign policy. War would be the handmaiden for
the exportation of Lenin's revolution, yet war could not be waged until
the Soviet Union was assured of military victory.
This particular component of Lenin's detente has changed con-
siderably. In the first place, the Soviet Union since 1956 has advocated
the theory that wars, especially in the form of life and death struggles
between the two opposing sociopolitical systems, are not inevitable.
There is, to be sure, a persistent danger of war, especially in the form
of a reckless anti-Soviet thrust by the hopelessly frustrated capitalist-
imperialist states. Brezhnev has often elaborated on the persistent
threat of war. In Brezhnev's words:
Imperialism's forces of aggression will evidently not
lay down their arms for a long time. There are still
adventurers who are capable of kindling another military
conflagration in order to further their own mercenary
interests. We therefore consider that it is our sacred
duty to conduct our policy in such a way as to avoid
being caught unawares by any emergency and firmly to
counter any attempt at returning the world to "cold war"
days. 76
Yet, Lenin's view of the inevitability of such wars is not
shared by Brezhnev. Thus, in addressing an American audience, Brezhnev
can assert:
There is bound to be an ideological debate between us
as to whose world view is more correct and whose way of
life is better. Here there is bound to be competition
between the two systems. But let us agree that the his-
torical dispute cannot be decided on the battlefield of
nuclear war. History will in due course deliver its
verdict .77
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Secondly, and most importantly, the Soviet Union has made impressive
gains in this area, and is no longer a vastly unequal adversary of the
United States. In fact, the U.S.S.R. by most accepted standards has now
achieved a relative military parity with the United States. It is this
military equality between the United States and the Soviet Union that
clearly separates Brezhnev's detente from any of its previous forms
and, it can be argued, which makes detente under Brezhnev a more aggressive
and threatening component of Soviet foreign policy. Brezhnev has
alluded to the existence of strategic parity in the following manner:
Our efforts are directed precisely at averting the first
strike and the second strike, indeed at averting nuclear
war in general. Our approach on these questions can be
formulated as follows: the defense potential of the Soviet
Union must be at a level that would deter anyone from
attempting to disrupt our peaceful life. 78
The history of Soviet-American detente until quite recently has
been set amidst the background of a vastly superior military arsenal
of the United States. Lenin, of course, languished in this setting of
American military might throughout his tenure in power. Stalin, as
historical evidence shows, made significant gains in altering the
U.S. -Soviet military equation; yet Stalin never achieved a realistic
parity between the two countries. Khrushchev, for his part, made repeated
attempts to offset the strategic inferiority of the Soviet Union.
However, Khrushchev, as did his predecessors, met with little success and
was compelled to conduct Soviet foreign policy in an environment marked
by American hegemony in the field of strategic weapons. It can be
reasoned that it was the lack of military parity or Soviet military superi-
ority that stood as the missing link in Khrushchev's policy of using
detente as an offensive global strategy.
However, Brezhnev has apparently secured this missing link, and
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has added it to the formula of Soviet-American detente. It is quite
important to emphasize this point. The achievement of strategic parity
with the United States has given Brezhnev the opportunity to greatly
increase the risk-taking potential in Soviet foreign policy; and Brezhnev
has apparently not allowed this opportunity to bypass him. While pur-
suing an aggressive foreign policy line, Brezhnev is able to temper any
American response with a new form of sabre rattling. Brezhnev has
shown no reticence to continually remind the United States of the grave
issues involving "weapons of mass annihilation," the "global destructive
power of nuclear weapons," and the like. In so doing, Brezhnev is
reinforcing the stated American goal of detente; to do everything
necessary to avoid a thermonuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.
As was seen above, the United States has shown a willingness to adhere
to this formula of detente and is ready to moderate its own position in
some cases so as to avoid inviting a thermonuclear holocaust that would
"threaten the very existence of mankind." Detente under Brezhnev may be
in the guise of the "Peace Program," the hand of friendship may have been
extended to the United States, and Soviet prestige and socialist gains
may be achieved on an incremental basis without the need for a Soviet-
American thermonuclear exchange. Yet, it can be argued that the constant
threat of such an exchange amidst the background of strategic parity
provides the basis by which the constraints and limitations imposed on
Soviet foreign policy have been greatly reduced.
The achievement of strategic parity and the "growing military
might of the Soviet Union," are closely intertwined with the Soviet
dictum of the "alignment of world forces" in favor of socialism.
Together, in the Soviet view, they form the complete East-West formula
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that has forced the United States to agree to detente with the Soviet
Union. In the words of the late Soviet Defense Minister Marshall A.A.
Grechko, a member of the Politburo:
The successful implementation of the Peace Proqram isconditioned by the existing balance of world forces andcontinued orderly changes in this balance in favor o?
socialism. It was prepared by decades of selfless struanlP
of Soviet people... and by the U.S.S.R.'s tra sforL?Kto
an invincible fortress of social ism.
.
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Confronted with the reality of this "invincible fortress," the
United States was, in the Soviet view, compelled to re-assess the role
of military force in regard to relations with the Soviet Union.
According to this view, "the growth of the Soviet Union's defensive
might have dispelled hopes that the U.S.A. would be able to achieve
military superiority, which would have enabled it to reach its goals
with the help of the use of military force, or the threat of its use."^°
The American recognition of the military might and strategic capabilities
of the Soviet Union forced the ruling circles in Washington to re-evaluate
the efficacy of confronting the U.S.S.R. militarily. This re-assessment
compelled the United States to "come to the conclusion that reliance on
military victory over the socialist commonwealth was groundless and
that a nuclear war would in fact prove suicidal for America itself. "^^
Brezhnev can also claim that the new historical era, characterized by the
growing might of the socialist world, will serve as a barrier against war.
In the words of Brezhnev:
Neither the lessons of history nor what would appear to
be man's natural aversion to killing his like has ever pre-
vented new blood baths, because the forces of war, the role
of those who stood to gain from war, were too great.
In our epoch this state of affairs has changed funda-
mentally. Today, the struggle against war has a reliable
basis in the strength of the forces of peace and the forces g2
of democracy, and in the freedom and independence of nations.
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In terms of strategic weaponry, the Soviet Union is quite
convinced that the achievement of parity with the United States is
a reality. Hence, Suslov can call for agreements that "are based on
the principles of the equal security of both sides and provide no unila-
teral advantages in the field of strategic missile arms to either
side..:«3 p,,thermore, the U.S.S.R. appears to be quite ready to utilize
this equality as a major factor in formulating its foreign policy,
especially as such policies directly pertain to the United States. In
the realm of conventional military forces the Soviet Union is equally
convinced that its position vis-a-vis the United States is at a level of
parity. Thus, while the United States may realize the uselessness of
using thermonuclear weapons against a now equal adversary, it is also
important, in the Soviet view, that the same assessment be made in regard
to conventional military endeavors. The United States, from the Soviet
perspective, having realized the insanity of using nuclear weapons, made
an attempt "to expand the 'applicability' of military force by strengthening
the components of that force that would make possible, while refraining
from a nuclear war against the U.S.S.R., to wage limited, so-called
84local wars with impunity."
Yet, as the Soviet Union is fond of reminding the world, the
American military endeavor in Vietnam and the eventual victory of the
communist forces of North Vietnam brought forth the objective reality
of the military ineptness of the United States. Military superiority,
conventional and strategic, had always been the ace card used in the
formulation of American foreign policy. However, as the Soviets assert,
"the war in Vietnam showed that, given the new alignment of forces in
the world, this card has been trumped," forcing the United States to
"understand that military force cannot serve as, so to speak, the 'heart
and soul- Of all foreign policy, as the logic of the 'cold «ar'
85presupposed." Brezhnev can also present the view that the Soviet Union
did much to help the Vietnamese In their successful struggle against
the United States. As stated by Brezhnev;
The war in Vietnam, for the ending of which the SovietUnion worked firmly and consistently, has e ded Relvlnoon the powerful moral and material ^ pport of the So ie?^Union and other socialist countries and on the soliS yof all the progressive forces in the world, the patriots
?I»»hL '""-"/''^"IP "P^'^l" t^-^ j'^^t cause offreedom and independence. 86
It became quite necessary for the United States to eliminate
the Cold War theory of military aggression and use of military force in
conducting its foreign policy. In the words of Arbatov:
The course and outcome of the American aggression in
Vietnam have shown that in today's conditions the U.S.
A
cannot also hope for success in "limited" and "local""wars
on which the American military-political doctrine of "flex-
ible retaliation" pinned its hopes in the late 1950's The
entire course of events in the late 1960's and 1970's has
called in question many of the foundations of the U.S.
foreign policy course as it was formulated during the "cold
war" years. 87
The Soviet Union therefore, is able to conduct Soviet-American
detente in the 1970's with what they perceive to be an equal stature
vis-a-vis the United States in the military field. Again, this parity
in military power can be seen as a prime determining factor in affording
the Soviet Union a more flexible and far-reaching detente policy. It is
imperative therefore, that the U.S.S.R. sustain this present co-equal
position and not allow the United States to re-assert its military
superiority. To do so would be to eliminate the very heart of Soviet-
styled detente of 1972-1980, and force the Kremlin regime to limit the
scope and purpose of its foreign policy. Thus, Brezhnev has repeatedly
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warned that while "we now have fine equipment," it is critical to
remember that "we live in an age of scientific and technical progress,
when weapons are being improved so rapidly that new forms and systems'
are often created not just within a year but even within a shorter
period. "88 Brezhnev can then logically argue that "stagnation in this
(military technology) sphere may be frought with serious consequences.
Our scientists, both civilian and military, must constantly think about
this and remember it.-^^ defense spending, irrespective of Soviet calls
for disarmament, must also be maintained at a high level so as not to
risk losing the vitally necessary Soviet-American military parity. As
stated by Brezhnev, in regard to defense, the U.S.S.R. will "spend on it
exactly as much as is needed for the reliable security of the Soviet
Union and for the defense, in conjunction with the fraternal countries,
of the gains of socialism, so that potential aggressors will not be
tempted to try by force to decide in their favor the historical controversy
between the two opposing social systems. "^'^
It is clear therefore, that Brezhnev stands in a position that
is far more advantageous than that which was realized by Lenin. It was
impossible for Lenin to achieve his dream of defeating the nations of
the capitalist-imperialist world without first achieving a high level of
military strength and then fighting his enemies on an equal basis.
Brezhnev does not suffer the same handicap. The Soviet Union of today
believes that it has realized the goal of military equality, thereby
radically altering the rules by which the game of Soviet-American detente
is played.
Detente as the preparation for the final East-West war . As mentioned
above, the Leninist detente formula was based on the fact that a respite
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was needed so as to prepare for the final cataclysmic confrontation with
the West. In Lenin's mind the ultimate goal of the destruction of the
worldwide capitalist-imperialist system could not be achieved without
waging this fatal life and death struggle. For Lenin the inevitability
of this Armageddon was unquestionable. What was questionable was the
time when this conflict would take place, and detente was meant to buy
as much time as possible before the conflict occurred.
As we have seen, the Soviet Union during the tenure of Leonid
Brezhnev has altered this basic dictum of a final full-scale war with
the United States. More specifically, Nikita Khrushchev revised this
line of reasoning with his theory that inter-camp wars were no longer
"fatalistically inevitable." In carrying through with this theme
Brezhnev has concluded that while all wars, including nuclear wars, are
permissible, they indeed are not inevitable. Brezhnev, as will be seen
below has rationalized that "just wars" are completely acceptable and
even necessary components of certain "progressive" changes in the world.
Yet, the unleashing of a total thermonuclear confrontation with the
United States is not seen as a feasible option for the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev has often repeated his philosophy that detente "is the path
from confrontation to cooperation, from threats and sabre-rattling to
the resolution of disputed questions through negotiations and, on the
whole, a reshaping of international relations based on healthy principles
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of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and mutual advantage." Moreover,
Brezhnev can claim that:
I should like to emphasize that we judge the develop-
ment of the international situation primarily by the extent
to which it is possible to make progress in consolidating
peace and eliminating the threat of nuclear war. In our_
view, definite positive results have been achieved in this
area in recent years.
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In regard to the United States. Brezhnev asserts that the turn
for the better in U.S.
-Soviet relations "has, of course, been of decisive
importance in lessening the threat of a new world war and in strengthening
peace. "^^ It has been argued above that the waging of a total nuclear
war was not a viable option for the ruling circles in either Washington
or Moscow. It was also reasoned that detente could not be viewed
properly as a policy that was designed to prevent a thermonuclear war.
In the Soviet perception detente would, in fact, as Brezhnev mentioned
above, serve as a deterrent to nuclear war. Yet, the lessening of the
danger of such a war is not based on the willingness of either side to
mutually agree not to destroy the other. Rather, it can be argued that
it is based on the existence of approximate strategic parity in the realm
of Soviet-American thermonuclear capability. Hence, with neither side
assured of surviving such a holocaust, it becomes logical to look for
other means to settle the dispute. The Soviet Union has opted for
detente as such a means, thus allowing for the active pursuit of foreign
policy objectives while tempering any American retaliation with the prospects
for a devastating and uncertain nuclear war.
It can be reasoned that the Soviet logic here is quite simple.
The final military confrontation with the United States is avoidable,
and is not an attractive option in that the U.S.S.R. can not be assurred
of surviving a thermonuclear war. Should the United States attempt to
conduct such a war, however, it too is uncertain of winning, thus allowing
the Soviet Union to exploit this uncertainty as a deterrent to hostile
American actions. Having confronted the United States with the reality of
strategic parity, the U.S.S.R. can then proceed on a course of foreign
policy endeavors without resorting to full-scale war and without inviting
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a total thermonuclear response from the United States.
However, while this final showdown with the West was no longer
inevitable or desirable, it is still <,„ite possible. The fact that the
soviet union does not wish to become engaged in a thermonuclear war.
will not in itself guarantee that such a war will not be waged, m
the words of Arbatov:
It hardly needs to be demonstrated that in todav'.conditions the prevention of a new world wa is b^o^-nqa mutual interest of paramount importance. Even the nerP
P0sIibiin?L'5I' verfbroa
'
the re ab e IclulTu"'"' 'f'l^ons, especially becausein li l , a tua ly guaranteed prevention of a thermo-nuclear war requires not only an understanding on therenunciation of conscious attempts to unleas^such a warbut also a radical improvement in the whole system ofinternational relations. ut
After all in a world where tension reigns, where hot-beds of military conflicts are smoldering, states can bedrawn against their will into an escalation of events in
which they may lose control over the situation and a
catastrophe will become inevitable. 94
The major cause for the existence of "hotbeds of military conflicts"
is, quite naturally in the Soviet view, the aggressive tendencies of
the United States and its NATO bloc allies. The United States may have
been compelled to reassess its relations with the Soviet Union and to
structure them in light of the military might of the U.S.S.R. However,
the United States could not be expected to lay down its arms quietly.
As stated by Soviet Colonel Sidelnikov, "the peace loving peoples and
the world's progressive public cannot fail to reckon with the fact that
the aggressive forces of imperialism have not laid down their arms and
evidently will not do so for a long time." Furthermore, it is argued that
"there is no dearth of adventurers who are capable of kindling a new
military conflagration and trying to unleash a new war for the sake of
95their own selfish interests." Brezhnev can also add a somber view of the
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reality of the present situation even in the era of detente. As stated
by Brezhnev:
To be sure, we are realists and cannot help seeinq factsof a different order as well. We know all too wel that warsand acute international crises are by no means over. iLre
III ?
aggression in the world, and not all nationsare able to feel secure. ^° ^^t^n:>
Brezhnev, in writing to an American audience, has attempted to
demonstrate the hostile anti-detente attitude that prevails in the United
States. In Brezhnev's words:
Such (American) readers have come under the influence
of political forces bent on sabotaging detente. Actively
using the means of manipulating public opinion, these
forces present their own private interests as the interests
of the nation. They are busy creating log jams in the way
of agreement between our countries on crucial questions of
arms limitation and the preparation of conditions for trans-
ition to disarmament. 97
The Soviet view of the possibility of a large scale thermo-
nuclear war with the United States is closely connected to the Soviet
theory of the "alignment of world forces," as well as the Soviet belief
in the attainment of strategic equality with the United States. As
outlined above, the latter two components, when viewed together, formed
the basis for the United States being forced to accept detente. The
new variable, that of an American-initiated thermonuclear war, is a
result of the United States making a desperate attempt to counteract the
inalterable process of the alignment of world forces and to thwart the
military might of the Soviet Union. This belief is accurately summarized
by Brezhnev:
The point is that the aggressive circles of the capitalist
world are reacting to their defeats in social battles, to the
loss of colonial possessions, to the abandonment of capitalism
by more and more countries, to the successes of world socialism
and the growing influence of the Communist Parties in the
bourgeois states - to all these trends - with a feverish build-
up of military preparations .. .By relying on these "positions
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of strength " imperialism hopes to retain the possibilitywhich IS slipping from its hands, of ordering o?her
^'
countries and peoples around. 98 ^
By reacting in such a manner the United States, according to
Soviet spokesmen, might well attempt to force the issue in regard to
the ultimate victor in the struggle between the two diametrically
opposed socio-economic systems. Claiming that the United States is
"hard pressed" to react, Marshall Grechko could still claim that "they
are in every way stepping up their opposition to the process of detente,
and they have not abandoned their plans to resolve the historic argument
between capitalism and socialism by force of arms."^^
The specter of massive American arms buildup is then raised as
the barometer for measuring the still-existent aggressive tendencies
of capitalism-imperialism. As Brezhnev noted:
We also have no right to forget that, in conditions of
the easing of international tensions, processes that con-
stitute material preparations for a world war are continuing
and even intensifying.
The military budgets of the countries of the North
Atlantic bloc are increasing by $2,000,000,000 to
$3,000,000,000 annually, and behind these figures are more
and more new types of weapons of destruction - new and
increasingly destructive nuclear bombs and warheads, new
and increasingly powerful missiles, tanks, and planes, war-
ships and submarines. The qualitative improvement of weaponry
has assumed unprecedented scope, 100
Thus, while the Soviets claim that they want no part of a Cold
War posture, and certainly want no part of a nuclear war, they must still,
in their words, recognize that, "the possibility of a retrograde move-
ment to the 'cold war' has still not been ruled out, although each new
success of the peace policy makes the changes that are taking place
more and more durable and stable.
""'^^
What this translates to in the
Soviet viewpoint is the need "to maintain vigilance and to give a firm rebuff
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to all the schemes of imperialist reaction. Hence, the Soviets
can argue that detente, while eliminating the inevitability of a new
world war, requires the continued buildup of military might in order
to ensure that such a war is not launched by the United States. The
Soviet Union in short, must be ready and willing to wage full-scale
war if necessary. In the words of Sidelnikov:
Our military-theoretical thought believes that as lonq
as this complex and difficult problem remains unsolved and
the aggressive forces of imperialism and various kinds of
adventurers continue to exist and operate, it will still
be necessary to be ready to wage war using any means of
armed struggle. 103
Brezhnev can claim in this regard that "of course we are
improving our defenses." "We cannot do otherwise," according to Brezhnev,
because "we have never yielded, and shall never yield, in matters of our
own security or the security of our allies. """^^ In Brezhnev's view, the
need for increased defense expenditures is a direct result of the
imperialist-inspired arms race. As stated by Brezhnev:
The military preparations of the capitalist states are
compelling the socialist countries to allocate the necessary
funds for defense, diverting them from civilian construction
to which we would like to dedicate all our efforts and all
our material resources. Dozens of newly independent countries
are also being drawn into the orbit of the arms race, which,
of course, is prompted by the threat to their independence
posed by imperialism now in one part of the world, now in
another.
It is clear therefore, that continued qualitative and quantitative
improvements in the Soviet military arsenal within the overall framework
of detente are quite necessary in the Soviet view. The necessity is
dictated, according to Soviet spokesmen, not by the desire to wage
nuclear war but rather, by the need to both maintain the vital parity
in strategic arms and to be prepared for any American attempt to unleash
a new world war. Throughout this process the U.S.S.R. continually
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bemoans the fact that the United States maintains the paradox of
increasing its military budget while signing accords with the Soviet
Union aimed at limiting arms buildups. Thus, a Pravda editorial can
cite the logic of the U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy who "pointed out
the discrepancy between the Pentagon's desire to expand U.S. strategic
forces and the spirits of the agreements signed by the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S.A. and currently in effect between them."^°^ At the same however,
the Soviet position, exhibiting a similar paradox, is quite acceptable.
As stated by Grechko:
Therefore, our Party, in pursuing its active peace-
loving foreign policy, constantly provides it with increased
vigilance and shows tireless concern for strengthening the
country's defense capability and for increasing the combat
might of the Armed Forces, outfitting them with up-to-date
military material and weapons and improving their combat
readiness
. .
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By way of summary it can be noted that Lenin was thoroughly
convinced of the inevitability of a final all-inclusive war with the
West, but that Brezhnev is convinced that such a conflict can be avoided.
In short, for a number of reasons Brezhnev would prefer not to opt for
a war with the United States. Rather, he has chosen what the U.S.S.R.
feels is a more reasonable alternative, the gradual, though forceful,
policy of incremental changes in the East-West balance through the
detente strategy.
Detente as a reaction to a potential anti-Soviet alliance . As pointed
out above, Lenin was obsessed with the fear that the capitalist-
imperialist nations would, in their own best interests, form a military
alliance aimed at crushing the Soviet state. Lenin reasoned that his
enemies, once freed of their involvement in World War I, would naturally
turn their combined resources toward their common foe. Detente, in this
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respect, was aimed at reducing the threat presented to the West and
at precluding such a joint enterprise by the imperialists.
In many respects the threat of this potential anti-Soviet
alliance has changed considerably. To be sure, the United States and
the Soviet Union each has a bloc of military allies that could be counted
on for assistance in the time of war. Yet, as far as the Soviet Union
is concerned the predominant imperialist military adversary that it
must confront is the bastion of capitalism-imperialism and the "other
camp's" most formidable nation, the United States.
In the Soviet view, a military onslaught against the U.S.S.R.
could only be effectively waged with the direct involvement of the United
States. A military attack by the United States would obviously be of
great concern to the U.S.S.R., whether the United States acted alone or
in conjunction with its military allies.
The Soviet Union is less seriously concerned with a Western
military coalition than Lenin was as a direct result of two previously
mentioned variables in the detente formula. That is, the U.S.S.R. is no
longer an "oasis" isolated from the rest of the world by virtue of its
socialist form of government, and no longer suffers a severe military
inferiority in regard to the United States. Thus, the fear of a Western
coalition can be seen as being nearly synonymous with the concomitant
possibility of the United States waging a new world war. Having become
desperate in the face of the reality of the alignment of world forces
in favor of socialism, having recognized the growing military might
of the Soviet Union, and realizing the futulity of stopping the unalter-
able movement of the world toward socialism, the United States in con-
junction with its military allies, might well resort to nuclear war.
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As will be mentioned below, the Soviet Union has attempted to
make a unified Western coalition, military, economic, or political in
nature, a difficult task for the United States to achieve. Detente with
the U.S.S.R., as cited earlier, is a more attractive option for some West
European nations than it is for the American government. Accordingly,
some Western governments are unwilling to join the United States in a
unified anti-Soviet posture of any kind. In the military realm the
U.S.S.R. has by virtue of its achievements through detente, tried to make
an effective anti-Soviet coalition less realistic. In the words of
Andropov
:
Unshakable guarantees that no aggressor or coalition of
aggressors will be able to gain the upper hand over social-
ism have been created and are growing stronger year by
year. 108 ^
However, the Soviet Union feels that the attempt to create such a
bloc of anti-Soviet and anti-detente forces is being made by many reac-
tionary leaders in the West. While the Soviets claim that such a
coalition could not prove to be effective militarily, the U.S.S.R. can
still acknowledge the possibility of creating an anti -Soviet front:
We can see that today an international bloc of the
enemies of peace and detente is being formed. Along with
the military-industrial complex, imperialist reaction,
fascists and colonialists, it includes the Maoist leader-
ship of China. 109
The role of the People's Republic of China in relation to the
Soviet perception of and motives within detente is subject to debate.
At any rate, there is evidence to suggest that Soviet concerns with the
C.P.R. provided a major stimulus for the pursuit of the latest variation
of detente. As mentioned above the Soviet Union may well have feared
that a U.S. -China detente would virtually isolate the Soviet Union from
the world's other major superpowers. As stated by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
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the Soviet Union developed an "obsession" with China which:
...led to an urgent need or an urgently felt need both totranquilize the European front and to block any consolidation
of a Chinese-American connection directed against the SovietUnion. The Russians doubtless anticipated that after the
cultural revolution China for its part would be equally deter-
mined to block any Soviet-American relationship directed
against itself, and that the Chinese would try to break out
of diplomatic isolation. HO
Similarly, Hans J. Morgenthau has noted that the China question
is the most important of the three basic reasons that prompted the Soviet
Union to pursue a detente with the United States:
First, they are engaged in a struggle with China which
both sides take with extreme seriousness .. .This being the
case, no country can afford a two-front confrontation, let
alone a two-front war. In the measure that the relations
between the Soviet Union and China become aggravated, the
Soviet Union has a vital interest in mitigating the tensions
with the West. Here is the first reason for detente. TH
George Schwab has also noted that ever since China "emerged as a
troublesome neighbor and one whose nuclear arsenals and delivery systems
are growing and improving, Moscow has been forced for tactical reasons
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to open more channels of communication with the West." The reason for
these expanded communications, of course, is to preclude the possibility
"of a military invasion of the Warsaw pact countries, including perhaps
the European part of Russia, at a moment when Moscow may find itself in
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a military confrontation with Peking."
In a traditional military sense, there would seem to be ample
evidence to support the argument that the U.S.S.R. wanted to avoid a
two-front confrontation. Large-scale border clashes between Soviet and
Chinese troops had been reported for some time and the war of polemics
between Moscow and Peking was continuing. Thus, it would seem plausible
that the Soviet Union would be concerned with reducing tensions on its
Western border so as to avoid being trapped in an East-West crunch
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should the Chinese decide to open full-scale hostilities.
The C.P.R., however, presents the Soviet Union with an equally
important problem in regard to the pursuit of Soviet objectives within
the framework of detente. It will be argued below that the Soviet Union
has maintained the goal of the worldwide victory of socialism as an
integral part of its detente strategy. It will also be reasoned that
the U.S.S.R. hopes to achieve this final goal through the use of the
strategic objective of continuing the growth of the alignment of world
forces in favor of socialism. The specific strategy that the Soviets
will use, as will be demonstrated, is the alignment of "third world"
or developing nations into the socialist camp, through the anti-imperialist
pro-socialist national liberation movement. It is here that the Soviet
Union must be concerned with the C.P.R. and its revolutionary activities.
In the first place, the Chinese appear to be no less bellicose than the
Soviet Union in regard to the primacy of the goal of the ultimate victory
of socialism. Secondly, the U.S.S.R. has long been forced to compete
with China for influence in the developing nations and in some Asian
nations under communist party control. Finally, in the wake of the
1972 U.S. -China rapprochement, it has become clear that the C.P.R. has
been intent on branding the Soviet version of revolutionary support as
being militaristic in nature and of serving the cause of Soviet national
interests, specifically in the form of military expansion.
Thus, it would seem incumbent upon the Soviet Union to preclude
any damaging U.S. -China detente and to engage in a meaningful U.S. -Soviet
detente so as to avoid a two- front military confrontation. It would also
appear to be of necessity for the Soviet Union to isolate the C.P.R.
from the revolutionary movement in the "third world" and to denounce the
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Chinese as "counter-revolutionaries" and "reactionaries." Thus, in his
keynote address at the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress (a report that was later
acclaimed as the Program of Peace - see above) Brezhnev asserted that:
About our relations with the Chinese People's RepublicThe Chinese eaders, as is known, have put forth the?r ownspecial Ideological-political platform
, which is i coLat ble
life .nd'Jhf ' ''rr'''''''' ^^"^^"^"^ °^ internationarl a d the world Communist movement and have demanded that
we renounce the line of the 20th Congress and the C P S UProgram They launched intensive hostile propaganda against
ourpartyand country, made territorial claims against theSoviet Union, and even brought things to the point of armedborder incioents in the spring and summer of 1969.114
Brezhnev has claimed that the Soviet Union has firmly opposed
the Chinese attempts to "distort the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, to
split the international Communist movement and the ranks of the fighters
1 1
5
against imperialism." Consequently, Brezhnev has been stern in his
rebuff of any anti-Soviet propaganda presented by the Peking regime:
...we, of course, cannot fail to see that the anti
-Soviet
line in China's propaganda and policy is continuing and that
the Ninth C.P.C. Congress firmly established this hostile
course toward the Soviet Union in its decisions.
What can be said in this connection?
We resolutely reject the slanderous fabrications con-
cerning the policy of our party and state that are being
disseminated from Peking and instilled in the Chinese
people. 116
This evidence would suggest that the Soviet Union is quite concerned
with the C.P.R., and that this concern is expressed most vividly in the
area of Soviet-Chinese competition in the revolutionary movement in the
developing nations. Thus, while rejecting Chinese polemical attacks
against the Soviet Union, Brezhnev outlined this competition in the form
of anti-Chinese attacks:
In the period under review, attempts from various sides
to attack Marxism-Leninism as the ideological and theoretical
basis for the activity of the Communist movement became very
acute. The Chinese leadership shifted to the creation in a
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emen-
number of countries of schismatic grouoinas nnHpr th. •board of so-called
''Marxist-LeninisrPar?iL " nh T^"'
seeking somehow to unite them as'^'oun ^ ighfiJTh
'
international Communist moveraent.il 7
""^'ani to tne
That thi-s policy line did not diminish during the actual impl
tation Of the Peace Program is evidenced by remarks made by Brezhnev
during his keynote address at the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress. Here, Brezhnev
claimed that:
Relations with China are. of course, a special and separatequestion. The po icy of its present leaders is open y dire Jedagainst most of the socialist states. More than ?hat! U l?nesup exactly with the positions of the world's most ext;eme
reactionaries
- from militarists and enemies of detente in theWe tern countries to the racists of South Africa and the facist
rulers of Chile. This policy is not only completely alien
to socialist principles and ideals, in effect it has become animportant reserve for imperialism in its struggle against
socialism. MS ^
In regard to the possibility of an anti-Soviet coalition during
the Brezhnev era, the C.P.R. has therefore, played a central role in
increasing the possibility of such. This is quite different from what
Lenin saw. Lenin felt that an imperialist, and certainly not an imperialist-
socialist, coalition against the Soviet Union was a very definite possi-
bility. Brezhnev, however, must be concerned that an imperialist-Maoist
anti-Soviet coalition is a potential reality.
Brezhnev, apparently aware that a similar fear may be realized
in Peking is careful to assert that a U.S. -Soviet detente will not
adversely affect the Chinese. In Brezhnev's words:
To all who are aware, if only slightly, of the actual
course of events, of the nature of the development of Soviet-
American relations, it is absolutely clear that the improve-
ment of Soviet-American relations is in no way detrimental
to the interests of any third countries 1
9
In addition, Brezhnev has also stated that:
It is often said that the idea of creating and ensuring
security in Asia by collective effort is directed against
o?'"1soUt?ni"'chinr'"R't'Jh
'''''^''^^
"surrounding"r i olati g C a. But these contentions are either theproduct^of morbid suspicion or a reluctance to face the
Again, the main fear that the Soviet Union expresses in a
military sense is that the West, hopelessly frustrated by Soviet and
Soviet-inspired successes, may react in an aggressive manner. Brezhnev
has often claimed that detente has "inspired and strengthened the forces
of peace and progress and heightened their prestige and influence among
121the masses." Yet, as Brezhnev is also quick to point out:
But it has also alerted and activated the forces of
reaction and militarism, those who would like to drag
Europe and the whole world back to the time of the cold war
of teetering on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. It has
alarmed those who are growing rich on the production of
tools of death and destruction, who cannot conceive of any
political career other than whipping up "crusades" against
the socialist countries, against the Communists
..
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The Soviet Union is also quite aware that this reaction is
directed mainly at the U.S.S.R. itself. As Brezhnev has claimed:
...imperialism's aggressive forces and their yes-men
are again putting out the hackneyed myth about the notor-
ious "Soviet menace," which allegedly looms over the
Western countries. Absurd assertions grossly distorting
the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states
are persistently disseminated - by the mass information
media and frequently by figures holding prominent positions.
To summarize, it can be stated that the Leninist fear of an
anti-Soviet coalition has been changed, but certainly not eliminated, in
the thermonuclear world of the 1970's. Yet, while the specific details
of this phobia have been altered, the logic in this variable of Lenin's
detente remains unchanged. Lenin had argued that the greater the threat
posed by the Soviet state, the greater would be the potential for the
West to jointly crush the menace that threatened it. Brezhnev has
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reasoned in a similar fashion. The greater the threat posed by the U.S.S.R.
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in regard to the world balance of power, Soviet military might, and
dissemination of socialism, the greater would be the risk of a reckless
anti-Soviet thrust by the United States (in conjunction with its allies
and perhaps, the People's Republic of China). In both cases detente
has been utilized by the Soviet Union as a means to forestall such
reactions by the West. Lenin used detente as a means to convince the
West that coexistence with, and not the elimination of, the Soviet state
would be in its own best interests. Similarly, Brezhnev through the
selling of the Peace Program has shown the West in general, and the
United States in particular, that detente with the Soviet Union is the
only feasible alternative open to them.
Detente as a means for securing Western economic assistance
. One of the
major strategic objectives of the Leninist detente was the acquisition of
much needed Western assistance in the reconstruction of the devastated
Soviet economy. With the ravages of World War I came the stark reality
that the Soviet industrial, agricultural, and overall economic base
could not be restored without foreign support. As outlined above,
Lenin knew all too well that such support could best be provided by the
imperialists, and most notably by the United States.
A number of aspects of Soviet-American relations have changed
since 1917, and the Soviet Union has made impressive gains in many areas
during that timespan. Yet, in the realm of economic relations, the
Soviet Union under Brezhnev, has found itself in a situation where
its relations with the capitalist world have not changed since Lenin's
time. True, the Soviet Union did not suffer from a war-torn ravaged
economy from 1 972-1976. At the same time however, the U.S.S.R. was, as
always, plagued with pressing problems in both its industrial and
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agricultural sectors. In fact, it can be stated that one of the
common strands of U.S.
-Soviet relations from their very inception is
the Soviet need for Western, and particularly American, economic
assistance in helping to correct Soviet economic deficiencies.
The reliance on American trade and expanded economic contacts
with the United States represents one of detente 's more controversial
aspects. The infusion of scientific, technological, and economic
expertise from the United States has also afforded the opponents of
detente a logical and formidable argument. Both Lenin and Brezhnev
have outwardly claimed that the final victory of the forces of socialism
and the ultimate defeat of the capitalist system are their main objec-
tives. At the same time they both asserted that American economic
assistance is a necessary prerequisite for achieving that goal.
Reduced to its simplest form the logic employed by Brezhnev, as
defined in detente, reads as follows. The Soviet Union has achieved
strategic parity with the United States and uses such as a major pillar
for its relations with the West. To achieve and maintain that parity,
the U.S.S.R. has drained much of its economic resources, thus post-
poning the construction of a "new society" and creating a host of
domestic concerns. In order to reduce the burden placed on its economy
the Soviet Union must achieve a Soviet-American arms reduction accord,
and, simultaneously engage the assistance of the United States in
solving its economic problems.
It was pointed out above that Brezhnev's economy was not suited
for an intense level of military, scientific-technological, and economic
competition with the United States. Brezhnev was compelled to reduce
the tenacity of this competition by offering a peaceful and cooperative
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posture to the United States. It was also shown that Brezhnev would
like nothing better than to re-channel part of his military-defense
allocations to more "constructive" domestic areas. Yet, to do so would
require a concrete arms limitation agreement with the United States,
and negotiations on that front are more often than not at an impasse.
It was also mentioned that the sustainment of strategic parity and
the matching of the United States in both qualitative and quantitative
military improvements is of paramount urgency for the U.S.S.R. Hence,
a logical option for Brezhnev is to employ the strategy of detente that
on one hand necessitates massive military spending with which to threaten
and contain the United States, and on the other calls for American
support to buttress the Soviet economy so that the military threat can
be sustained and domestic discontent quieted.
The Soviet Union has made no attempt to conceal the fact that
economic relations with the West form an integral part of the detente
formula. Brezhnev has often pointed out that "economic and scientific-
technical ties with the capitalist states are consolidating and
broadening the material base of the policy of peaceful coexistence. "^^^
Furthermore, Brezhnev has cited the fact that the Soviet Union sees
"foreign economic relations as an effective means facilitating the
accomplishment of both political and economic tasks. "^^^
The subject of Soviet-American trade and economic relations in
general between the two countries are subjects too broad in scope to
cover in a comprehensive fashion here. The Soviet line of reasoning
however, as sketched above, is capable of being summarized in a fairly
concise manner. The belief in Moscow is that the "Soviet Union attaches
a great importance to the expansion of foreign trade, including trade
with the U.S.A.." and that such relations "arp h».„^atio e becoming a more and more
promising reserve for increasing the economic effectiveness of the
U.S.S.R..S national economy.
..
..l^^
The U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign
Trade, Patolichev in analyzing Soviet trade «ith the West, summarized
those relations as follows-
them Thus, foreign economic ties offer a more efficWsolution to a number of problems arising ?nThe cour^seeconomic construction . 127 ^ r or
Brezhnev, in addressing an American audience, can show the scope
of the Soviet-American economic relations that he would hope to see. In
the words of Brezhnev:
...Now, I think we all agree that it isn't sufficient
merely to overcome the anomaly, generated by the "cold war "
of the complete freezing of Soviet-American trade. Today
'
life faces us with much bigger questions. I have in mind,
nrst of all, such forms of economic relations as stable,
large-scale ties in a number of economic branches, andlong-term scientific and technological co-operation,
something that in our age is of great importance . 1 28
Brezhnev can also show that while the expansion of economic
cooperation is very important, it cannot be based on ideological relaxa-
tion or "liberalization." As stated by Brezhnev:
An important factor in consolidating the positive
political changes in the international arena and in
creating a material basis for a lasting peace is the all-
round development of economic and scientific-technical links.
It meets the interests of all states and all peoples. How-
ever, there are circles in the West that hope to obtain from
us, in exchange for such links, political and ideological
concessions. That is a futile undertaking. 129
In discussing the importance of expanding Soviet-American trade,
Brezhnev has claimed that the future successes of detente are, in many
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ways, dependent on the success achieved in this area. Thus, in his speech
at the Second Moscow Session of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic
Council, Brezhnev stated:
^t^;Lr^oS^ron!-:r?r„:?er;:.^^re^:^r^d^.^cr^rL:?:t
American peaceful co-operation and good-neighbor iness niuch
?97?and'lQ7.''%" ^^^^TP^^^^^d
throu h joint'eff '
'l9
1 3 and 1974 stands the risk of being weakened. 130
In describing the policy of detente the Soviet Union is careful
to point out that it is a continuation of the policy established by
Lenin and that there is a perfect continuity from Lenin's Decree on
Peace to Brezhnev's Peace Program. In the field of Soviet-American
economic relations the U.S.S.R. is fairly accurate on this account.
Contemporary Soviet spokesmen assert that:
The Soviet Union's principled attitude toward the use
of external markets, including the U.S. market, for the
needs of socialist construction was defined by V.I. Lenin
Back in October, 1919, Lenin said: "We are decidedly in
favor of an economic understanding with America - with all
countries, but especially with America. "131
The U.S.S.R. can conclude this reasoning with claims that are
quite reminiscent of those made by Lenin. Soviet spokesmen assert that
this cooperation with the United States "will make it possible for the
Soviet Union to enlist additional material and financial resources in
accelerating the pace of socialist construction; this will not only
satisfy the country's growing domestic requirements but will also pay
1 "^Pfor American participation in this construction."
By its own admission therefore, the Soviet Union is seeking
American aid in the socialist construction of the Soviet Union, which
would further heighten the demise of the United States. The payment
for this would be "mutually advantageous" agreements that would be
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profitable fo. American business enterprises. Hence, b. exploiti
both the naivite' and g.eed of the United States, the Soviet Union
would hope to reap tremendous benefits.
in summary, it can be stated that no significant changes have
manifested themselves in this area frc. Lenin to Brezhnev. Lenin and
Brezhnev both recognized the necessity of utilizing American economic
assistance and both added this to their respective detente formulas.
world. Lenin realized full well that in order to postpone any potential
anti-Soviet coalition among the imperialists he would need to exploit
the antagonisms and contradictions that existed among them. By allowing
the capitalists to fight among themselves, Lenin reasoned that an
alliance aimed at crushing the Soviet state would be an impossibility.
Hence, it was necessary for Lenin to continually point out the intense
conflict of interests and contradictory needs of the West, and wherever
possible, to incite feuds and conflicts among his enemies.
It can be demonstrated that it is equally important for the
Soviet Union under Brezhnev to highlight and exploit any fissures that
it may find in the capitalist-imperialist structure. It will be argued
below that Brezhnev finds the necessity of utilizing discord within the
West because of his realization that an effective economic and political
coalition aimed at thwarting the goals of the U.S.S.R. would pose a very
serious problem. A complete return to the cold war by the entire West,
under the leadership of the United States, in the Soviet view, would do
irreparable damage to the objectives, both foreign and domestic, that
the Soviet Union has set for itself. Thus, it is quite imperative for
Brezhnev to show the lack of unity among America's allies, and to claim
that their internal contradictions and conflicting interests are
greater than the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As noted above, the
U.S.S.R. is still concerned that a coalition of "anti-Soviet aggressors
may be attempted by the West, or the West and China. The West, under
the onslaught of the advances of socialism, will continually attempt
to create such an alliance, as Brezhnev has often claimed:
Incidentally, our common class enemy, the internationalbourgeoisie, shows a good many examples of the international
coordination of its own actions in the struggle against
revolutionary forces. Wherever the exploiter system is injeopardy, wherever the forces of national and social libera-
tion and democratic forces gain the upper hand in the struggleimperialism is making feverish attempts to coordinate i^s
counter-attacks
- there are a good many examples of this in
our days, in Europe, in Africa and in other places. 133
It is incumbent upon the Soviet Union therefore, to preclude
any successful coordination of this nature to the point that it will
serve as a deterrent to Soviet actions. In an attempt to do so the
U.S.S.R. has intensified its progaganda efforts aimed at publicizing
the growing discord among the nations of the West. Thus, Brezhnev can
repeatedly claim that "inter-imperialist rivalries and discord within
the Common Market and within NATO have intensified," and that "the
growing power of the international monopolies have made the competitive
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struggle still more ruthless." This competition, in the Soviet view
then manifests itself in new areas of contradictions and antagonisms
among the imperialists. As summarized by Brezhnev:
The capitalist countries' governments are making one
attempt after another to smooth out the contradictions and
to reach accords on joint measures to overcome the crises.
But the nature of imperialism is such that each country
strives to obtain advantages at the expense of the others,
to impose its own will. Differences come to light in new
forms, contradictions flare up with new force. 135
The Soviet Union has gone to great lengths to show the nations
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Of the West that these contradictions exist and are intensifying. In
particular, the U.S.S.R. has highlighted what it sees as an intensi-
fication of the discord existing between the United States and its
allies in Europe. Soviet spokesmen have claimed, for example, that "the
situation in the Middle East has clearly shown the sharp intensification
of differences between the United States and its European allies. "^^^
Here, the U.S.S.R. can cite the fact that:
...American circles have been accusing their NATO
partners of "leaving the U.S.A. in isolation,".. Western
Europe, for its part, is rebuking the U.S.A. for acting
without advance consultation with its allies for rendeHnq
support
- above all military support - to Israel even
while using other countries' territories for the shipment
of arms . i
The Soviet Union has also taken advantage of the energy crises
in the West to show that the antagonisms within imperialism are
intensifying. Thus, the U.S.S.R. can claim that the energy problem has
demonstrated the "American 'monopoly circles' attempt to exploit the
current fuel shortage in Europe for the defense of their economic and
political positions there. "^^^
Much of what the Soviet Union sees as fertile ground for sowing
discord among the nations of the West is a result of specific economic
crises that plagued the capitalist system during this period of detente.
The energy crisis and fuel shortage problem was touched upon in regard
to Europe's antagonisms with the United States. However, from the
Soviet perspective, this is but one of many specific contradictions and
crises that are confronting the United States. The Soviet Union has
let it be known that the crises within the United States itself are of
great concern to the West and highlight anew the inherent contradictions
of the capitalist-imperialist system. It has been noted that these
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conflicts have "emerged with special force" not only in the realm of
"serious foreign policy difficulties" but also in the area of "inflation
and unemployment, the balance of payment deficits, the undermining of
the position of the dollar and the difficulties in the world market. "^39
These acute difficulties then, in the words of Arbatov, translate into
severe social problems, including:
...the problem of poverty in the richest capitalist
country, the problem of the black population of America
which is subjected to especially cruel oppression, the
'
crises and decay of the big cities, the monstrous crime
rate, the decline in morals, the growing hostility of
the younger generation to traditional bourgeois "values,"
and finally, the economic problems engendered by a predatory
attitude toward nature. '^^
Brezhnev can then paint a picture of a capitalist society that
is void of human rights. As stated by Brezhnev:
...nearly a hundred million people are at present unemployed
in the nonsocialist countries. Many capitalist states violate
the rights of national minorities and foreign workers, and the
right of women to equal pay for equal work. This is probably
why many Western powers have not yet subscribed to inter-
national covenants establishing the social and political rights
of man. 141
These internal contradictions are then translated into antagonisms
within the imperialist camp as a whole. Brezhnev has stated that "perhaps
never before in recent decades have the crises of bourgeois democracy
and the progressive internal decay of the political machinery of capitalist
1 42
rule been so obvious." Then, as Brezhnev states, "in conditions of
these crisis phenomena, which are inevitable and stem from the very
nature of capitalism, an increasing aggravation of the economic and
political contradictions among various capitalist states and their
143
groupings is taking place..."
Regardless of the causes, the Soviet Union has pointed out a
number of different crises, contradictions, and tensions that exist within
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the capitalist world, which the U.S.S.R. is quite willing to exploit.
"The processes of international detente and the bankruptcy of the anti-
Soviet, anticommunist 'cold war' myths" it is claimed, "are facilitating
the development of crisis phenomena in the military-political blocs and
groupings created by the imperialists, which are directed against the
national-liberation movement .
"^ Soviet spokesmen can then scan the
globe and paint a glowing picture of conflicts among the alliances formed
by the capitalist-imperialist world:
Already there is sufficient reason to talk about thedecline of SEATO...
Fissures have also appeared in the edifice of another
pro-imperialist grouping - the Asian and Pacific Council
(ASPAC)
. .
.
These are difficult days for CENTO, although recently
imperialist circles have been making intensive efforts
aimed at enlivening this organization...
The Organization of American States (O.A.S.) is going
through a profound crisis ... 1 45
It was mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union could not sustain
a lengthy and intensified economic and military competition with the
United States and still hope to achieve any measure of success in either
the foreign or domestic realm. It can also be reasoned that the U.S.S.R.
could not endure such a posture with the entire West for a long period
of time. Hence, detente has been sold individually by Brezhnev to a
number of Western nations. Should the United States withdraw from a
strong detente posture with the U.S.S.R., the Soviets reason that the
economic and political advantages with America's allies could still
accrue to the Soviet Union. Thus, Brezhnev, in analyzing the harm done
by anti-detente forces, can claim that:
They managed to prevent the U.S. government from honoring
its promise to end discrimination against the Soviet Union in
the fields of trade and credit. As a result the Soviet Union
turned to other markets; its trade with other Western
can
countries grew appreciably, while U.S. foreian tr;^Hp cu-f^...^damage that could easily have been avoided 1?6
^^"'"^
To briefly look ahead, beyond the period of 1972 to 1976, it
be shown that detente has reaped some benefits in this area for the
Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan drew sharp criticism
from the Carter Administration, while calls for an end to detente,
economic boycotts, and non-participation in the Olympic Games were made
by American spokesmen. Yet, in the face of American requests for a
unified anti-Soviet posture among its allies, many Western governments
found it unwise to strongly denounce the U.S.S.R. and to participate in
any joint anti-Soviet activity whether it be economic, political, or
athletic
.
Thus, the "divide and conquer" syndrome employed by Lenin,
although changed by virtue of the means by which to conquer, has per-
sisted as a variable in the detente formula of Brezhnev. Lenin hoped
to exploit inter-capitalist rivalries as a means to postpone an
onslaught against the Soviet state by the imperialists. Brezhnev, it
can be argued, has hoped to exploit these differences as a means for
solidifying detente and for precluding a total relapse into the costly
Cold War years.
Detente as a means for achieving the final victory of socialism . The
single most important factor in the formulation of detente by Lenin was
the fulfillment of his most sacred duty; the achievement of the world-
wide victory of socialism and the concomitant final and total defeat
of the capitalist-imperialist system. Lenin had told us that the two
opposing systems could not survive together for a long period of time,
that in the end one or the other must triumph by destroying the
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antithetical system. The realization of this triumph, for which
detente was created, remained, in this writer's view, as the primary
motivating force for Lenin throughout his lifetime.
While many of Lenin's eight detente components have been altered
over the years, the goal of worldwide communist domination has not
changed. The timing and the means of realizing that objective may
have been revised, but the objective itself, the final victory of
socialism and the complete collapse of capitalism-imperialism, has not
been modified. Moreover, Brezhnev and other Soviet spokesmen have told
us that recent events have manifested the irreversible nature of the
march to a worldwide socialist victory. The U.S.S.R. is quite confident
that the benefits of detente, the growing might of world socialism,
and the decay of the capitalist system are realistic, objective criteria
that clearly demonstrate the favorable position of the Soviet Union in
regard to achieving its ultimate goal. Hence, Brezhnev can claim that:
...the Soviet Union's international position has never
been stronger. The security of the Soviet people is more
reliably ensured than ever before. Our people are working
under the banner of peace and are carrying on the struggle
for peace in the cause of the emancipation of labor. 14/
Suslov has also made it clear that the final victory of socialism
is the ultimate goal of world communists. In Suslov's words:
In struggling for democracy and the satisfaction of the
working peoples' economic and social demands, the Communists
never forget about the ultimate goals of their struggle - the
elimination of capitalism and the establishment of a new, just
socialist system. The ideas and policies of reformism and the
theories of class cooperation with the exploiters have always
been rejected and continue to be rejected by the Communists
.
Many of the eight detente variables analyzed here also point to
a picture of confidence for the U.S.S.R. in regard to the final victory
of socialism. In the first place, the Soviet Union is no longer an
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oasis of socialism in a world dominated by the forces of imperialism.
The alignment of world forces in favor of socialism, the consolidation
of power by the socialist commonwealth, and the successes of communist
parties in the capitalist world have all made the world of imperialism,
and not socialism, the minority system in the East-West balance of
power. The Soviets also feel that the achievement of strategic parity
and overall military equality have made the Soviet Union, and thereby
the entire socialist world, a formidable adversary to the West. It has
also afforded the Soviet Union an unprecedented opportunity to further
shift the balance of power to the socialist side. Finally, the crises
and antagonisms in imperialism have, in the Soviet view, done much to
further hasten the demise of that system, and make socialism a far more
attractive and realistic alternative. Brezhnev has often repeated his
belief that the Soviet Union is watching over the unstoppable march of
socialism and the simultaneous decline of capitalism. In Brezhnev's words:
The ideological political crisis of bourgeois society
is intensifying. It affleets the institutions of power
and the bourgeois political parties and shatters elementary
moral norms. Corruption is becoming more and more open,
even in the highest levels of the state machinery. The
decline of spiritual culture is continuing, and crime is
on the increase.
The crises of capitalism, in conjunction with the further spread
and strengthening of socialism, is seen by the Soviets as a realistic
gauge for measuring the success of the ultimate communist goal. However,
this goal, while attainable, is still subject to the terms of the new
detente, i.e., a gradual victory over capitalism within the parameters
of a "peaceful" erosion of the capitalist system. In the words of
Brezhnev
:
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The Communists are by no means predictinq the "a.itn
matic collapse-' of capitalism. It stilf a considerablereserves. However, events of recent years confirm wUhnew force that capitalism is a societ^ withou? aTtire.^^O
In the Soviet view the United States has pursued goals and
objectives that, while anti-socialist in nature, lack any long-term
philosophical objectives and are concerned with more limited imperialist
goals. The U.S.S.R. claims that "an important feature of Soviet
foreign policy is that it organically ties up the burning issues of the
day with long-term problems and main goals" which, it is stated, "makes
it possible to overcome the narrow bounds inherent in the policy of
the capitalist countries, a policy which so often is being guided by
purely pragmatic considerations . "^ From the Soviet Union's perspective,
the goals of Soviet foreign policy do not lack such limited objectives,
but are guided by the desire to achieve the ultimate long-term victory.
Thus, the Soviets can claim that:
...As to its consequences, the implementation of our
foreign policy programme designed for a long historical
period will be tantamount to a major victory of the forces
of peace over the forces of aggression and war. It will
also radically alter the entire structure of international
relations. It is only natural that such an aim can be
achieved only through struggle for a stage-by-stage imple-
mentation of the corresponding tasks and only by overcoming
the stubborn resistance put up by the aggressive imperialist
circles interested in preserving and fanning the hotbeds of
tension .and conclict, and in maintaining the atmosphere of a
war danger. 152
Brezhnev has often claimed that the objectives of Soviet foreign
policy are not determined by any short-term or temporary concerns. Thus,
Brezhnev can refer to the "consistent and unchanging course of the Soviet
Union in foreign policy, a course for the peaceful coexistence and
co-operation of states, irrespective of differences between their social
and political systems, a course for detente, a course that is unaffected
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by momentary considerations of expediency. -^^S Brezhnev has also claimed
that:
For us Soviet people the active struggle for peace isnot atenporary task dictated by the moment. It is ourprincipled deliberate, and consistent policy, which wepursue in fraternal unity with all the countr es of the
socialist community.
i-r it^i. r in
With great insight into the future of social develop-
ment Marx wrote that when the working class builds its own
socialist, society, its "international rule will be Peace
national ruler will be everywhere the saiF^^'
Labor . '
The ultimate objective of detente for Brezhnev is therefore,
identical to that of Lenin. Lenin may have been more impatient than
Brezhnev, and may have wanted detente to afford him the time by which to
prepare himself for the destruction of capitalism. Yet, Brezhnev, while
delaying the attainment of this goal, and eliminating a total war as a
means for success in this endeavor, has not lost sight of this most basic
and all-encompassing objective. Thus, Brezhnev can assert that:
We shall continue to wage a vigorous struggle for
international detente, for the elimination of hotbeds of
war danger, for an end to the arms race. We shall continue
to administer a resolute rebuff to those forces that want to
reverse world development. We are convinced that our rightful
cause of the struggle for peace and social progress will
triumph. "1 55
The Limitations of Detente
The evidence cited to this point would suggest that the policy
of detente as defined by Brezhnev has the final victory of socialism as
its main objective. Yet, as Brezhnev has pointed out, the attainment
of this goal will not be realized immediately as the forces of imperialism
will not quietly lay down their arms, modify their inherent aggressive
nature, or willingly accept the demise of their system in the face of
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the inalterable victorious march of socialism. Thus, as Soviet
spokesmen have repeatedly pointed out, an intense struggle with the
West, and in particular with the United States, is an inherent character-
istic of detente. Brezhnev has stated in this regard that, despite
-the
successes in relaxing international tensions, a hard struggle against
the enemies of peace, national and social liberation faces us."^^^ The
form that this struggle will take will be, as Soviet spokesman claim,
in the field of economics, science, and the military. More importantly,
this struggle will be increased in the realm of ideas, in an acute
intensification of the ideological warfare between capitalism and socialism.
"It must be stressed absolutely clearly," the Soviets tell us "that
the improvements of relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States in no way means an easing of the ideological struggle. "^^^
Rather than signalling an end to the ideological confrontation between
East and West, detente will ensure that this struggle will become more
intense and acute. As the Soviets have claimed, "it is necessary to be
ready for a situation in which the weaker the positions of aggressive
militarist circles, the greater the extent to which the ideological
struggle will intensify and become an increasingly acute form of confron-
tation between the two social systems. "^^^ Hence, the Soviet Union has
prepared for a fairly lengthy and fierce struggle with the United States,
as outlined in the strategy of detente. As noted by Soviet commentators,
"Marxist-Leninists have consistently associated peaceful coexistence
with the prospect of further deepening and extending the inevitable
159development of the world revolutionary process." By so doing, the
Soviet Union, in the face of American opposition to this process, regards
"peaceful coexistence as a form of confrontation between the two social
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systems." Brezhnev has noted on a number of occasions that detente
will involve a hard struggle on the part of the "forces of peace."
Hence, in addressing the World Congress of Peace Forces, Brezhnev can
claim:
...But I would like to stress most emphatically that
neither peace nor detente will descend on the world in a
manner of some divine blessing. Peace and detente can onlybe the result of persistent and tireless struggle by allpeace forces
- the states, political parties and tendencies,public bodies and individuals - against everything resistingdetente, imperiling peace, and creating the danger of war. 161
Brezhnev has also claimed that this struggle will not be an easy
one. In Brezhnev's words:
The struggle for the triumph of reason in international
relations can hardly be an easy one. Every gain on the road
to lasting peace comes about through struggle, through fierce
clashes with the most reactionary circles of imperialism and
their accompl ices .1 62
If the Soviet Union is to engage in this kind of confrontation
with the United States, and if the Soviet-designed detente policy is
the catalyst for this struggle, then it is logical for the U.S.S.R. to
establish the "rules of the game" that will govern this conflict. The
Soviet Union has, in fact, codified the rules governing detente, and has
established clear limitations on what it sees as permissible action
through this policy. To do so the U.S.S.R. has employed the one-sided
perspective of Marxist-Leninist ideology and has arrived at conclusions
that can be seen as a product of that ideology. The Soviet logic here
is quite simple. The Soviet Union is the champion of peace, friendship,
social progress, democracy, freedom, etc. The United States, on the
other hand, is the promoter of war, aggression, exploitation of the
masses, oppression, and the denial of freedom and national liberation,
among others. The goals of detente are the elimination of war, aggression.
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exploitation, and national oppression, and the promotion of peace,
social progress, and national liberation. Hence, by definition Soviet
activities are adjudged as being consistent with the cause of detente,
while American actions are quite obviously inappropriate if they are
at odds with the objectives of the U.S.S.R.
Detente, from the Soviet view therefore, establishes unilateral
restraints on the United States, while affording the Soviet Union freedom
in pursuing actions that it assesses as being consistent with the cause
of worldwide socialist gains. In analyzing the third Nixon-Brezhnev
summit meeting held in Moscow, the U.S.S.R., immediately following the
U.S. president's departure, noted that the policy of detente, as defined
in the summit reinforced the Soviet quest to:
rebuff the intrigues of aggressive imperialist forces,
to strengthen the socialist commonwealth, to ensure further
growth in the U.S.S.R. 's economic and political might and
an increase in the Soviet peoples' well-being, and to
facilitate in every way the safeguarding of lasting peace
on earth and the social progress of the peoples. 163
The Soviet Union has applied these unilateral restrictions on
American foreign policy in many areas of Soviet-American relations.
Yet, it can be reasoned that it is in the realm of the national liber-
ation struggle that the obvious nature of these limitations becomes
most visible. The U.S.S.R. has shown that the national liberation
struggle, and the Soviet support in any fashion for this struggle is quite
legitimate. While detente is characterized by an absence of war and the
existence of relaxation of tensions, it does not pertain to Western
relations with the developing countries. As the Soviets have pointed out:
...there can be no peaceful coexistence between the
oppressed and the oppressors, between the exploiters and
the exploited, between the imperialist states and their
colonies. There can be no peaceful coexistence in the
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context of the internal processes of the cla.. .nH
national liberation struggle in the caoit^ . •
and their colonies J 64
p alist countries
Thus, the United States is told that the restraints imposed
upon it by detente eliminate the potential for suppressing the national
liberation movement in any of the developing nations. More importantly,
the Soviet Union is allowed to render any kind of support, including
military, to strengthen revolutionary forces which are striving to
assert national independence. As noted above, relaxation of tensions.
peace, and friendship, the cornerstones of detente, do not apply to
relations between the West and the developing world. However, as Brezhnev
has often repeated, detente most definitely applies to Soviet support for
the developing nations. As stated by Brezhnev:
Moreover, as we have done in past years, we shall pav
great attention to promoting our relations with the national-
liberation forces, and with the new states of Asia and Africa
that, having taken the path of freedom, are now endeavoring
to consolidate their independence and promote their economic
and social development. 165
Brezhnev can also claim that:
The entire course of postwar development has proved
convincingly that colonialism and aggression, the policy
of colonial tyranny and the policy of force, are essentially
two sides of the same coin. There is therefore every justifi-
cation for the fact that in the very name of your Congress
(World Congress of Peace Forces) the struggle for peace is
associated with the struggle for national liberation. 166
It is not surprising therefore, that the U.S.S.R. can apply this
ideological logic to the question of war as a means of achieving objectives
during an era of detente. The Soviet Union has consistently argued that
the renunciation of war as a means for solving differences in the world is
one of the primary goals of detente. "The Leninist policy of peaceful
coexistence," we are told "embodies the irrefutable fact that wars as
a means of achieving political aims are alien to the verj^ nature of
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socialisn,." Vet, in the Soviet view, all wars are not the sa.e.
The Soviet Union has gone to great lengths to lecture the United States
on the subject of wars during the new detente era, and to show that
Soviet-inspired and/or Soviet supported wars of national liberation are
quite legitimate and not contradictory to the principles of detente.
The Soviet lexicon therefore, provides the following definitions of just
and unjust wars
:
A war is just if it is a continuation of a policy of thedefense of revolutionary gains, the freedom and independence
of peoples and the cause of socialism and communism A war
IS unjust and reactionary if it is a continuation of a policy
aimed at suppressing revolutionary struggle, the freedom andindependence of one people or another or the socialist gains
of the working people, or at subjugating a particular country. ""^^
Brezhnev has claimed that such "unjust wars" take the form of
local wars. In Brezhnev's words:
We must not forget that wars will keep breaking out, people
are still being killed, and cities, factories, villages, and
objects of cultural value are being destroyed in various parts
of the world. These are what politicians have become accustomed
to calling "local wars," that is, wars confined to the rela-
tively narrow boundries of some geographical region. Past
experience shows that, as a rule, in modern conditions, these
break out wherever and whenever the forces of imperialism and
reaction attempt to put down liberation movements, or to
obstruct the free and independent development of states that
have opted for progressive internal development and the anti-
imperialist line in foreign policy. 169
What the Soviet Union is saying, in this writer's view, is that
detente affords the socialist world under the leadership of the U.S.S.R.
a carte blanche in regard to the conduct of its foreign policy. An
analysis of the "objective" laws of Marxist-Leninist ideology will show,
as the Soviets claim, that the justifiable nature of the actions pursued
by the country advocating that ideology is true by definition. At the
same time, the United States is reacting in an aggressive manner to
the further dissemination of the socialist cause, thus rendering its
224
foreign policy a hostile and inappropriate one. In this context, the
United States can expect wars of national liberation to be waged against
it or its supported governments, with the support of the U.S.S.R. Yet,
the United States is told that any response on its part to these wars
are reactionary in nature and will meet with a firm rebuff by the
Soviet Union.
The U.S.S.R. has therefore, attempted to place one-sided restraints
on the United States, while pursuing its own objectives in an unabated
manner. The Soviet Union, during the latest detente has provided consider-
able support to the revolutionary causes of the developing nations,
confronted the United States in Angola and the Middle East, and militarily
intervened in Afghanistan. In all these areas, among others, the Soviet
Union has expressed shock and dismay at the critical American response.
The Soviet Union has repeatedly asserted that these actions are not only
beyond criticism from the perspective of detente, but are guaranteed
components of that process.
Soviet Objectives Within Detente
The detente of Leonid Brezhnev differs in the areas outlined above
from the detente of Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev by virtue of the means
used to achieve the ultimate objective of detente, the worldwide
victory of socialism. Lenin, it was shown, argued on the basis of his
revolutionary philosophy that the Soviet Union could not coexist with the
West for a long period of time and would therefore wage a life-and-death
struggle with its ideological antithesis in the foreseeable future.
This total, cataclysmic war syndrome, as mentioned above, was revised by
Khrushchev who transformed detente from a defensive maneuver to an offensive
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strategy. Brezhnev, in continuing the Khrushchev method of utilizing
detente in the mode of a peaceful offensive, added the factors of
strategic parity and a less bellicose image to his foreign policy, thus
making it a more acceptable process for the capitalist-imperialist states.
It has been argued throughout this dissertation that Brezhnev,
while altering the strategic basis of detente, has maintained detente
as a policy that serves the cause of the worldwide victory of socialism.
It remains to be shown how Brezhnev, through short-term objectives and
strategies, hopes to use detente as a tool for achieving his and the
Soviet Union's long-term objectives. Stated very simply, it can be argued
that the spectrum of Soviet goals reads as follows:
1. ) The final objective - the complete and final victory of socialism
led by the Soviet Union.
2. ) Strategic objective - the continued growth of the alignment of
world forces in favor of socialism.
3. ) Specific strategy - the alignment of "Third World" or developing
nations into the socialist camp, through the anti-imperialist,
pro-socialist national liberation movement.
These objectives are distinct, in this writer's view from the
specific strategies or means used to achieve them, i.e., placing unilateral
constraints upon the United States, eliminating the need for a thermo-
nuclear war, exploiting antagonisms within the Western camp, maintaining
strategic and conventional military parity, precluding an anti-Soviet
alliance, utilizing economic assistance from the United States, etc.
These tactical maneuvers might best be viewed as specific procedures
detailing the general blueprint for action as outlined in the objectives
of the U.S.S.R.
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The final objective of detente has been dealt with in some
detail above and need not be repeated here. However, the strategic
objective, that of continuing the shift in the balance of world forces
to the socialist side, deserves a careful analysis. It has been shown
that the alignment of world forces in favor of socialism is, in the
Soviet view, an accomplished fact. Indeed, in the Soviet view, the
manifestation of this pro-socialist shift was the primary motivation
for the West and specifically the United States to reassess its foreign
policy and to agree to a detente with the Soviet Union. However, the
Soviet Union is obviously not satisfied with maintaining the balance
of world forces as it now exists, and is clearly intent upon further
augmenting the ranks of the pro-socialist nations. The Soviet Union has
repeatedly stressed that detente in no way signifies the preservation of
the status quo in regard to political or social developments. As stated
by Arbatov:
...in launching a broad peace offensive and a vigorous
and consistent struggle for detente and for the triumph of
the principles of peaceful coexistence in international
relations, the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries did not assume, and indeed could not assume, a
commitment to guarantee the social "status quo" in the
world and to halt the processes of class and national
liberation struggle engendered by the objective laws of
historical development.
.
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In the view of Suslov, the crises of capitalism have shown that
"the absence of historical prospects for imperialism is becoming
increasingly obvious at the present stage. "^^^ This, in conjunction with
class struggles and antagonisms within "the entire world of capital,"
leads Suslov to conclude that the prospects for socialist expansion are
improving. In Suslov's words:
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The working people's desire for unity is increasina in
UrftT °I TK^'f k^^^ positions Of the Communist^Parties and of all left wing forces have become considerably
stronger. The national-liberation movement is dealing heavyblows to imperialism. 172 ^
It was mentioned earlier that the United States, in the words of
Henry Kissinger, hoped to use detente as a means of displaying Western
innovations and advancements to the public in the socialist world. The
Soviet Union had apparent cause to be concerned, as the commodity-starved
Soviet consumer might well find this array of Western goods to be quite
attractive. Thus, Brezhnev continuously exhorted his and the East
European bloc's communist parties to strengthen their ideological
vigilance and cooperation. By so doing, Brezhnev argued that the increased
contacts in detente could well serve the cause of socialist alignment.
In Brezhnev
' s words :
We are convinced of the rightness of our path and of our
Marxist-Leninist ideology, and we have no doubt that the ex-
pansion of contacts, which is natural in conditions of detente,
exchanges of spiritual values and information and the develop-
ment of ties between the publics of various countries will
serve well to disseminate the truth about socialism and to win
more and more new supporters to the side of the ideas of
scientific communism. ' 73
Brezhnev, in advocating the policy of detente, has undoubtedly
been mindful of conservative criticism within his own party. Brezhnev
has taken the occasion of rebutting any anti-detente sentiment to
reinforce the point that detente does not mean being "soft on capitalism,"
nor does it entail the maintenance of the status quo. In his address
at the 25th C.P.S.U. Congress, Brezhnev again asserted his belief that
detente implies an inherent intensification of the ideological struggle
with the West, and is designed, above all, to create favorable conditions
for the further spread of socialism. Brezhnev then added:
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refutes the fabrications about "freezing." Suff ce t to
Z'fll Itj''' changes that have Uken placein the world in recent years. K'ai-t;
That is how things stand with the question of the relatinn
ship between detente and the class struggle Fait ^u^lo Ih
"
revo utionary cause, we Soviet Communists are fighting and willcontinue to fight for peace - the supreme good for people
Ite'm"'^
^°ndition for the progress of mankind in Sur
Much the same sentiment is echoed by Suslov who states:
We Communists have no illusions with respect to the anti-
popular nature and policies of imperialism or its ideology of
anti communism. The affirmation in international affairs of
the principles of peaceful coexistence does not in the
slightest signify a slackening of the class struggle on a
worldwide scale or a "reconciliation" between socialism and
capitalism. They are irreconcilable. It is a fact of
reality that the class struggle in the international arena
continues to be distinguished by great acerbity. Now, when
the imperialists are becoming increasingly aware of the
impossibility of overcoming socialism by force, this struggle
is more and more often being carried over into the spheres of
economics, politics and ideology. 175
The economic and political crises that the Soviet Union envisages
in the West are, in the Soviet view, obvious manifestations of problems
that make the capitalist system less attractive to the developing nations
of the world. In conjunction with the already-existing worldwide shift
toward socialism, these crises became major catalysts for an era of
global transition from capitalism to socialism. "The numerous manifesta-
tions of instability in the economic and political system of imperialism
are not the result of some accidental concurrence of circumstances,"
according to Kosygin. Rather, this is seen as "an objective developmental
process in the epoch of the general transition from capitalism to socialism."
This "general transition" will certainly cause some problems for the socialist
world, as the imperialists will do everything in their power to halt this
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process. However, as Kosygin goes on to say:
difficulties are that confront
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continuing to change in favor of
It has been mentioned throughout the course of this report
that detente has always provided the Soviet Union with a breathing spell,
a respite in, or an absence of war. Peaceful relations with the United
States, be it as an avoidance of war for Lenin, or an alternative to
the Cold War for Brezhnev, have always, in the Soviet view, provided
the best conditions for socialist proliferation and communist construc-
tion. Hence, it is not surprising that the U.S.S.R., through the latest
detente, is confident that the alignment of world forces in favor of
socialism is a cause that is best served by the policy of peaceful and
cooperative inter-camp relations. An authoritative Pravda editorial can
therefore, summarize the objectives of detente as follows:
Peaceful coexistence creates favorable conditions for
the comprehensive development of the class struggle of the
proletariat against the sway of capital and the struggle for
national liberation of oppressed and dependent peoples. To
struggle for peaceful coexistence in our time means to struggle
for the progress of mankind, since favorable opportunities for
the solution of fundamental social problems are created in
conditions of peace... ^78
The strategic objective of Soviet foreign policy, as defined
in detente and explained by Soviet spokesmen, is quite clear. While
avoiding a thermonuclear war, and utilizing American economic assistance,
the U.S.S.R. is clearly attempting to further the process of shifting
the balance of power in East-West relations in favor of the socialist
commonwealth of nations. Such a course is consistent with the Soviet
view of the final objective of detente, and is a reflection of a more
ae
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gradual and incremental means by which to achieve long-term goals,
specifically the complete victory of socialism on a worldwide basis.
Yet, it can be argued that the U.S.S.R. cannot hope to achieve equal
success in this regard in all areas of the world simultaneously. The
existence of objective pre-conditions for socialist transformation,
the development of mature communist parties, the level of capitalist
entrenchment, the ability to wage wars of national liberation, and
host of other factors have made some geo-political areas more suitabl
than others for the shift to the socialist camp. The Soviet Union, i
this regard, has looked upon the world of developing nations as the
most appropriate for the influx of socialist influence and the demise
of American or Western control. Hence, it can be demonstrated that the
specific strategy underlying the strategic objective of the further
favorable alignment of world forces is the enhancement of the national
liberation movement.
In speaking to the World Congress of Peace Forces, Brezhnev
asserted:
For millions of people on our planet, there is still no
peace, they are forced, arms in hand, to fight against
imperialist aggressors and their accomplices and against
the tyranny of invaders, for their own freedom and indepen-
dence and for the elementary right to be masters in their
own home. Peace partisans cannot fail to draw their own
conclusions from this. 179
The conclusions to be drawn from Brezhnev's point of view are
rather simple. The Soviet Union claims that the support for struggles
against "invaders," and "imperialist aggressors" is an elemental factor
in its foreign policy. Moreover, such support, even in the form of
direct military assistance or the use of socialist military personnel
(e.g. Cuban armed forces), is not contradictory to the spirit or intent
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Of detente. In fact, such assistance is an inherent and unquestionable
component of the process of Soviet-American detente. As the Soviet
Union asks in rhetorical fashion:
.n.tnc^'" "^^^^[l^^
^o^cerned, isn't the struggle
against racism and apartheid and the defense of and respectfor the sovereignty of young independent countries a contri-bution to the easing of tension and to the creation on ou?planet of t e necessary conditions for a peaceful, happylife for all peoples, large and small?180
The U.S.S.R. can argue therefore, that the easing of tension in
the international arena can best be accomplished by the proliferation of
successful struggles for national liberation and independence by the
developing countries. This process, replete with full Soviet support,
must not appear as a form of Soviet hegemony, however. The U.S.S.R. is
careful to show that the alignment of world forces, and not Soviet
national interests, is served by the victories of national liberation
struggles. In the words of Brezhnev:
The Soviet Union's attitude toward the complex
processes in the developing countries is clear and
definite. The Soviet Union does not interfere in the
internal affairs of other countries and peoples. Respect
for the sacred right to every people and every country to
choose its own path of development is an immutable principle
of our Leninist foreign policy. But we do not conceal our
views. In the developing countries, as everywhere else, we
are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and
national independence and regard them as our friends and com-
rades in struggl e. 181
The national liberation movement and the alignment of newly-
independent developing countries in the socialist camp is, in the Soviet
view, a major component of the Soviet desire to continue the pro-socialist
shift in the balance of world power. "The Soviet Union is expanding its
political ties with the developing countries," we are told, and is
"supporting their endeavor to strengthen their independence, to advance
along the path of social progress, to take an active part in world affairs.
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and to overcome vestiges of inequality in their foreign relations. "^82
By so doing, the U.S.S.R. hopes to not only increase its camp of
allies and decrease that of the United States, but to also make the
process of detente and the pro-socialist alignment of world forces
irreversible factors of international relations. Thus, the Soviet Union
can argue as follows:
Acting shoulder to shoulder with world socialism the
developing countries can bring about genuine national liber-
ation and the satisfaction of their legitimate interests and
rights and can make a still weightier contribution to the
struggle to reinforce the easing of tension and to make
the positive changes in international relations irreversible. ""^^
It is important to emphasize the point that successful national
liberation wars and revolutions are contributing factors to the easing
of international tension in the Soviet view. By eliminating the
vestiges of imperialism, neo-colonialism, national oppression, and the
like, the U.S.S.R. is serving the cause of peace and reducing inter-
national tensions. Since the agreed upon objective of detente is
precisely this reduction of international tensions and the creation of
world peace, the Soviets can logically argue that detente and national
liberation struggles are synonymous objectives.
In supporting the cause of national liberation, the Soviet Union
has focused its attention on the developing nations of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. However, it can be further shown that the U.S.S.R.,
during the latest detente, has placed special emphasis on the revolutionary
process on the African continent. It is here that the U.S.S.R. has hoped
to make significant progress in winning the support of the newly-independent
former colonies. It is also on the African continent that the objec-
tive preconditions for a socialist transformation can be seen as being
almost non-existent. Yet, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the remarkable
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ability, as taught by Lenin, to adapt and revise Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary ideology so as to properly address any given circumstance.
Hence, Soviet theoreticians have been able to devise a prescriptive
format for the "special conditions" that characterize the revolutionary,
liberation struggle in Africa. This special form for the African revolution-
ary process encompasses three basic stages:
^' The national liberation revolutinn ("a broad anti-colonial, anti-
imperialist front is formed in which nearly all social strata of
the population.
. .participate to various extents").
2- The national-democratic revolution, ("the task of this stage is the
struggle to consolidate political independence, achieve economic
independence and advance along the path of social progress").
^- The socialist revolution, ("which presupposes the coming to power of
the working people, headed by the working class").
The Soviet Union, in developing this three stage revolutionary
process, has, in effect, admitted that the goal of socialist construction
may well be a very distant objective for many former colonies and semi-
colonies. In the Soviet view, the difficulties encountered in underdeveloped
countries "determine the need for a relatively long transitional period
during which the socialist revolution develops, deepens and is crowned
1 85by the construction of a new society." However, the longer the
"transitional period" prior to the construction of a socialist society,
the less attractive the model of a national liberation/socialist
revolution might be to overly enthusiastic newly- freed colonies. Thus,
the Soviet Union has continued the Leninist process of adapting ideology
to the present environment, and allowed for a much shorter and more
attractive revolutionary process. The U.S.S.R. can argue that during the
detente era it is quite possible to fuse the revolutionary process
"into a single strea.," thus creating a revolution with "an anticapital ist
and socialist orientation." It can then be reasoned that:
Such a revolution, enormously accelerating the revolu-tionary process in the given country and shortening theintermediate stages of historical development, calls forthe maximum acceleration of social development, which
with the support of other socialist states, can place'onthe agenda the construction of a socialist society. 186
The launching of an anti-imperialist and pro-socialist national
liberation revolution, with the full support of the Soviet Union and the
other socialist nations, is not a goal that is unattainable in the very
near future. Rather, the Soviets argue, this objective can be realized
almost immediately. Moreover, from the Soviet perspective, the goal of
the construction of a "new (i.e. socialist) society" can also be accom-
plished in a relatively short period of time. It is important to note
that the Soviets feel that it is detente that has created the necessary
preconditions for this rapid process and which has made the socialist
construction goals possible. After all, as the U.S.S.R. has often told
us, detente creates the most favorable conditions for the construction of
a new society. Soviet spokesmen can therefore, "consider the effect on
Africa of detente, which has become ever more significant under the
influence of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist
1 87
countries and progressive forces throughout the world." So as to
leave no doubt as to the direct relationship of detente to the African
national liberation movement, Soviet spokesmen can argue as follows:
What has happened and is happening in Africa is the
development of the Portuguese colonial peoples' struggle
for freedom and independence, new trends in relations with
former mother countries and the like - all this has become
possible as a direct result of detente, which has
graphically demonstrated the narrowing of imperialism's
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opportunities. It is no longer so easy for imperialist
reactionaries to apply brute force to maintain their
supremacy in a given sector of the "third world " Then
too, public opinion in capitalist countries nowadays
reacts more sharply to all revivals of the earlier
position of strength" policy. 188
The Soviet Union has therefore, made little, if any, attempt to
conceal the fact that it will strive to woo the developing nations
into the pro-socialist, or at a minimum the non-capitalist, camp. Further-
more, the policy of detente is seen as the major catalyst by which the
national liberation struggle is waged. With the United States now unwilling
or unable to muster a reasonable and meaningful response to Soviet activity
in the third world, the U.S.S.R., under the aegis of detente, appears to
be quite comfortabl e in pursuing its objectives there. The Soviet Union
has also made no effort to hide the fact that it has realized a number
of triumphs in the developing world during the most recent detente. The
U.S.S.R. can both revel in the successes of socialist gains in the third
world and use these triumphs as a form of appeal to those non-aligned
nations which have not opted for Soviet support. Thus, in analyzing the
25th C.P.S.U. Congress, Soviet commentators can reason as follows:
The Congress declared very resolutely that the CPSU has
supported and will continue to support peoples who are
fighting for their freedom. The peoples of Vietnam, Chile,
Laos, and Angola know this very well...
The 25th Congress reconfirmed the unconditional devotion •
of our Leninist Party to the fraternal alliance of workers
of all countries and to its consistent course aimed at
uniting the ranks of the world Communist movement and at
strengthening the solidarity of all anti-imperialist forces
in the struggle for common aims... 189
Detente under Leonid Brezhnev has established the goals and
objectives outlined above. As such, Brezhnev's detente appears, at first
glance, to differ significantly from Lenin's detente. Yet, it can be
reasoned that upon closer examination the differences appear to be less
significant than the common threads that wind themselves through the
detente policy of these two Soviet leaders. Both Brezhnev and Lenin
have attempted to augment the ranks of the socialist camp and decrease
that of the West, with the ultimate aim of vanquishing the latter.
Lenin hoped to realize this end with the aid of socialist revolutions
in Europe, most notably in Germany. Brezhnev hopes to reach his goals
with national liberation/socialist revolutions in the developing world.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The introductory chapter of this dissertation presented three
major hypotheses. Taken together, these hypotheses addressed what this
writer felt were the most widely misunderstood aspects of the policy
of detente. Moreover, these hypotheses provide a concise capsule
summarization of what this writer views as the essence of detente. It
is important therefore, to examine these hypotheses here in summary
fashion in light of the evidence presented within the body of this report.
The first hypothesis posited the belief that detente is a
political strategy that was designed by the U.S.S.R., that has its
theoretical foundation in Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology, and
is governed by the dictates of that ideology. It was shown here that
detente was not mutually developed by the Soviet Union and the United
States. Rather, detente was and is a political strategy that was con-
ceived by the U.S.S.R. as a means by which to properly manage the
temporary coexistence of capitalism-imperialism and socialism. Having
initiated the policy of detente, the Soviet Union attempted for a
number of years to have the United States accept the Soviet philosophy
of detente as the only alternative to American decision makers. It
was only recently, in the Soviet view, that the United States
realistically assessed the alignment of world forces, the growing might
of the Soviet Union, the existence of strategic parity, and the bankruptcy
of pursuing an anti-Soviet course of action. Thus, the United States,
according to the Soviet perception, has finally been forced to accept
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detente, as defined by the Soviet Union, as a political necessity.
Detente may have been transformed from a defensive tactic to an
Offensive strategy and finally to an aggressive policy with unilateral
constraints placed upon the United States. Yet, as was shown, it was
the Soviet Union that initiated these revisions, and it was the Soviet
Union that has continually defined the scope and purpose of detente.
In addition, it was demonstrated that detente was created on
the basis of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology. While attempting
to achieve the ultimate objective of communist ideology the Soviet Union
realized that a policy of peace with the West was an urgent need.
Detente was presented here as a means by which the U.S.S.R. could best
realize the objective of transforming the world in the communist order
and of achieving the ultimate and total defeat of the capitalist-
imperialist system.
Two distinct schools of thought on this subject matter were
analyzed. The first school presented the general belief that ideology
had been replaced by concerns of national interest, balance of power,
and power politics as the major determining factors of Soviet foreign
policy. Characterized by an "end of ideology" posture, this school
looked upon ideology as a secondary concern, and as a manipulative or
cosmetic aspect of Soviet foreign policy. However, it was shown that
ideology formed the nucleus of the Soviet policy of detente in its
earliest formation in 1918. While many of the tactical components of
detente have been altered or revised in the ensuing sixty-two years,
the central core of the policy has not been changed. An unswerving
commitment to the ultimate goal of Soviet ideology, the final defeat
of the West, has remained as the major focal point of the Soviet
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policy of detente.
When analyzed amidst the background of short-term Soviet
objectives, the detente policy may very well appear to be a non-ideological
strategy. However, it was argued that it was difficult to separate short-
term goals of Soviet foreign policy from its much broader long-term
objectives. It was also reasoned that gradual and incremental shifts in the
balance of power in favor of the U.S.S.R. are but small pieces in a much
larger Soviet design. The Soviet Union has repeatedly informed us that
the goal of the construction of a new society can best be accomplished in
conditions of peace. Detente, in the Soviet view, was created as the best
means to achieve that peace and the objective of socialist proliferation
and communist construction.
The second hypothesis stated that detente was a political
strategy developed by V.I. Lenin in 1918. Thus, detente in 1972 or
1980 can be seen as the present variation of a policy that was initiated
by the U.S.S.R. shortly after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Soviet
Russia. It has become fashionable to apply the term detente to Soviet-
American relations from 1972 to 1980, with the normalization of those
countries' relations under the leadership of Richard Nixon and Leonid
Brezhnev. Yet, it was argued that detente as practiced by Brezhnev is
a policy that is both a descendant and continuation of a strategy that
was conceived by Lenin.
Lenin, confronted with an array of foreign and domestic
difficulties, realized in March of 1918 that he could not guarantee his
political survival without a large-scale consolidation of strength.
Furthermore, Lenin knew all too well that he could not pursue the
objective of defeating the capitalist-imperialist system until such time
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as he was strong enough to confront his enemies. Thus. Lenin required
a breathing spell, a respite in war, by which he could prepare hi.self
for the final confrontation with the West. Detente was created by Lenin
as the policy that would provide this respite.
It was reasoned that in designing detente, Lenin addressed
eight major needs of Soviet Russia. Detente would provide the necessary
time, in conditions of peace, that would allow for the internal consoli-
dation of strength by the new Soviet regime. Detente afforded the Soviet
Union the opportunity to survive as an "oasis" in a capitalist-imperialist
world until such time as other nations could join the socialist ranks.
Detente gave Lenin the time to focus on the inordinate East-West military
imbalance and to implement the corrective action necessary to achieve
military parity. Detente underscored the objective necessity of waging
a total East-West war and provided the means by which Lenin could best
prepare for this final inter-camp conflict. Detente afforded Lenin the
opportunity of preparing for the inevitable alliance of anti-socialist
forces and the eventual onslaught against the U.S.S.R. Detente provided
the forum by which Lenin could expand East-West economic ties and secure
the much needed influx of Western economic assistance that was vital to
the ravaged Soviet economy. Detente gave Lenin the chance to exploit
any and all antagonisms within the capitalist-imperialist camp, thus
precluding any anti-Soviet alliance among his enemies. Most importantly,
detente provided Lenin with the best means by which he could achieve the
goal of gaining the worldwide victory of socialism.
The policy of detente that was created in 1918 and revitalized
in 1920-1921 did not die with the passing of Lenin. Stalin, in gaining
complete hegemony over Soviet politics during his lifetime, continued
the policy Of detente that was bequeathed to hi., while
.aking subtle
shifts in the overall detente formula, Stalin adhered to the basic
core of detente as designed by Lenin. In fact, Stalin was able to
strengthen the internal and international position of the U.S.S.R. and
therefore, strengthen the policy of detente.
Nikita Khrushchev continued the policy of detente as updated by
his predecessor. However, Khrushchev realized the need to alter the
policy and to transform detente from a defensive tactic to an offensive
strategy. Hence, Khrushchev revised many of the original detente com-
ponents of Lenin and restructured the policy in the mold of a more
gradual process that did not necessitate the inevitability of a final
East-West confrontation.
Brezhnev maintained the basis of detente that he inherited upon
his assumption of power in the Kremlin. Yet, Brezhnev realized the need
to reduce the obvious threat presented to the West during the Cold War
years and to re-design the detente process in the form of a more appealing
political strategy. However, Brezhnev was able to add a very aggressive
strain to detente and make the policy, in reality, a far greater threat
to American interests.
Thus, the third major hypothesis presented the view that detente,
conceived and implemented by the U.S.S.R., has posed and will continue
to pose serious threats to the interests of the United States. In fact,
detente, as perceived by the Soviet Union could by definition accrue
unilateral advantages to the cause of world socialism. It was shown
that detente was created by the Soviet Union and was a direct by-product
of a revolutionary ideology that has avowed goals and objectives that
are inimical to those of the United States. Thus, in theory, the Soviet
251
policy of detente poses an inherent threat to American interests.
In accepting the terms of detente as established by the U.S. S.R.
the united States has not only given credibility to this Soviet strategy
but has also increased the threatening character of the policy. By
condoning Soviet-styled detente, as the U.S. did from 1 972 to 1976,
the American government, as was argued, afforded the U.S. S.R. the oppor-
tunity to conduct U.S.
-Soviet relations in a manner that gave Moscow much
to gain and little, if anything, to lose.
It was shown that the United States has reassessed the detente
policy recently and has demonstrated an unwillingness to adhere to the
principles of detente as established by the Kremlin regime. However,
the Soviet Union, far from seeing the demise of Soviet-American detente,
is doing all in its power to make the process irreversible. The Soviet
Union has repeatedly informed us in the West that the causes for the
American dissatisfaction with detente are not only not contradictory
to the spirit of detente, but are necessary and inevitable components
of that policy.
The U.S. S.R. has made no attempt to conceal the fact that
detente established the best conditions for the further dissemination
of socialist influence and the construction of communism. In short,
detente and the American willingness to accept detente will, in the
Soviet view, provide the catalyst by which the Soviet Union will realize
its ultimate communist objectives. Hence, it is not surprising that the
U.S. S.R. can assert that detente will signal a drastic intensification
of the East-West ideological struggle and that detente will sharpen
and reinforce the class antagonisms with the West. According to the
Soviet Union, detente has been forced upon the United States by the
the
American realization of its weakening position in the world and
growing .ight of the Soviet Union. While the reality of the alignment
of world forces in favor of socialism forced the United States to
accept detente, it will be detente, in the Soviet view, that will be
the fulcrum for the further favorable alignment of world forces.
The Soviet Union has claimed that detente has as its ultimate
objective the total collapse of the West and the complete worldwide
victory of socialism. In this view, detente is an irreversible policy
that will not condone the status quo posture, sustainment of the
present balance of power, or any attempted convergence with the United
States. In addition, detente, from Moscow's perspective, allows for the
support of the U.S.S.R. for wars of national liberation, and violent
anti-Western national revolutions. At the same time, detente is not
applicable to American relations with the newly developing former
colonies and will not allow for any American reaction to national
liberation endeavors. Detente does not permit the buildup of "aggressive"
military forces by the United States, but at the same time, necessitates
continued increases in Soviet military power.
Stated very simply the Soviet theory of detente would place
unilateral restraints upon the United States and seriously hinder any
American action that would threaten Soviet ideological goals. Simultan-
eously, detente, from the Soviet perspective, would permit the U.S.S.R.
to conduct its foreign policy with almost no constraints as it is
designed with the objectives of securing "peace" and "freedom" for all
peoples. It was also argued that the Soviet theory of detente has also
been translated into practice. Having achieved the long sought after
military parity with the United States, the U.S.S.R. has used the threat
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Of a thermonuclear confrontation between the two superpowers as a
factor that would seriously hinder any direct American response to
hostile Soviet actions. Thus, it can be reasoned that the theory and
practice of detente has not only failed to diminish aggressive and
anti-Western Soviet activity but has allowed for its more active pursuit.
It was stated earlier that the history of Soviet-American
relations is, in fact, the history of Soviet-American detente. It can
also be argued that this history has been quite successful for the Soviet
Union and has been less than favorable for the United States. Prior to
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 the United States was not confronted
with any communist adversary. When the first communist government
came to power it initiated detente as a desperation policy that would buy
the necessary time to ensure its survival. Amidst the background of
detente the Soviet Union was able not only to ensure its own preservation
but to watch over the spread of communist control to many other nations.
In time, detente lost its necessary defensive and protective character
and became the means by which the Soviet Union could further proliferate
socialist/communist influence. In 1981 the United States is confronted
with a number of communist adversaries as the alignment of world forces
is indeed in favor of the socialist world. The historical progression
from 1918 to 1981 that was inspired by detente can logically continue
as long as detente remains the dominant East-West and Soviet-American
activity. The non-communist world is the minority socioeconomic system
in 1981. It can be argued that the continued adherence to detente, as
defined by the U.S.S.R., by the United States will continue to foster
the demise of the non-communist world of nations.
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